

CIRCULAR LETTER

OF

CHILTON ALLAN,

To His Constituents,

In the Congressional District

COMPOSED OF THE COUNTIES

OF

FRANKLIN, WOODFORD, FAYETTE, & CLARKE,

IN THE STATE OF

KENTUCKY.

WASHINGTON:

PRINTED BY JONATHAN ELLIOT, PENN. AVENUE.

1835.

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CIRCULAR LETTER
OF
CHILTON ALLAN,
TO HIS CONSTITUENTS.

Washington City, Feb. 2d, 1835.

Fellow Citizens:

In the tranquil seasons of regular government, the circular of a public servant, to his constituents, is, for the most part, merely descriptive of the common current of legislation, and the execution of the laws. But the period, during which it has been my lot to serve you in Congress, has been distinguished by a succession of extraordinary events, that have shaken the pillars in the temple of your liberty, to their deepest foundations. In one state nullification rose up in the habiliments of peace, and being unopposed, even by remonstrance, succeeded in striking down the laws, and treaties, and judicial power of the United States. In another state, we saw the monster nullification buckling on its hostile armor, preparing to light the torch of civil discord, and to oppose forcible resistance to the execution of the laws. At other times we have beheld the gathering flood of federal power, rising high above, and spreading wide over the embankments of the constitution.

These momentous events have thrown us back upon first principles, and made it our duty to resurvey the partitions and boundaries of authority.

The two opposite tendencies in our governments, of anarchy among the members, and tyranny in the head, were early seen by our sagacious statesmen, and divided the people into the two great political parties, who have been conflicting ever since the formation of the constitution. Those who most dreaded anarchy, and the dissolution of the confederacy, sought in liberal constructions of the constitution, powers with which to make the federal arm sufficiently mighty to guarantee public order, and the integrity of the union. Those who most feared the despotism of the central power, made efforts, by strict and literal constructions of the fundamental law, so to pare it down, as to leave the states in all the plenitude of unrestricted

sovereignty. The opposing parties, each looking at but one side of the question, as parties are ever wont to do, have proceeded to dangerous extremes. Experience has fully proven that these two opposite tendencies do really appertain to our system of government, and that the consummation of either would be equally fatal to American liberty. On subjects so grave and important, so identified with the liberty of the people, I have endeavored to lay aside party spirit. My business is with principles; it is no part of my purpose either to praise or censure any party, or any man. I propose to look into our constitution and laws for the errors which lie at the bottom of the mischief, and point out the new guarantees we should take for the liberty of our children, in seasonable reforms. For while powers, dangerous to liberty, are delegated to rulers, it were worse than childish to imagine they will not be exerted by whoever may happen to be in the ascendant. Enlightened freemen repose upon good fixed principles, and not upon the forbearance of rulers to bring bad ones into action. That the power of the Federal Government has been extending itself from its formation up to this time, is a fact about which there is no dissenting voice. The great fundamental error which has facilitated this march of federal dominion, was committed in the year 1789. It was the unfortunate and fatal construction, that the officers of the American republic held their places at the will of the Executive. This forced construction—I say construction, for the power to remove officers is not delegated in any express grant of the constitution, has given our government an anti-republican tendency. It has made the officers independent of the people, and destroyed responsibility, which is the principle upon which our whole system rests. It has converted the servants of the people into the agents of the President. They are no longer the ministers of the law, but are bound to do their office according to his commands. The union of the appointing and removing power in the hands of one man, is the key-stone in the arch of arbitrary government throughout the world. It is the hold of this power that maintains Louis Philippe on the Throne of France. It is the possession of this power that enables the Emperor of Russia to give law to forty millions of people. It is the power to appoint and remove the officers of his kingdom, that enables the King of England always to command a majority of the representatives of the people in the House of Commons. The Commons vote him money, and with the use of money in all the forms of patronage, he contrives to control the ballot box, and thereby secures the re-election of his friends. This is nothing but Cæsar's principle in another form. He said with money he could get men, and with men he could get more money. By this purchase of men with money and money with

men, Cæsar was enabled to conquer the world. And it is by precisely the same principle that the great mass of the human race has ever been held in slavery by their rulers. Looking below the outward forms, and coming to the springs and principles that propel the political machine, the appointing and removing power is the lever by which the strength of the few has every where overcome the strength of the many. The union of those powers in a single hand is the deep and broad foundation of a privileged order—the foundation of a distinct interest between the officers and the people—between the governors and the governed. The people have an interest that the government should be cheap, but those who are independent of the people, and live upon the Treasury, have an interest that it should be extravagant. The people have an interest to have a President with limited and defined powers, but it is the interest of the officers dependant on his will, that the power which dispenses favors among them, should be boundless, for the more it is augmented, the more they hope to share in its benefits and bounties. We shall see here what has been seen every where, the renewal of the old contest between the rulers and the people. What is the history of nations but a history of the oppression of rulers, and the suffering and resistance of the people. Over the face of the whole earth, in all ages, we behold these two separate interests in perpetual conflict. Whether it be possible so to divide power between government and people, as to guarantee public order and public liberty, is an undecided question—I say undecided, because no nation that has ever existed under the sun, has been able permanently to preserve its liberties from the encroachments of the power of its own government.

If freedom and slavery be compared in regard to numbers, time and place, it will be found that freedom has not been enjoyed by one in a hundred of the human family: that its residence upon earth has been but a few centuries, and confined to but few countries. In the contest between the few and the many, the few in the long run have every where triumphed over the many. Under this view of the subject shall we pass heedlessly forward? Shall we shut our eyes, and prematurely rush into the common grave in which has been buried the liberty of nations? Shall we close our ears to the distant clanking of the chains of slavery, and quietly wait until the rivets are put through and fastened? Shall we lay the flattering unction to our souls, that we have a grant from heaven, that our liberty shall be rescued from the common doom, and made immortal? Or rather shall we not act upon the solemn conviction, that the duration of our independence does depend upon the vigilance and wisdom with which we guard it? It seems difficult, at first view, how the few

can contrive, under the forms of our constitution, to govern the many. A few illustrations will make it plain. It will not be many years before there will be a hundred thousand federal officers in the republic. Now the great body of the people at their homes, on their farms, and in their work shops, not being eye-witnesses, have to judge of the men and measures of their government upon evidence. These hundred thousand officers will be interested witnesses, and will go among the people, and give voluntary evidence that all their chief does is right and proper.

This army of officers all holding their places by one will, all having one interest, being all moved by one command, can easily by their united power and influence, crush any one who dares to raise his voice in behalf of the people, and who would tell them the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Who could stand before the systematic attacks and slanders, and accusations, of legions of interested accusers, dispersed over the whole land, seconded and supported by a press, fed from the same crib, and acting by the same command?

In the warfare that will be carried on by the rulers, against the people, one primary object will be to hunt down and destroy, and thrust out of their way, all public men who are advocates of popular rights. Every true patriot will be held up to public scorn as the vilest culprit. In the history of the machinations, and stratagems of the officers of government to increase their own emoluments, and perpetuate their own power, it is no new expedient to put the friends of the people out of their way. The history of the Grecian republics, is filled with examples, which disgrace almost every page of the fall of the purest patriots under the fraud and violence of the enemies of liberty. They banished Aristides, murdered Phocion, and imprisoned Miltiades. When Mark Anthony, Octavius, and Lepidus, were about to divide the Roman empire, and destroy the liberties of their country, their first step was to make out lists of the statesmen, and patriots, (among whom was Cicero,) who must first be put to death. The manners of the world have changed; then they made short work of it, by taking heads off. Now they have to arrive at their object, by a slower process, by false accusations; supported by interested witnesses. The public press which ought to be the ally of liberty, will be bought over by the hundreds of thousands of dollars of governmental patronage, and will give the same interested testimony.

This powerful league, in possession of the government, and public treasure, and whose influence extends to every house in the nation, and who are united for the purpose of living in ease and splendor, upon the sweat of the poor man's face; will *profess* all the while to be the

exclusive and devoted friends of the people, and thus the confiding community will be deceived, and under this deception vote for the friends of usurpation. It is thus that the few, contrive to govern the many. Thus it is that under the forms of a free constitution, they will commence their conquests upon the public liberty. The power of removal is the political lion in our system—a lion that long slept, but when aroused from his slumber, has laid every barrier prostrate that was placed around him. In the pure days of the republic, and in the simplicity of his heart, Mr Madison thought that the power of impeachment would be a sufficient check upon the removing power. The power of impeachment against the appointing and removing power—against the power that has the dispensation of the honors and treasure of the nation, experience has fully shewn would be just about as efficient as would the strength of the wren or snow bird to resist the force of the eagle. This power is a Sampson, that all of the constitutional ropes and withes cannot bind, and unless his locks be speedily clipped, he will lay hold of the pillars of the temple, and heave our liberties into ruins.

The veto power, and the privilege of going into the halls of Congress with the appointing power in his hands, will sooner or later place the legislative power at the feet of the Executive. General Jackson did not express the danger too strongly, when he said that so long as the President retained this power, that corruption would be the order of the day. If it shall be impossible to impress the country with a sense of the impending dangers; if these fundamental errors, which experience has developed in our system, shall be suffered to come to maturity, many of the present generation may live to see the last days of the republic. But if the sanctity of legislation shall be secured from Executive invasion, and the officers of the land shall be made responsible to the people by a timely reform, the vessel of state will be righted, and be restored to its republican tack. The popular authority, in the enactment of laws for the common good will be revived, and the representative principle again exalted.

I say nothing of many other abuses, for they are the consequences of those already pointed out. The principle that the officers of the Republic are the President's servants and dependant on his will, necessarily subverts the power of the people, and places the public treasure, the legislative, and judicial power in his hands. To suppose that the people can retain their power over their government with this principle at the bottom of it, is just as rational as it would be to believe that animal life could be sustained without vital air.—The vital principle in a republic, is the responsibility of public functionaries to the people. Destroy the dependence of the public offi-

ers upon the people and their power is gone, and the republic is at an end, except the name.

To restore the power of the states and the people, it is necessary that the representatives of the states should have the same share in removals that they have in appointments.

The introduction of the representative principle is all that has elevated, distinguished, and made secure the modern edifice of liberty above the rude and clumsy structures of antiquity. It is to this representative principle that freemen must cling for safety. But how is this principle to be preserved? by no other means than by intelligence and justice, in the appointing and removing power.—The people, and the executive, bring their power to bear on the government in the selection and removal of public functionaries. And here is the foundation of the maxim, that a republic can exist only in a nation where intelligence and virtue have the ascendancy.

But if in judging of the conduct of representatives, no regard is had to justice; if no regard is had to the manner in which they have discharged their duty; the strong incentive to upright conduct is taken away, and the value of the representative principle destroyed.

Behold one result of this stupendous and all engulphing power of removal, as displayed in the Post Office department! I allude not to its administration by any particular individual, but to the principles upon which it is organized. Its operations extending from the centre, to every part of the circumference of the republic with the rapidity of the winds. In the possession of the political, commercial, and social correspondence of the whole country; employing the services of over thirty thousand men, all guided by, and dependant on, one irresponsible man, it is the most potent, and will become in the hands of any party, the most dangerous political engine in the world.

But there are other reasons why executive power should be reduced to dimensions compatible with liberty. In proportion as this power shall expand and tower above restraint, it will become more seductive in the eyes of vaulting ambition; and the danger will be increased that our liberty will perish under the blows of rival aspirants for its attainment.

Why have all writers agreed, than an elective monarchy was the worst of all the forms of government? It is because the prize is too high, too tempting, for the weakness of human nature. Such elections have ever degenerated into corruption and violence, because, the aspirants for power, like Macbeth, were willing to sell their souls for a crown.

I shall not divert your attention by any allusion to ordinary legislation; for why should you pause to brush away the dust, or sweep

down the cobwebs in the apartments of the political mansion; when every effort should be directed to repair the breaches in the foundation.

The march of federal power has displayed itself, also in the multiplication of federal officers, and in the continual increase of the expenses of the government.

The following table will shew the annual progressive increase in the public expenditures from the year 1791 to 1834, inclusive.

1791	-	\$7,207,539	1806	-	\$15,070,993	1821	-	\$19,090,572
1792	-	9,141,569	1807	-	11,292,392	1822	-	17,676,592
1793	-	7,529,575	1808	-	16,761,584	1823	-	15,314,171
1794	-	9,302,124	1809	-	13,867,225	1824	-	31,898,538
1795	-	10,435,069	1810	-	13,319,986	1825	-	23,585,804
1796	-	8,567,776	1811	-	15,601,808	1826	-	24,103,398
1797	-	8,626,012	1812	-	22,279,121	1827	-	22,656,764
1798	-	8,619,517	1813	-	39,190,520	1828	-	25,459,479
1799	-	11,077,043	1814	-	38,028,250	1829	-	25,044,358
1800	-	11,989,739	1815	-	59,582,493	1830	-	24,585,281
1801	-	12,273,376	1816	-	48,244,495	1831	-	30,088,446
1802	-	15,276,084	1817	-	40,877,646	1832	-	34,356,698
1803	-	11,258,983	1818	-	55,104,875	1833	-	24,257,298
1804	-	12,624,646	1819	-	24,004,199	1834	-	25,591,390
1805	-	13,727,114	1820	-	21,763,024			

I voted last year for a reduction in the salaries of the public officers, to the estimated amount of eight hundred thousand dollars. And I voted this year against a proposed increase of salaries to the amount of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars.

My convictions of duty in relation to the reduction of the expenses of the government do not arise so much from considerations connected with economy, as from those relating to the power of the government and the liberty of the people. However important the disbursement of the large revenues, of the republic, may be in other respects, it is more so, as a question of power. The amount of this central power, depends on the number of offices, and the amount of salaries in its gift, twenty thousand offices worth five millions, would confer just half as much power, as forty thousand worth ten millions.

I am, therefore, for a large reduction in the expenses of the government, for the purpose of lopping away its redundant power, and to elevate the authority and influence of the people.

In any government, no matter by what name it is called, where the offices are more numerous, and more valuable than those in the executive gift, than those immediately in the gift of the people, the executive power will soon become stronger than the power of the people. If the number of federal offices and the amount of compensation, of which, the people have the direct disposal, be compared with those of which the executive has the gift, the people's share would be about as one is to one hundred and seventy five. Hence,

we see the public servants that are elected by the people, generally, willing to quit the service of the people, and go into the executive department, because places in the executive department are worth several times as much as appointments under the people. The president can come into congress with a foreign minister's appointment in his hand, worth \$9000, and an outfit of 9000, and the people's business is abandoned—With a collector's commission, or that of a marker or gauger, or weigher in a custom house, he can take away the servants of the people. The power of the people is exerted through their agents, to restore their power, it is necessary that the situations of their immediate servants should be as desirable as the posts of the agents of the President.

It is no answer to say, that the president is himself responsible to public opinion, every four years; because his power and patronage will secure his reelection and the appointment of his successor. There will not be one time in a hundred, that a popular president will not be able, in effect, to transmit his power to his favorite.

But there are other countrolling views on the subject; when the salaries of the federal officers are placed far above what the states can afford to pay, the attention of the most competent men, is drawn away from the service of the states, and in proportion, as state power and influence is thus impaired, additions are made to federal sway.

The following table will exhibit the salaries paid by the several states to their governors and judges, and the population of each state, to wit:

States.	Governors.	Judges highest cts.	Judges next to highest.	Populati'n.
Maine,	\$1,500	\$1,800	\$1,500	599,450
New Hampshire,	1,200	1,400	1,200	269,326
Vermont,	750	1,175		280,652
Massachusetts,	3,666	3,500	1,800	910,408
Rhode Island,	400	650	550	97,199
Connecticut,	1,100	1,100	1,050	297,675
New York,	4,000	2,000	1,250	1,918,608
New Jersey,	2,000	1,200	1,100	330,000
Pennsylvania,	4,000	2,666	2,000	1,548,233
Delaware,	1,333	1,200	1,000	76,748
Maryland,	3,500	2,200		447,040
Virginia,	3,333	2,700	1,500	1,211,405
North Carolina,	2,000	2,500	2,000	727,987
South Carolina,	3,500	3,500	2,500	531,185
Georgia,	3,000	2,100		516,825
Alabama,	2,000	2,100		309,527
Mississippi,	2,500	2,000	2,000	136,621
Louisiana,	7,500	5,000		215,739
Tennessee,	2,000	1,800	1,300	681,904
Kentucky,	2,000	1,500	1,000	687,917
Ohio,	1,000	1,200	1,000	937,903
Indiana,	1,000	0,700		343,031
Illinois,	1,000	1,000		157,445
Missouri,	1,500	1,000	1,000	140,455

Several inferences of great practical value can be drawn from foregoing table, from it we can collect what is the public opinion of the people of the twenty four States in regard to the salaries of their highest officers, but in order to get the full value of the information imparted by this document let us contrast it with the following to wit:

A table showing the salaries of certain Officers and the expences of certain departments of the Federal government for the year 1833:

President of the U. States	- - - - -	\$25,000
Vice President	- - - - -	5,000
Secretary of State	- - - - -	6,000
Clerks and Messengers in the office of the Sec. of State		21,479
Contingent expences of the office of the Sec. of State		25,009-86
Secretary of the Treasury	- - - - -	6,000
Clerks and Messengers in the office of the Secretary of the Treasury	- - - - -	17,887-43
First comptroller of the Treasury	- - - - -	3,791
Clerks & Messengers in the office of the first comptroller		20,700
Second comptroller of the Treasury	- - - - -	3,000
Clerks and Messengers in the office of the second comptroller	- - - - -	10,450
First Auditor of the Treasury	- - - - -	3,750
Clerks and Messenger in the Office of the first Auditor		15,059
Second Auditor of the Treasury	- - - - -	3,000
Clerks and Messenger in the office of the Second Auditor		17,783-83
Third Auditor of the Treasury	- - - - -	3,250
Clerks and Messenger in the office of the third Auditor		23 687
Fourth Auditor of the Treasury	- - - - -	3,000
Clerks and Messenger in the office of the fourth Auditor		17,051-53
Fifth Auditor of the Treasury	- - - - -	3,250
Clerks and Messenger in the office of the fifth Auditor		13,865,77
Treasurer of the United States	- - - - -	3,250
Clerks and Messenger in the office of the Treasurer of the United States	- - - - -	7,321-50
Register of the Treasury	- - - - -	3,250
Clerks and Messengers in the office of the register of the Treasury	- - - - -	25,883-10
Commissioner of the General land office	- - - - -	3,250
Clerks and Messengers in the General land office		21,970-16
Contingent expences in the general land office		13,158-41
Extra aid in the general land office	- - - - -	11,481-67
Solicitor of the Treasury	- - - - -	3,791-68
Clerks and Messenger in the office of the solicitor		4,279-20
Contingent expences of the office of the Secretary of the Treasury	- - - - -	10,000
Secretary of War	- - - - -	6,000
Clerks and Messenger in the office of the sec'y at War		25,058
Commissioner of Indian affairs	- - - - -	2,848
Temporary clerks in the pension bureau including contingencies	- - - - -	33,039
Secretary of the Navy	- - - - -	6,000
Clerks and Messenger in the office of the Secretary of the Navy	- - - - -	14,523

Post Master General	- - - -	6,000
Two assistants at \$2,500 each	- - - -	5,000
Clerks and Messengers in the office of the Post Master General	- - - -	41,100
Additional clerks hired in the post office department for 1831 and 1832	- - - -	34,477
Contingent expenses of the office of the post master genl.	- - - -	7,500
Custom house in the city of New York	- - - -	200,041-83
Furniture for the President's House	- - - -	20,000
Completing the regulation of the grounds and planting south of the President's House	- - - -	4,660
Pedestal Wall, railing and footway at the north front of the President's House	- - - -	10,000
Conducting water in pipes and construction of Reservoirs and Hydrants at the President's House and public offices	- - - -	12,423
Minister Plenipotentiary, Salary \$9,000 out fit \$9,000	- - - -	18,000
Collectors at Boston	} The following are a few specimens taken from the Custom House	4,009
Gauger		3,714,81
New York City collector		4,400
Weigher		3,422
Marker		3,879
Measurer		2,762
Philadelphia collector		4,400
Weigher		6,997-49
Measurer		2,674-17

And by perquisites, and extras, many of these officers receive from \$6000 to 8000 dollars a year.

The foregoing table exhibits only a few of the large drops in the ocean of federal expenditure.

The federal government pays a weigher in the custom house more than the state of New York, with a population of near two millions, pays its governor—a mere marker and gauger, and many of the subordinate officers here in the departments, receive each nearly twice as much as the governor of Kentucky, with a population of 687,917 souls. The door-keepers here receive as much as is paid to the judges of the court of appeals of Kentucky, and the waiters in the offices, receive as much as our circuit judges.

While this disparity exists between state and federal compensation, it is obvious that there will be a preference to serve the nation, rather than the states.

Able, faithful, and talented men, are essential to the maintenance of the power and authority of the state governments.

The experience of faithful public servants is the most valuable part of the public property. In a republic of vast extent, the people cannot quit their homes, and come together to carry on the government—they must do it by representatives. The success of the experiment, the liberty of the people depend upon a sacred regard to all the principles which should bind representatives and consti

ents together. While the representative is a faithful centinel upon the watch tower of the constitution, and the people are guided by justice in all their judgments of his conduct; while they stand by uphold and support the true servant, and punish the traitor, the republic is safe. Almost every where we see men holding the highest offices in the states, anxious to give them up and enter into the service of the nation. With a view to counteract this tendency, and to preserve and defend themselves, a few of the states have brought their salaries up in competition with the federal government. Louisiana with only a population of 215,739 determined not to be cut done, and lately, two of her most distinguished citizens left the national councils to serve their state. I know it is fashionable in what is called the higher circles of life, to advocate large and generous salaries to public officers; many scholars and statesmen agree in such views, and there are hosts of idlers in the towns and cities, who repeat and affect to approve of what they understand to be fashionable among the great—but according to my experience there is more practical wisdom among the plain industrious part of mankind. It is a universal opinion among that class of men, whose advice I choose to follow, that economy ought to be observed in the public expenditures. There are many who denounce this as prejudice, and assert that such an opinion in the people proceeds from parsimony; but those who thus reason have taken but a superficial view of the subject. An opinion that is so universal, and so long entertained, has a deeper and a broader foundation. The very people who entertain this opinion, and who are ridiculed for their parsimony, are, when occasion calls for it, liberal and open-handed. We have seen them submit without a murmur, to the payment of millions of debt occasioned by the war. The truth, that a government to be free must be cheap, is proven by all history, the people therefore when they are advocates for a cheap government, are advocates for a government with limited powers, and the ascendancy of their own authority; and a pure administration of the laws. There is another radical mistake on this subject: the public business has always been better done by men with moderate compensation than by those who have extravagant pay. In the days of Washington when a book-keeper received but \$1000, he staid in his office and always had his business up.

But when the wages are raised to 3 or \$4000, the officer turns politician, quits his office, neglects his business, and goes out to tell the people how to vote at their elections, so that he may retain his office, and have his salary increased still higher. The effect of large salaries will be to create an organized corps to superintend the politics of the country.

Now I believe the people entirely competent to elect their repre-

representatives without the aid of federal officers, and the slanderous handbills and publications with which the country is filled every year, before the elections.

I would admonish these officers by reducing their pay, to stay in their offices, and attend to their duty, as they did in the pure days of the republic.

Again when the salaries of the federal officers are placed so far above the profits of all the common pursuits of life, they will become objects of general desire and ambition—this city will become the general theatre, to which crowds of office seekers will flock from all quarters to make fortunes. There will be fifty applicants for every office, and the efforts for success will degenerate into servility and will assimilate the President's mansion, filled with countless scores of kneeling flatterers, to a European court, where competitors will contest their way to power and emolument by all the means of intrigue and submission. This is altogether incompatible with that inflexible republican independence, which should ever characterise our people and government: these evils could be corrected by reducing the pay of federal officers to what could be earned in the service of the states, or in the common pursuits of life—examples are already cited up in argument selected from the practice of European monarchies, to justify the augmentation of the salaries of our public functionaries, for the avowed purpose of enabling them to reciprocate the courtesy and hospitality of foreigners in European style. The extravagance of the salaries of the officers at the seat of government, has enabled them to ape the manners of foreign courts, and has introduced in the style of living a wasteful prodigality; and disfigured the simplicity of our republican institutions, by the exterior forms and shows of Royalty.

How can you cut down this giant power that is now above the laws, and stronger than the constitution, so effectually as by striking at the very core of its heart—at the money upon which it feeds and grows and is made strong—yes, it is money that is the life and blood, and muscle, and bone of power.

With a view to give a clear conception of the magnitude of the power and patronage of the Federal Government, which is conferred by the enormous expenditures of public money, I will present the subject uninvolved in the mysteries of the usual mode of calculation.

For the year 1832, the total expenditures of the government, were thirty-four millions, three hundred and fifty-six thousand, six hundred and ninety-eight dollars. Allowing twelve dollars to the pound, the whole weighed two millions, eight-hundred and sixty-two thousand and fifty-eight pounds. Allowing two thousand weight to each, it would load fourteen hundred and thirty-one waggons. Allowing fifty yards for each one to move on, it would make a train of teams,

stretching over the distance of forty miles, or as far as from Frankfort to Winchester.

From 1791 to 1834 inclusive a period of forty-four years, there has been collected from the people, and expended by the government, eight hundred and ninety-two millions, fifty-three thousand five hundred and thirty dollars. Allowing twelve to the pound, would make seventy-four millions, three hundred and thirty-seven thousand, seven hundred and ten pounds.

Divide this into loads of two thousand pounds weight each, and there would be thirty-seven thousand, one hundred and sixty-eight loads. Allow fifty yards for each to move on, and you have a train of teams stretching out, one thousand and fifty-five miles, or as far as it is from Lexington to Boston.

This letter is written in discharge of what I hold to be the duty of every public man, to give the people due and timely warning, of whatever may in his judgment jeopardise their liberty. But if this be the duty of every public servant, it is especially mine. Being myself one of the people, having been raised at the plow, and in the workshop; having been unsupported by either wealth or kindred; I feel bound by every just and sacred obligation, never to neglect, or to forget the interest of the generous community, to whose kindness I am indebted for the distinguished honor of having represented enlightened freemen fourteen years. Judging from all past history, I early foresaw the contest which would arise between the governors and the governed; therefore I never sought an executive appointment believing every service which I could render, was due immediately to the people, because I am indebted to them for what little knowledge I possess; for their partiality placed me in situations to obtain it.

I feel conscious that in what I have said to you, I have been actuated by no unworthy party motive. As to mere party spirit, I have seen enough of its pernicious tendency in the course of my public life to detest it. I have seen party spirit break up the harmony of communities, and destroy the kind and social relations of life. I have seen it taint the fountain of legislation, and crush the best interests of the country. I have seen it bring the union of these states, to the very verge of dissolution. I have constantly acted towards parties upon the hypothesis, that the great body of both were equally honest, equally patriotic, and would be equally willing to give their blood and treasure to defend the country. Among brethren inhabiting the same land, members of the same political community, agreeing in so much that is essential to the preservation of liberty, I have even felt more inclined to draw closer the cords which bind them to together, than to scatter among them the fire brands of hate and discord.

In regard to the President, having been one of twelve in the Senate of Kentucky, who voted in the negative on the resolution to instruct our members of Congress to vote for him. in this act, having followed the lead of no man, being guided alone by the unbiased dictates of my own mind; (for in this case the party with which I then acted, generally left me,) my motives and sincerity having never been questioned: I have never felt under any temptation to make myself conspicuous in the ranks of party. by opposing him for mere party effect. I have left that course to those who aided in elevating him to power, and after having approved of the principles of his administration, retired from him, not having realized their *golden* anticipations.

After the public voice had, by all the forms of the constitution, placed him in the Presidential chair, I determined to treat him as the Chief Magistrate of the Nation, and support him, whenever, in my judgment, he was right. Accordingly, on the most trying occasion during his whole administration, when he most needed assistance in his conflict with Nullification, I gave him my support with as much cordiality as if he had been the President of my own choice.

After having experienced so long the forbearance and kindness of his friends in my district, it would be unnatural that the censure which I have been compelled to bestow on parts of his administration, should, in any degree, have proceeded from personal unkindness to him or them.

Those who chuse to make a trade of politics, who notice well the current of the winds, and always float along with majorities, who get good appointments and high salaries, have an easy time of it. Believing that the liberty of your children and my own depended on a strict adherence to the constitution, it has been my hard lot to toil in minorities. I stood five years by the Constitution of Kentucky, in a minority before it was restored, and I have been here four years in a minority who were making efforts for the restoration of the Federal Constitution to its original limitations. Every candid man will see how difficult it has been for me to pass through such difficult service in high party times, without giving offence. It fell to my lot to make the first speech that was made in the Kentucky Legislature, against the reorganizing act; and the first that was made against the bill for placing six Judges in the Court of Appeals. The duty was also imposed upon me of drafting the law that finally restored the constitution. Those who may have taken exception to these, or any other of my political acts, should recollect, that I obeyed the will of my constituents; and while I freely expressed my own opinions, I never impeached the motives of others.

But I have been more than compensated for all the afflictions and troubles which I have endured in the public service, during the most violently agitated periods in the civil history of our state and nation, by the good fortune of having been sustained by a just and generous people. I never desired any other reward, than the pleasure of having done my duty, and the approbation of my constituents. Accept, fellow citizens, my grateful acknowledgements for the confidence with which you have honored me.

CHILTON ALLAN.
