xt759z908r39 https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt759z908r39/data/mets.xml Military Historical Society of Massachusetts. 1881 books b92-264-31852156 English J.R. Osgood, : Boston : Contact the Special Collections Research Center for information regarding rights and use of this collection. Peninsular Campaign, 1862. McClellan, George Brinton, 1826-1885. Peninsular campaign of General McClellan in 1862 / papers read before the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts in 1876, 1877, 1878, and 1880 ; printed by the Society. text Peninsular campaign of General McClellan in 1862 / papers read before the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts in 1876, 1877, 1878, and 1880 ; printed by the Society. 1881 2002 true xt759z908r39 section xt759z908r39 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN OF GENERAL McCLELLAN IN I862 PAPERS READ BEFORE THE MILITARY HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF MASSACHUSETTS. IN i876, i877, 1878, AND i88o PRINTED BY THE SOCIETY VOLUME I. BOSTON JAMES R. OSGOOD AND COMPANY i88i COPYRIGHT, 1881, BY JOHN C. ROPES. Stereotyhed and Printed by Rand, Avery, & Co., liosion, Mass. PREFACE. T HE following papers, all of which relate to the Penin- sular Campaign of Gen. McClellan in 1862, were prepared for the Military Historical Society of AMassa- chusetts, and have been read at its meetings. This Society was formed in January, 1876. Its chief object is the investigation of questions relating to the late War of the Rebellion. Papers (or reports) are prepared by committees appointed to investigate given questions, and are read before the Society; after which they may be- come the subject of discussion and of criticism. The papers thus furnished are, of course, written from different standpoints; and it is hardly necessary to say that no one but the writer is responsible for the state- ments in his own productions. Besides the present volume, the Society hopes to pub- lish soon a series of papers on the Campaign of Gen. Pope in Virginia in 1862. Of the other papers prepared for the Society, a few have already been, or soon will be, published, or privately printed. iii PREFACE. The work of the late Commodore Foxhall A. Parker, on the Battle - of Mobile Bay, was originally, as his preface states, read before this Society on Dec. 10, 1877. A paper read before the Society by Col. Benjamin WV. Crowninshield, on the Battle of Cedar Creek, was privately printed in 1879. A paper read before the Society on Oct. 8, 1877, by Joliii C. Ropes, Esq., oil the Campaign of Waterloo, will appear in the Atlantic MIonthly in June of the present year. And the forthconing work of Col. Theodore A. Dodge, oin the Campaign of Chancellorsville, consists of papers which were read before the Society in 1880 and 1881. A list of the members of the Society, and of the papers which have been prepared for it and read at its meetings, is added. JOHN C. ROPES. THEODORE LYMAN. FRANCIS WV. PALFREY. Executive Committee. BOSTON, April 11, 1881. WV OFFICERS. PRESIDENT. BVT. MAJOB-GEN. GEORGE H. GORDON. SECRETARY. BVT. CAPT. EDWARD B. ROBINS. POST-OFFICE Box 2&55, BOSTON. EXECUTIVE CO-nFlT TEE. JOHN C. ROPES, ESQ. COL. THEODORE LYMAN. BVT. BRIG.-GEN. FRANCIS W. PALFREY. This page in the original text is blank. M E M B E RS. Lieut. C. W. AMoRY, Late Second Massachusetts Cavalry. Bvt. Capt. NATHAN APPLETON, U.S.V., Late Second Lieutenant, Fifth Massachusetts Battery. Bvt. Major-Gexn. WILLIAM F. BARTLETT,' U.S.V., Late Brigadier-General, U.S. V. Major HENRY P. BOWDITCII, Late Fifth Massachusetts Cavalry. Bvt. Col. BENJAMIN W. CROWNINSHIELD, U.S.X., Late Major, First 3assachusetts Cavalry. Bvt. Brig. -Gen. CASPA CHOWNINSHIELD, U.S.V., Late Colonel, Second Massachusetts Cavalry. Bvt. Brig.-Gen. GREELY S. CURTIS, U.S.V., Late Lieutenant-Colonel, Frst Massachusetts Cavalry. Bvt. Major-Gell. CHARLES DEVENS, U.S.V., Late Brigadier-General, U.S. V. BVt. Col. THEODORE A. DODGE, U.S.V., Captain, U.S.A., Retired; Brevet Lieutenant Colonel, U.S.A. Dvt. Lieut.-Col. WILLIAm R. DRIVER, U.S.V., Late Major and A. A. G., U.S. V. Deceased Dec. 17,1876. il viii MEMBERS. Bvt. Col. THOMAS F. EDMANDS, U.S.V., Late Lieutenant-Colonel, Twenty-fourth .lfassachusetts Infantry. Ass' t. Paymaster CHARLES FAIRCHILD, Late U.S.N. Bvt. Col. CHARLES W. FOLSOM, U.S.V., Late Captain and A. Q. Jr., US. V. Brt. Major-Gen. GEORGE H. GORDON, U.S.V., Late Brigadier-General, U.S. V. Major JoHns C. GRAY, Late Judge-Advocate, U. S. V. Lieut.-Col. FRANKLIN HAVEN, Jun., Late Second California Cavalry. Capt. FRAN-CIS L. HIGGINSON, Late Fifth Massachusetts Cavalry. Bvt. Lieut.-Col. HENRY L. HIGGINSON, U.S.V., Late Major, First Massachusetts Cavalry. Ass' t-Surgeon JOHN HROMANS, Late U.S.N. and U.S.A. Bvt. Lieut.-Col. CHARLES P. HORTON, U.S.V., Late Captain and A. D. C., U.S. V. Capt. JoiN LATIHROP, Late Thirty-fifth Massachusetts Infantry. Co]. THOMIAS L. LIVERMORE, Late Eighteenth New Hampshire Infantry. Lieut.-CoI. GEORGE H. LYMAN, Medical Inspector, U.S.A. Col. THiEODORE LYMAN, Late Volunteer A. D. C. to M21ajor-Gen. George G. Meade. Bvt. Col. AUGUSTUS P. MARTIN, U.S.V., Late Captain, Third Massachusetts Battery. MEMBERS. Bvt. Major HERBERT C. MASON, U.S.V., Late Captain, Twentieth Massachusetts Infantry. Capt. RICHARD S. MILTON, Late Ninth Massachusetts Battery. Bvt. Brig.-Gen. FRANCiS A. OsnoRN, U.S.V., Late Colonel, Twenty-foutr th Massachusetts Infantry. Bvt. Brig.-Geni. FRANCIS WV. PALFREY, u.S.V., Late Colonel, Twventieth Massachusetts Infantry. Bvt. Brig.-Gen. JoaN C. PALFREY, U.S.A., Late Captain, Corps o( Engineers, U.S.A. ; Chief Engineer, Thirteenth Army Corps. BVt. Brig.-Gen. CHARLES L. PEIRSON, U.S.V., Late Lieutenant-Colonel, Thirty-ninth Massachusetts Infantry. Capt. WILLIAM E. PERKIN.S,' Late Second Ml assachusetts Infantry. Capt. CHARLES H. PORTER, Late Thirty-ninth Massachusetts Infantry. Bvt. Brig.-Gen. SAM1UEL A. PORTER,2 U.S.V., Captain U.S.A., Retired. Brt. Major, U.S.A. Bvt. Brig.-Gen. SAMtUEL 31. Qui-Ncy, U.S.V., Late Colonel, Seconjd Massachusetts Infantry. Bvt. Capt. EDWAr.D B. RworiN-s, U.S.V., Late First Lieutenant, Twentieth Massachusetts Infantry. Bvt. Brig.-Gen. ALFRED P. ROCKWELL, U.S.V., Late Colonel, Sixth Connecticut Infantry. JOHN C. ROPES, Esq. Lieut. AN-DREW 11. RUSSELL, Ordnance Corps, U.S.A. 2 Deceased April 21, 1850. 1X I Deceased Jan. 18, 1879. x 3MEMUBER S. Bvt. Brig.-Gen. HENRY S. RUSSELL, U.S.V., Late Colonel, Fifth Massachusetts Cavalry. Bvt. Major WILLIAM P. SHREVE, U.S.V., Late Fir.t Lieutenant. Second Sharpshooters, IJ.S. F. Bvt. Lieut.-Col. J. LEVwS STACKPOLE, U.S.V., Late Mfajor, U. S. V., Judge A drocate. Bvt. Bri.-Gen. ROBERT H. STEVEENSON', U.S.V., Late Colonel, Twenty-fourth M1assachusetts Infantry. Bvt. Capt. HOWARD STOCKTON, U.S.A., Late First Lieutenant, Ordnance Corps, U.S.A.; Captain and A. A. D. C., U.S.V. Bv'. Lieut.-Col. WILLIA1 WV. SWAN, U.S.A., Late Captain, Seventeenth Infantry, U.S.A. Capt. GEORGE A. THAYER, Late Second Mlassachusetts Infantry. Bvt. Brig.-Gen. CHARLES F. WALCOTT, U.S.V., Late Colonel, Sixty-first ilassachusetts Infantry. Brev. Brig.-Gen. STEPHEN 31. WELD, U.S.V., Late Colonel, Fifty-sixth M1assachusetts Infantry. Bvt. Brig.-Gen. CHARLES A. WHITTIER, U.S.V., Late Lieutenant-Colonel and A. A. G., U.S. V.; Captain, Nine- teenth Infantry, U.S.A. Major-Gen. JAMEs H. WILSON, U.S.V., Late Lieutenant-Colonel, Thirty-fifth Infantry, U.S.A.; Brer. .lM(jor-General, U. S.A. CORRESPONDING MEMBERS. Col. ARCHER ANDERSON, Late A.A.G., C.S.A. Major-Gen. FRANCIS C. BARLOW, U.S.V. HENRY ARMITT BROWN,' Esq. Bvt. Major-Gen. JOHIN M. CORSE, U.S.V., Late Brigadier-General, U.S. V. Commander GEORGE DEWEY, U.S.N. Capt. OSWALD H. ERNST, Corps of Engineers, U.S.A. Brig.-Gen. Lucius FAiRCHILD, U.S.V, Late Captain, Sixteenth Infantry, U.S.A. Capt. GUSTAVUS V. Fox, U.S.N., Late Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Capt. GEORGE R. GAITHER, Late First Virginia Caralry. Bvt. Major-Gen. GEORGE S. GREENE, U.S.V., Late Brigadier-General, U.S. V. Major-Gen. WINFIELD S. HANcocx, U.S.A. 1 Deceased Aug. 21, 187d. xi xii CORRESPONDING MIEM1BERS. Capt. JED. HOTCHKISS, Late Captain of Engineers, C.S.A. First Lieut. MCIIENRY HOwARD, Late A. D. C. and A. L G., C.S.A. First Lieut. HENRY W. IhUBBELL, First Artillery, U.S.A.; Late Second Lieutenant Fortieth New York Infantry. Bvt. Major-Gen. A. A. HIUMPHREYS, U.S.A., Late Chief of Engineers, U.S.A. Rev. J. WILLIAMI JONES, D.D., Late Chaplain, C.S.A.; Secretary Southern Historical Society. J. W. KIRKLEY, Esq. Lient.-Gen. JAM IES LONGSTREET, C.S.A. Major-Gen. WILLIAM MAHONE, C.S.A. Capt. W. GORDON MCCABE, Late Captain of Artillery, C. S.A. Major-Gen. IrtvIN McDOWELL, U.S.A. Bvt. Major-Gen. M. C. MEIGS, U.S.A., Late Quartermaster-General, U.S.A. Bm. Col. FRED. C. NEWHALL, U.S.V., Late M1ajor and A. D. C., U.S.A.; Lieutenant-Colonel and A. A. G., U.S.V. Bvt. Lieut.-Col. JoHN P. NICHOLSON, U.S.V., Late First Lieutenant, Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania Infantry. Le COMTE DE PARIS. Bvt. Major-Gen. JOHN G. PARKE, U.S.A., M1ajor, Corps of Engineers, (2S.A. Commodore FOXHIALL A. PARKER,1 U.S.N. I Deceased June 10, 1879. CORRESPONDIG JME3MBERS. xiii Bvt. Brig.-Gen. L. H. PELOUZE,1 U.S.A., M1fajor and A.A. G., U.s. A. Bvt. Lieut.-Col. WILLIA M BROOKE RA.WLE, U.S.V., Late Captain, Third Pennsylvania Cavalry. Capt. RICHARD ROBINS, Late Thirty-Ninth Infantry, U.S.A. Bvt. Lieut.-Col. ROBERT N. SCOTT, U.S.A., Mfajor, Third Artillery, U.S.A. Capt. N. S. SIALER, Late Independent Kentucky Battery, Field Artillery. Bit. Brig.-Gen. JAMES SHAW, Jun., U.S.V., Late Colonel, Tenth Rhode-Island Infantry. Gen. WILLTAM T. SHERmIAN, U.S.A. Bvt. Major-Gen. E. D. TOWNSEND, U.S.A., Late Adjutant-General, U.S.A. Lieut.-Col. CHARLES S. VENABLE, Late A. A. G., C.S.A. Bvt. Brig.-Gen. FRANCIS A. WALKER, U.S.V., Late Lieutenant-Colonel and A. A. G., U.S. V. Bvt. Major-Gen. G. K. WARREN, U.S.A. Bvt. Mlajor-Gen. ALEXANDER S. WEBB, U.S.A., Late Brigadier-General, U.S. V.; Brevet Major-General, U.S. V. Lieut. SKIPWITH WILMER, Late A. D. C., C.S.A. First Lieut. EDMUND L. ZALINSHI, Fifth Artillery, U.S.A.; Late Second Lieutenant, Second N. Y.H.A. I Deceased June 2, 1878. This page in the original text is blank. REPORTS. SLNCE its organization, papers have been read before the Society on the followine subjects: - THE PENINSULAR CAM lPAIGN OF 1862. 1. GE:N. MCCLELLAN'S PLANS FOR THE CA-MPAIGN OF 1862, AND THE AL- LEGED INTERFERENCE OF TIIE GOVERNMENT WITH THEM. JOHN C. ROPES, ESQ. 2. THE SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. GEN. JOIN C. PALFREY. 3. TEE SEVEN-DAYS BATTLES:- Mechanicsville, Gaines's Mill, White Oak Swamp, Glendale, GEN. FRANCIS W. PALFREY. 4. THE SEVEN-DAYS BATTLES: - Malvern Hill. GEN. FRANCIS w. PALFREY. 5. THE PERIOD WHICH ]ELAPSED BETWEEN THE FALL OF YORKTOW1N AND THE SEVEN DAYS' BATTLES. GEN. FRANlCIS W. PALFREY. 6. COMMENTS ON THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. GEN. CHARLES A. WHITTIER. xv xvi REPORTS. GEN. POPE'S CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA IN 1862. 1. THE CONDUCT OF GEN. MCCLELLAN AT ALEXANDRIA IN AUGUST, 1862; THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF HIS COMMAND; AND His ALLEGED NEGLECT TO SUPPORT THE AItmiM OF GEN. POPE. LIEUTr.OL. FRANKLIN HAVEN, JUN. 2. THE SnIE SUBJECT. GO. STEPHEN M. WELD. 3. THE CHARACTER OF GEN. HALLECK'S MIILITARY ADDMINISTRLTION IN THE SUMMER OF 1862; WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO T1lE REMIOVAL, BY HIS ORDER, OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOM1AC FROM1 THE PENINSULA, AND TO THE SHARE WHICH BELONGS TO HIM IN THE CAMPAIGN OF GEN. POPE. GEX. SAMUEL M. QUINCY. THE OBJECTS AND GENERAL PLAN OF THE CAM1PAIGN. 4. FIRST PART, TO THE CROSSING OF THE RAPPAHANNOCK RiVER. LiEuT.-COL. CHARLES P. HORTON. 5. SECOND PART, TO THE 28TH OF AUGUST. JOHN C. ROPES, ESQ. 6. THIRD PART, TO THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN. JOHN C. ROPES, EsQ. 7. THEc CASE OF FITZ JOHN PORTER. Gnx. STEPHEN M. WELD. 8. REVIEW OF THE ABOVE REPORTS. COL. THEODORE LYMANT. 9. THE SAME SUBJECT. COL. THOMAS L. LIVERMORE. 10. THE TWENTY-SEVENTH DAY OF AUGUST, 1862. GOn. GEORGE II. GORDON. 11. THE HEARING IN THE CASE OF FITZ JOHN PORTER. JOHN C. ROPES, Esq. THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 1. THEI DISASTER TO THE ELEVENTH CORPS AT CHANCELLOBSVILLE. COL. THEODORE A. DODGE. REPOR TS. xvii 2. THE FIGHT OF SUNDAY, MIAY 3, 1863, AT CHANCELLORSVTLLE. COL. THEODORE A. DODGE. 3. SEDGWICK AT CHANCELLORSVILLE. COL. THEODORE A. DODGE. TlHE ANTIETAM CAMPAIGN. THE ALLEGED DELAY IN THE CONCENTRATION OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, AND THE REASON-S WHY THE SECOND CORPS DID NOT ENTER INTO THE ACTION EARLIER ON THE DAY OF THE BATTLE. MlzoR JOHN C. GRAY. THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 1. THE NUMBERS OF THE Two ARMIES. GEN. GREELY S. CURTIS. 2. THE CAUSES OF THE CONFEDERATE FAILURE. GEN. GREELY S. CURTIS. 3. PICKETT'S CHARGE. LIEtIT.-COL. WILLAIMl R. DRIVER. THE CAMIPAIGN OF 1864. 1. THE USELESSNESS OF THE MAPS FURNISHED TO THE STAFF OF THE ARMnY OF THE POTuXAC PREVIOUS TO THE CAMPAIGN OF MAY, 1864. COL. THEODORE LYMAN. 2. TEE BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. COL. WILLIAM W. SWAN. 3. THE SAME SUBJECT. COL. THEODORE LYMAN. 4. THE OPERATIONS OF TEE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC FROM THE SEVENTH TO THE ELEVENTH DAYS OF 'MAY, INCLUSIVE. GEN. CHARLES L. PIERSON. 5. THE CAPTURE OF THE SALIENT AT SPOTTSYLVANL., MAY 12. GEN. FRANCIS C. BARLOW. 6. THE SAME SUBJECT. Cs. McHENRY HOWARD, C.S.A. 7. REVIEW OF GEN. BARLOW'S PAPER ON THE CAPTURE OF THE SAXIENT. GEN. LEWIS A. GRANT. xviii REPORTS. 8. Tnz OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC FROM MAY 13 TO JUNE 2, INCLUSIVE. MAson WILLIAM P. SHREVE. 9. THE FAILURE TO TAKE PETERSBURG ON JUNE 15. COL. THEODORE LYMAN. 10. THE SAmE SUBJECT. COL. THOMAS L. LIVERMORE. 11. THEI FAILURE TO TAKE PETERSBURG ON THE SIXTEENTH, SEVENTEENTH, AND EIGHTEENTH DAYS OF JUN-E. JOHN C. ROPES, ESQ. 12. THE OPERATIONS AT BERMUDA HUNXDRED ON THE SIXTEENTH, SEVEN TEENTH, AND EIGHTEEN:TH DAYs OF JXNE. GEN. FRA XCIS A. OSBORN. 13. THE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE WELDON RAILROAD IN AUGUST. CAP. CHARLES H. PORTER. 14. THE OPERATIONS OF THE CAVALRY OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC IN 1864. GEN. JAMES H. WILSON. 15. THE SAME SUBJECT, GE-N. JAES H. WILSON. 16. THE ]BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. COL. BENJ. W. CROWNINSHIELD. THE BA TTLE OF M1OBILE BA Y, A UG. 5, 1864. COYXODoB1! FOXHALL A. PARKER. THE CAM.lPAIGN OF 1865. THE NUMBERS OF GEN. LEE'S ARMY AT THE OPENING OF THE CAM- PAIGN, MWARcH 25. COL. THEODORE LYMAN. THE CGAM.1PATIGV OF WATERLOO. TE GROUCHY CONTROVERSY. JOHN C. ROPES, Esq. TABLE OF CONTENTS. 1. G EN. MCCLELLAN'S PLAN-S FOR THE CAMPAIGN OF 1862. AND THE ALLEGED INTERFERENCE OF T11E GOVERN-MEN-T WITHT THEM. By JOHN C. ROPES, ESQ. 2. THE SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. By Brr. BRi..-GFN. JOHN C. PALFREY, U.S.A. 3. THE PERIOD WHICH ELAPSED BETWEEN THE FALL OF YORKTOWN AND THE BEGIN-NING OF THE SEVEN-DAtYS BATTLES. By BvT BRIG-GEN. FRANCIS W. PALFREY, U.S.V. 4. THE SEVEN-I)DAYS BATTLES. -To MALVEBN HILL. B Brr. BRIG-GEN-. FRANCIS V. PALFREY, U.S.V. 5. THE BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL. By BVT. BRIG.-GEN. FRANCIS W. PALFREY, U.S.V. 6. COMMEN-TS ON TIHE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. By BvT. BRIG.-GEN. CHARLES A. WHITTIER, U.S.V. This page in the original text is blank. I. GENERAL McCLELLAN'S PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN OF 1862, AND THE ALLEGED INTERFERENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT WITH THEM. BY JOHN C. ROPES, EsQ. COMXrITTEE. JOHN C. ROPES, Esq. Bvt. Brig.-Gen. JoHN C. PALFBEY. Capt. WILLIAm E. PERKINS. Bead before the Society on Monday evening, Norv. 1S, 1876. This page in the original text is blank. THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. GEN. McCLELLAN'S PLANS. T HE committee to whom wvas referred the follow- ing subject of inquiry, namely, "Gen. McClellan's plans for the campaign of 1862, and the alleged interfer- ence of the Government with them," have the honor to report as follows: - Late in the autumn of 1861, Gen. McClellan seems to have definitely renounced whatever plan he had before entertained of an advance upon the enemy's positions at and near.Manassas Junction, and to have begun to enter- tain the plan of a movement of the bulk of the Army of the Potomac down Chesapeake Bay, and of operating upon the communications of the rebels with Richmond. Your committee will consider, - 1. What his plans actually were; 2. What, in the judgment of your committee, were their merits and defects; 3. What authority Gen. McClellan bad to carry them out; and 4. The alleged interference of the Government with them. THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. First, then, what were his plans for opening the cam- paign of 1862 On Feb. 3, 1862, Gen. McClellan addressed a letter to President Lincoln, in which he advocates landing at Urbana on the Lower Rappahannock,' which is, he says, "-but one march from West Point, the key of that region, and thence but two marches to Richmond. A rapid movement from Urbana," he goes on to state, "would probably cut off Mlagruder in the Peninsula, and enable us to occupy Richmond before it could be strongly re- enforced. Should we fail in that, we could, with the co-operation of the navy, cross the James, and throw our- selves in rear of Richmond, thus forcing the enemy to come out and attack us.' In this plan we observe two things:- 1. That Gen. McClellan expected to strike the enemy's communications with Richmond. Not only was Magruder to be cut off, but Richmond itself was to be occupied before the army at Manassas Junction could fall back to cover it. 2. That crossing the James was a contingency regarded as possible.2 In this letter of Feb. 3, 1862, he also says, "The worst 1 Gen. McClellan's Report, p. 47, Gov. ed.; N.Y. ed., p. 105. 2 It is reasonable to suppose that this possibility would have entered into and formed a part of his subsequent plan, had not the rebel iron-clad Merrimac closed the James River to our forces at the time his second plan was formed. Crossing the James is, however, suggested in Gen. IMcClellan's letter to Mr. Stanton of March 19, 1862, after the Merrimac had come oat. (Rep., p. G3, Gov. ed.; N. Y. ed., p. 133.) 4 GE-. McCLELLAN'S PLANS. coming to the worst, we can take Fort Monroe as a base, and operate with complete security, although with less celerity and brilliancy of results, up the Peninsula." For reasons not stated in his Report, but which Mr. Swinton I considers satisfactory, and due entirely to the falling-back of the rebel army behind the Rappahannock, the plan of going to Urbana was abandoned, and the plan of taking Fort Monroe as a base was definitely adopted. This plan was stated in some detail in a letter from Gen. McClellan to the Secretary of War.2 HEADQUARTERs ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, THEoLOGICAL SEXARt, VA., March 19, 1862. SIR, -I have the honor to submit the following notes on the proposed operations of the active portion of the Army of the Potomac. The proposed plan of campaign is to assume Fort Monroe as the first base of operations, taking the line of Yorktown and West Point upon Richmond as the line of operations, Richmond being the objective point. It is assumed that the fall of Rich- mond involves that of Norfolk and the whole of Virginia; also, that we shall fight a decisive battle between West Point and Richmond, to give which battle the rebels will concentrate all their available forces, understanding, as they will, that it involves the fate of their cause. It therefore follows, - 1st, That we should collect all our available forces, and operate upon adjacent lines, maintaining perfect communication between our columns. 1 Army of the Potomac, pp. 90, 91. 2 Report, Gov. ed., p. 62; N.Y. ed., p. 132. 5 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 2d, That no time should be lost in reaching the field of battle. The advantages of the peninsula between York and James Rivers are too obvious to need explanation: it is also clear that Vest Point should as soon as possible be reached, and used as our main d6p6t, that we may have the shortest line of land transportation for our supplies, and the use of the York River. There are two methods of reaching this point:- 1st, By moving directly from Fort Monroe as a base, and trusting to the roads for our supplies, at the same time landing a strong corps as near Yorktown as possible, in order to turn the rebel lines of defence south of Yorktown; then to reduce Yorktown and Gloucester by a siege, in all probability involving a delay of weeks perhaps. 2d, To make a combined naval and land attack upon York- town the first object of the campaign. This leads to the most rapid and decisive results. To accomplish this the navy should at once concentrate upon the York River all their availa- ble and most powerful batteries: its reduction should not, in that case, require many hours. A strong corps would be pushed up the York under cover of the navy, directly upon West Point, immediately upon the fall of Yorktown; and we could at once establish our new base of operations at a distance of some twenty-five miles from Richmond, with every facility for devel- oping and bringing into play the whole of our available force on either or both banks of the James. It is impossible to urge too strongly the absolute necessity of the full co-operation of the navy as a part of this programme. Without it the operations may be prolonged for many weeks, and we may be forced to carry in front several strong positions, which, by their aid, could be tuned without serious loss of either time or men. 6 GEN. McCLELLAN'S PLANS. It is also of first importance to bear in mind the fact already alluded to, that the capture of Richmond necessarily involves the prompt fall of Norfolk; while an operation against Nor- folk, if successful, as the beginning of the campaign, facili- tates the reduction of Richmond merely by the demoralization of the rebel troops involved: and that, after the fall of Norfolk, we should be obliged to undertake the capture of Richmond by the same means which would have accomplished it in the begin- ning, having, meanwhile, afforded the rebels ample time to per- fect their defensive arrangements; for they would well know, from the moment the Army of the Potomac changed its base to Fort Monroe, that Richmond must be its ultimate object. It may be summed up in a few words, that, for the prompt success of this campaign, it is absolutely necessary that the uavy should at once throw its whole available force, its most powerful vessels, against Yorktown. There is the most impor- tant point, - there the knot to be cut. An immediate decision upon the subject-matter of this communication is highly desir- able, and seems called for by the exigencies of the occasion. I am, sir, very respectfully, Your obedient servant, GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General. HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War. Three things are to be especially noted in this letter:- 1. That the principal idea of this campaign was not that of operating on the enemy's communications. The rebels will concentrate all their available forces between West Point and Richmond, where the decisive battle will be fought. 7 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 2. That the plan would, in Gen. MIcClellan's judgment, require in all probability many weeks for its accomplish- ment, and great and unnecessary loss of life, unless the co-operation of the navy was to be made in great force. The danger of a delay before Yorktown, if no combined operations should be attempted against it, seems to have been foreseen. 3. That Gen. McClellan expected altogether too much from the efforts of the navy. Your committee are of opinion, that, while the ships of war might have run past the enemy's works at Yorktown and Gloucester, they could not have assisted materially in reducing thew. Second, what were the merits and defects of these plans For a masterly sketch of the situation in which the young officer, who then commanded the armies of the United States (Gen. McClellan was only thirty-five years of age in December, 1861), found himself in the spring of the year 1862, your committee would refer to Mr. Swinton's chapter entitled "Plans of Campaigns," in his excellent work on the Army of the Potomac.' Nothing can be added to what is there said of the peculiar diffi- culties of an army-commander under a popular govern- ment; of the necessity of his recognizing the need of a perfect understanding with his political superiors; of his being something, at any rate, of a statesman; of the folly of his not accepting the situation heartily, and making the best of it. Nor can your committee do otherwise 1 Page 68. 8 GEN. McCLELLAN'S PLANS. than concur in Mr. Swinton's estimate of Gen. McClel- lan's character and capacity in these respects. Passing, then, from this aspect of the subject before us, let us consider the plans in themselves. We need not dwell on the first, or Urbana, plan (for it was never car- ried out), further than to say, that in the opinion of your committee it would have been a very hazardous under- taking to land an army of a hundred thousand men or more on such an entirely unprepared place as Urbana was. So large an army could not have been transported there in less than two or three weeks, and great difficulty would have been experienced in providing for the troops which arrived first. Moreover, the Comte de Paris re- marks1 on the difficulty of crossing the Dragon Swamp between Urbana and the York River, and, what is more important, on the impossibility, while Yorktown remained in possession of the enemy, of getting a new base of supplies at West Point. Gen. Barnard2 also remarks, that between Urbana and Richmond are the Tlattapony and Pamunkey Rivers, besides the Dragon Swamp; and furthermore, that Urbana is fifty miles from Richmond, while Fredericksburg is in a straight line hardly more, and Manassas Junction only eighty miles in a straight line, and only a hundred and twenty by rail. From these considerations Gen. Barnard deems it highly im- probable that Gen. McClellan could have succeeded in reaching Richmond or its vicinity before the army of Gen. Johnston could have covered it; and in this opinion 1 Histoire de la Guerre Civile en Amerique, vol. ii., p. 473, Paris ed. 2 Peninsular Campaign, p. 94, n. 23. 9 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. your committee, having in mind the three weeks at least (Gen. McClellan I says six weeks) which were required for the transportation of the aimy from Washington to Fort Monroe, and the peculiar difficulties of marching on the Peninsula, are entirely disposed to concur. It is true that Gen. McClellan himself, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War,2 was of a dif- ferent opinion. He "hoped," he says, "if proper secrecy was observed, to reach the vicinity of Richmond before they could concentrate all their troops there; that they could not get all their troops down from Manassas, etc., before we got there." No doubt this idea of striking the communications, and capturing the base of supplies, of the rebel army which was quietly observing Washington, was a fascinating idea, and quite in accordance with the laws of strategy, so far as concerned the object of the movement. But strategy is concerned only with possible things; and your committee are entirely of the opinion, that to suppose that Gen. Johnston would have been ignorant of the transportation of the army to Urbana, or, knowing it, would have so delayed falling back that Gen. McClellan could have got between him and Richmond, was absurd. The second plan, which took Fort Monroe for the base of operations, did not hold out any hope of operating on the enemy's communications. Gen. McClellan's language on this point is quite plain; and we shall quote it again, for we believe that an opposite idea has widely prevailed. 1 Report, Gov. ed., p. 162; N.Y. ed., p. 310. 2 Vol. i., p. 425, First Series. 10 GEN. McCLELLAN'S PLANS. Ile says in his official letter to Mr. Stanton, of March 19, 1862,1 "It is assumed . . . that we shall fight a decisive battle between West Point and Richmond, to give which battle the rebels will concentrate all their available forces, understanding, as they will, that it involves the fate of their cause." In this opinion Gen. McClellan was perfectly correct, no doubt. In reading Gen. Johnston's Narrative,2 we find no suggestion of the existence of any difficulty in bring- ing his army from the Rapidan to Richonwid in time for the defence of the capital. Gen. Johnston, in fact, urged upon Mr. Davis the desirability of bringing up from the Carolinas all the troops of the Confederacy, in order that the army of Gen. McClellan might be attacked by an overwhelming force; thereby showing that he had no doubt of his ability to delay for a considerable time the advance of our forces up the Peninsula. Now, bearing this in mind, that the plan of the Penin- sular campaign of Gen. McClellan, as conceived by himself, embraced a conflict with the entire rebel army before Rich- mond, or somewhere on the Peninsula, your committee are unable to find any great advantage in this plan over that of a campaign on the Rapidan or Rappahannock, except such as may perhaps result from the nature of the ground. It being, in round numbers, as far from Fort Monroe to Richmond as it is from Fredericksburg to Rich- mond; and it being admitted, that, although the enemy may be on the Rappahannock when our army is landing at Fort Monroe, they can get back to Richmond before a 11 I See ante, p. 5. 2 Page 108, et seq. THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. force marching from Fort Monroe can get there, -where is the advantage of starting from one place rather than from the other The facility for communication possessed by the enemy in the Virginia Central, Orange and Alex- andria, and Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroads, taken in connection with the length of time required to carry our army to the Peninsula, rendered the military situation, for all practical purposes, precisely the same as if the rebel army had been encamped in the vicinity of Richmond, where it could of course have formed line on the northern or on the eastern side of the city with equal facility, - unless, we repeat, the