xt7gqn5z6g1b_10 https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7gqn5z6g1b/data/mets.xml https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7gqn5z6g1b/data/50w29.dao.xml Woman's Democratic Club of Fayette County (Ky.) 0.68 Cubic Feet 2 boxes archival material 50w29 English University of Kentucky The physical rights to the materials in this collection are held by the University of Kentucky Special Collections Research Center. Contact the Special Collections Research Center for information regarding rights and use of this collection. Mary Shelby Wilson Woman's Democratic Club papers Women -- Kentucky -- Societies and clubs Women -- Suffrage Women -- Political activity -- Kentucky. Mary Shelby Wilson Woman's Democratic Club papers text Mary Shelby Wilson Woman's Democratic Club papers 2016 https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7gqn5z6g1b/data/50w29/Box_1/Folder_11/18074.pdf 1926 1926 1926 section false xt7gqn5z6g1b_10 xt7gqn5z6g1b a" a u‘ H ”—_T_——__—”“ A s A F E l l INTERNATIONAL POLICY : i 1 A N A D D R E s s l l BY I, l PROFESSOR JAMES T. SHOTWELL E I, ('nrncu'iu l-Znuiuumvm: [or lnlvl'nniiuml l'mnvu ; . I l l BEFORE TIIE DEMOCRATIC ; , WOMEN'S LUNCHEON CLUB ; l OF PHILADELPHIA : l e I a l 3 r I |I i i! l i l E a i r 3 1 | 81 l i i l l I . l JANUARY TWENTYi—FIFTH, NINETEEN TWENTY—SIX ‘ l l l 1 l l l i E l 3, l l l l l l l V l l ' i ‘i f l I l I I 1 l l l l l I i A SAFE INTERNATIONAL POLICY 3. Address before the Democratic Women’s Luncheon Club, January 25, 1926 By PROFESSOR JAMES T. SHOTWELL i The other day, at a great luncheon in New York, I heard i a speech by a distinguished American banker in eulogy of 1’ Mussolini and in praise of the achievements of Fascism. I wish to begin my survey of the possibilities of American foreign policy by a comment on that speech. There were a . thousand men and women of rather unusual education and ; enlightenment who listened with hardly any outward sign ' of dissent, to the praise bestowed upon the great Italian 1 leader, and who applauded rather generously the thesis that Italians should be left free to choose their own form of ' government, and we should not judge them by our standards. i Now I shall have a word to say later about how free i the Italian people are to choose their own form of Fascism. l . But I want first to bear witness as well as the apologist for i Mussolini, to the splendid achievements of his administra— i tion. I am ready to admit, as any of us must who have i} travelled in Italy since the Fascist Revolution, that the gov~ ' ernment of Mussolini has done very remarkable things. It has achieved what had not been achieved in Italy under parliamentary government. The material development of i Italy, as a result of the stern, thorough—going measures ‘un— : der Mussolini, has been outstanding and even spectacular, It is very much admired by efficiency experts the world over, i and I have no desire to try in any way to discount that I great national achievement. Moreover, it is not only a ma: 1‘ terial development that Fascism has to its credit; there is a i [3] l l I spiritual development as well, one that appeals to me much more. They have galvanized into existence a new, vital ‘3' sense of patriotism, which calls for and receives an almost l idolatrous sacrifice on the part of the Italian citizens. This ii is a new thing in a country which had not yet fully de- {1 veloped its natiOnality; for Italy had kept much of its local 5 divisions, down to the Great War, and the smaller loyalty I of locality and faction had not sufficiently yielded before the . greater loyalty to the State. I myself saw the symbol of i this new Italy, the new spiritual Italy in the celebration by the Fascists a year ago or so in Rome, when they assembled from all parts of the country, and on a brilliant Sunday morning marched up the hill before the Quirinal before ‘ their king, who reviewed the procession from the balcony of j the palace. They came with glittering banners hearing all kinds of devices, symbols of the sense of communal adher— ‘V ence to a new conception of loyalty for the fatherland. It was a magnificent, inspiring spectacle. As these young 1 men—~and they were mostly young men—as these youths l marched by, they were humming a refrain of which the first i and last words had a strange antithesis. The opening line i of the refrain was “Benito Mussolini," and the last word v was “Liberta.” Now, there is no possibility of joining these I two words by any rhetoric nor by any enthusiasm that the Fascists may bring around the name of their great leader. 1 For the one thing they have sacrificed in Italy for this move- ment is liberty. At the present time in Italy there is no l liberty of the kind that we think most precious in the de- I velopment of this country, the liberty of'the individual of l free—speech and the right to protest against even an effi- l cicnt government. And I am going to ask you as a body of 1 students of politics to consider the bearing of such an i, experiment in efficiency with its immediate results in 1121- l tional development, upon the institutions of liberty, which f democracy seeks to establish and maintain. I i There is a parallel for Italian efficiency, not an exact ' parallel, but much closer than one would think at first, in the old Germany before the war. There was an efficient 1 [4] l l state whose achievements in government, in national and 5 local administration, marked it out in such a way that the 5 German citizens of the pre—war period felt it so safeguarded, 5 their cultural heritage so furthered their new science, with 5 its application of invention and discovery to the needs of 5 daily life, that it was almost a crusading duty to impose 5 both form and content—their Kultur—upon the rest of the . world. It was an efficient State which had brought into its 5 cities ideas of hygiene and of local control, such as were 3 unknown in some of the neighboring States that were our allies in the late war. It was a country that had safe~ guarded its workmen and aged by social insurance and gave ’ ample scope to popular education. I can’t take time to . remind you of further ways by which efficient Germany had really carried the devices of civilization, if not farther than other countries, at least to the very parallel with the far- ; thest point of advance. And then what happened? There 5. was not the fullest degree of participation in the organiza- 5 tion of government of administration, because there had 5 been, two generations ago, a loss of liberty in our sense of the word, and because of their very efficiency, they failed to realize, and do not yet realize, that they lacked the effec- f tive instruments of political control, without which liberty cannot function except to check and frustrate good and 5 bad policies alike. Germany passed over into the great ad- venture. I am not speaking now of relative war guilt at 5 all; that would take more than another hour. But there is 5 no doubt at all that the German people had no appropriate 5 means for expressing its will in terms of responsible action. 5 This was not the fault of anything in 1914. It was because back in the 60’s Bismarck, by his remarkable success—the 5 success of a single genius—overthrew by a fascist act the 5 parliamentary control of the executive. I want you to 5 weigh this thing. Bismarck’s assertion of his power, his 5 defiance of his parliament, was a fascist act. It destroyed 1 the safeguards of effective parliamentary action which Eng- 5 land, France, and this country maintained. And even now Locarno on the German side of the negotiations is put , through more by the inspired leadership of the German [5] government than by the participation or anticipatory partici- pation of the German people. Now I take it that in a democratic country, dedicated to the principles of self— government from its very beginning, we ought to be more aware than we seem to be, of the danger of the laudation of enterprises of that kind which have, for the present at least, ‘ brought prosperity and spiritual rejuvenation to Italy. The long vision of history must be kept in mind, not merely im— l mediate advantage. 1 The only thing that makes the Fascism of Italy safe, l even for itself, is that there is _now a League of Nations I as a great cautionary body in Europe, an organization of 1 nations against which the adventurous elements in Fascism { now run up, and find to their surprise that a new interna- . tional safeguard for peace exists to supplement the irre- ‘ sponsible national structure. Can you conceive of what the l Mussolini government would have been doing in the pre— war days, how it would have been tempted, almost beyond the power to resist, by this militant spirit of nationalism, to join with others in “glorious” adventures, to extend the power of its country beyond its frontiers by joining up, either with a France or a Serbia, as against Germany and 1 Austria or with a Germany militant as against the others. The Mussolini government, had it existed in 1904 to 1914, would have endangered at every critical turn in the diplo- j macy of that period, the peace of the world. It narrowly 3 escaped endangering the peace of the world, as you know, f in the Greek-Italian incident. Mussolini learned in that incident the strength of the co—operative movement for 1 peace, which has recently become incarnate in the Treaty ‘ of Locarno. It is the League of Nations rather than Fas~ i cism which makes Italy safe for the world and itself at the l present time. ‘. Now, what about applying the lesson of European his- ‘ tory to ourselves? Is there a way to secure efliciency for democracy and at the same time safeguard its responsible » organs of government? We, in this country, have had glimpses of an even greater problem. We stated once be- fore the world that we wish to see the world made safe [6] for democracy; and, in spite of cynic and partisan, that inspired phrase still has meaning. But we learned before the war was over, that such a task could not be taken over by inspired leaders alone, no matter how great their in— spiration. We have learned since the war, I hope, that it , can’t be achieved by organization alone, by the injection into the living tissue of international affairs of a single con- , stitution, to be there left to work unsupported by new and , continued effort. The organization of the League of Na— ] tions as outlined in the Covenant, if left by itself, and not I made to function according to the real and necessary in- , terests of the nations composing it, will not achieve safety " of democracy. There is only one way by which we can 1 bring these two great safeguards, inspired leadership and ‘ institutional organization, to work through the ages for 3 the purposes which I suppose are most dear to all Amer- icans—and that is by the education of democracy. It is a slow and long process; but it is a process that gains in swiftness with each accretion to the forces engaged upon it. At first, however—and we are at the beginning—it is a slow, I long, discouraging thing. For. the first thing that we must do in political education is to get rid of our prejudices; and if we get rid of our prejudices, we haven't much left! It is the most radical step we can take. Most people’s ' reasoning, you know——including my own, I suppose—is i hardly more than an excuse for our prejudices. If you i actually take up a problem on which a person says he has i made up his mind, it generally means adjusting new facts to existing prejudices. A long weight of habit lies behind ‘ this process which we call reasoning, pressure of previous i convictions on all sorts of other things, all involved in a l vast maze which we call our intelligence. Much of it is , subconscious, eluding analysis, and political ideas are mainly i of this kind. The weight of habit, of custom, of prejudice, has been in a large degree imbedded in the political parties » of our country. Just as I am willing to admit that I have these prejudices in my own make-up, I think that the Democratic as well as the Republican party, might admit as well that it is largely made up out of the persistence [71 from past generations of habitual ways of seeing things. Political parties largely embody the habitual prejudices that come from other incidents and are now no longer ap— plicable in the world of today. If we are going to make the world safe for democracy, we have to make democracy itself a reasonable expression of thinking people who can bring to the problems, as they come before us one after the other, an unprejudiced, or relatively unprejudiced solu- tion, which would be applicable for the given situation 9 at the time. t Now in this country this process of political education, ‘ while still inadequate, has begun. In its more recent phase of conscious effort, it dates back to the last decade of the , nineteenth century, when in the field of civic and municipal affairs, and more especially in the world of big business, a group of brilliant youngjournalists stirred the conscience of America with what was called the muck-raking articles in New York journals. I recall very clearly the strength of their appeal—coinciding in point of view with political movements of popular protest in the Middle West. When this attack on our complacent home life was made, the rich man was the symbol of success in our literature; even in our Sunday schools and sermons. Wealth itself was 21 nor— mal goal for the ambition of the young American. In two i or three years’ time this changed. The insurance scandals had been aired to the full, and a new assertion of the social conscience—if one may use such a term—caused wealth henceforth to be justified by wealthy people as a social trust, something for which they owed the community an accounting. 5‘ That great moral movement of the ’90’s, which is still going on. has passed from the sensational or journalistic f sphere into the teaching of civics in the schools. Civics in our schools is a very recent thing. It concentrated at first i on this immediate issue of civic reform in the town, county and State—with minor attention to the Federal Government. And it was still absorbed in teaching the responsibility of citizenship in home affairs when in 1914 across this most helpful movement of democracy came the great tragedy of [8] the European war. It was largely because this threatened to imperil the progress made, that many of those who had been foremost in the movement for civic advancement and political education at home were keenly against America’s going into the World War. They felt instinctively and felt rightly, so far as this issue was concerned, that it was going to inject, to say the least, a new and terribly complex prob— lem, bring distant and strange things into the familiar hor—Vl y izon of our political thinking; that it would retard, if not I destroy, the political education already begun, which had in ‘ it the germs of the regeneration of this country. But there was no way to stop this new disturbing issue. The World , War revealed that henceforth it was impossible for any great country to stay out of a world complication of that kind; that even neutrals were so only in name, and that a nation so powerful as ours could not escape an international responsibility. While it is too soon for the historian to trace authorita- tively the complications of the World War, it is at least clear already that its contagion, the spread of the last World War from that little Balkan country where it began, was no chance event at all, but that was simply the revela- ‘ tion of the intricate interdependence of modern civilization, and that it would have been impossible for any great nation, to have stayed out of that conflict without very seriously endangering its own welfare. The war revealed that in a world of credit, of interlacing relationships, the countries of today are something more than the countries depicted on .1 the maps in the atlases studied in our schools, with their 5 clearly drawn political frontiers filled in with solid masses of color. I remember down in the Balkans asking the Fi- ‘ nance Minister of a certain State where his financial capital t was, and he said, ”Of course, it is London.” Another one said “Paris,” and so on. This being so, it was clear that their frontiers along the Danube were not the only frontiers of the country, for they extend as far across as the lines of credit reach. There is something of each country in the financial and commercial interests of others. ‘ [9] The geography of the modern world has never been de— scribed correctly; there are no atlasses to depict it, because the fo‘rces that represent that surplus of a nation's vitality which is the problem of politics, are forever moving back and forth. To give you an instance of what I have in mind: WheneVer a British ship—like the Majestic—sails into an American harbor under the British flag, there is about as much British Empire under that flag as in all the barren wastes of Baflin Land. Now, it was this interaction of na- tional interests in the modern world which was revealed for * us by the World War. If these illustrations are signifi— cant, they show that policies of isolation are no longer i sound. If the last war revealed with tragic consequences ,y the need for intelligently safeguarding our international as ' well as our national interests, we should find out in “the next war” to what a greater extent we are now involved in other people's affairs. The facts cannot be ignored; the precaution should therefore be taken. ‘ But you say, “The next war will not happen,” or if It does we can leave the belligerents to their fate. Let us see what happened last October and November and what prevented a war from happening. I was down in Bulgaria at the time of the Greek incident on the frontier, and I Would like to sketch for you in a word “the war that never happened.” Suppose that Bulgaria had marched against the Greeks when they came in there with an army across the hills of Macedonia, marching with full war forma- tion, with their batteries of artillery and all the appurte— nance for invasion, with the Bulgarians fleeing from them from sixty villages and more—suppose the Bulgarians had - replied, as'they would have done in the past, and had under- i taken to drive the Greeks back. Then when the Greek re— s‘erves were called in from Saloniki, suppose that the Serbs ll? found in the disorders of the war a pretext to take Saloniki, 5 which is their one possible seaport on the Aegean, and which the Greeks suspect them of covetiug even now. The Serb maneuvers in the mountains near that frontier, were said by the Greeks to be of the nature of a threat of mobili- zation. Suppose the Serbs did what the Greeks said they [10] were going to do, and marched down on Saloniki. That would likely involve the withdrawal of all reserves from their northern frontiers, and there is a government in Hun- gary—this is all supposition, remember—which could hardly refrain from pouncing at once upon those rich corn lands— rich like the fields in Indiana—that stretch from the Danube over to the Carpathians, long ruled by Hungary, held now by Serbia. Then, the moment Hungary dashed in there the _ Little Entente awakens to the fact that Jugoslavia is at- ‘ tacked by Hungary on the north, and all Slovakia is ’ aflame. On the east Roumania has to come in to fulfill its ‘ treaty obligations and protect its frontiers. And the mo— ( ment Roumania, comes in, Soviets cross that broken bridge that separates them from their lost land of Bessarabia, which they have never given up. Then the war spreads north. There is a treaty between Roumania and Poland against Soviet invasion of either one, and Poland has to ‘ attack Russia. The moment Poland attacks Russia, that corridor between East and West Prussia can't separate the Germans any longer; and the moment the Germans are in the corridor, what happens? France is over the Rhine to protect Poland. With France and Germany at war, the world is once more aflame. Now, that impossible story took place in 1914, and against its repetition stands what? The League of Nations. Recently this League of Nations has come into our lives in less imaginary ways. Just the other day, as a result of the Treaty of Locarno, the League put up to us the question how far we were prepared to go in the often re- ' peated proposal of this people to call and put through a real i disarmament conference. I put a good deal of emphasis on ii the word “real.” Fortunately this inquiry came out of a l setting labelled with a new name. It could be regarded as growing out of Locarno instead of out of the League; and around Locarno there was none of the old prejudice to which I made reference before. So the President of the United States called for the co—operation of the country in going to the preliminary study conference and although the word “League” was somewhere in the invitation, the [11] House of Representatives voted him the $50,000, 359 to one, and the Senate took only two minutes to pass the vote unanimously. This action indicates two things. It is the indication, I think, of a turn of the tide in this country, with reference to our policy of, self—effacement in interna— tional affairs; and also—and this is much more serious—it symbolizes an idea in America that the real way to get peace is to disarm. Now, it is this last point that I want to concentrate upon. It is held by most people in this country that if you get rid of armaments you are taking a thoroughgoing step which will insure peace; and that the way to insure peace is, therefore, to take that thoroughgoing step. And there i is an impatience with any nation that doesn’t share this conviction. There is a tendency to criticize France or Germany or England or Japan because they have some sense of the realities behind armaments. Now, what is this Disarmament Conference? What is its setting in the peace movement? Is it the beginning or the end of a process by which we shall have peaceful settle- ments of international disputes? That question is the ques- tion which the League of Nations has put to the world in the questionnaire. They sent around a questionnaire to the different governments and asked them, “What are arma— ments? What are their uses? Are there peace armaments and war armaments? When you propose disarmament, how much do you propose? Are you thinking of armaments used in war, or are you thinking of existing armaments in time of peace P” And these questions puzzled most people. I saw an account from a British paper in London, that the British were not only puzzled about it, but were rather enjoying a story that had come out about the way the questionnaire was prepared. It was said that a British . officer on the committee got bored with its philosophic dis- cussions and jotted these questions down as a joke, and the French took them up seriously and put them out before the world! And that story was cabled over to the New York Times. As a matter of fact, the reason that question— naire covers these enormously far—reaching fields, is that [12] we have never yet considered the problem of disarmament in its real setting. We have thought that it was simply a case of cutting out this or that battleship, of lessening the length of guns, or their elevation, of limiting the size of an army, and nothing more. But if you were living in France today, and you knew that across the Rhine—or, I will put it this way: Suppose you were in Philadelphia and you knew across the Delaware River there had grown up at Passaic Falls—where Hamilton wanted to have a great national factory—a factory turning out fertilizer from the nitrogen of the air at the rate of a thousand tons or more a day, and that the eighty engineers and sixty chemists and - twenty thousand workmen of that factory could readjust those retorts and the rest of the fairly simple apparatus, so that in a week’s time or so it would be one thousand tons a day of high explosive to fall on the city of Philadel- phia. Then you would wonder whether getting rid of 20% of your national guard had anything very serious to do with the question of disarmament. The French are putting up to us the realities not only of disarmament, but of the whole war machinery; and this fact has not yet reached the con— sciousness of this country. I will say in short that the one way to disarmament, as contrasted with the way to limit or reduce existing arma- ments—the one way to disarm the world is to build up the parallel for the war system which exists in the instruments of justice between nations; such instruments of conciliation and mediation, as already stand before the world in Court and League. There is no other way to bring disarmament than to have a substitute for armaments. It must be a way by which a co-operative world will proceed to recognize the rights and justice of other countries and not to enforce upon them, by the fascist act of army and navy, our ideas , of our justice and out right. We have to turn from that world—old process to a new interacting co-operative concern, community of nations, which is now coming into existence. I happen to have spent a fair number of years in the study of history, and just at this point I want to make clear that I have not forgotten the lessons of its narrative of [13] the experience of the past; for no historian can expect to see a new millenial era arise overnight, transforming nations in their most fundamental aspects. But all the same, I am convinced that we are turning a corner from the past; and that the process of co-operation for peace has begun to supplant the world—old rule of force. This new process now affects the public law of Europe through the Treaty of Locarno, and the Covenant of the League of Nations. But it has only just begun, and it is a process that cuts at a historical past so deeply rooted that it may take more generations to see its ultimate fruition than any of us would like to anticipate. That the movement is long and may be slow does not make it any the less real; and once i we are fully conscious of it, it should receive no less sup- port, no less ardent service upon the part of those to whom these matters of justice and of peace are real than if it were immediately realizable. We must learn to keep our faith in things that don’t materialize all at once. We mustn’t be discouraged because for a few years now, or it may be even longer, this country slowly learns its adjust— ment to this new world. It took the French Revolution one hundred years or more to make France democratic, but the forces released in 1789 slowly working through a population inherently much more conservative than ours, beat back from barricades a dozen times, came on with the gathering strength of an irresistible tide. They haven’t yet—no one in the world has yet—full liberty, equality and fraternity, but they have at last enshrined the ideals in the formal government of the Third Republic, and they are safe there in spite of the imputation of outsiders that France would surrender this thing to Fascist leadership. It took almost a hundred years for France to assure itself the great principles of the Revolution; one may reckon it from 1789 to 1879, when republicans finally and definitely won the re- public. It may take us perhaps a hundred years and more to realize the dream I have in mind, but during this period that dream must be realized step by step, by the par— ticipation of this government in every responsibility that comes its way, tending toward the realization of what I [14] think were the policies implanted in the sanctuary of liberty at the beginning of the country’s life. We have before us definitely now a question whether this country will go one little step in the path for the substi— tute for war; whether we will enter the World Court, even with reservations that almost render it ineffective, in my judgment. There is little hope for our effective work in the future unless this first step is taken now. But entry into the World Court is only one of a number of problems before us. Apart from that, we must decide exactly what we will do in this Disarmament Conference. We can take to that Conference two things: the mechanism of the . ' Washington Conference for limitation and reduction of armaments; and an American policy enabling the world to go ahead with the implied promise that we will not wreck their independent plans by inadvertence. This needs explanation; butlet us turn back to the Wash— ington method. It was good enough as far as it went in lessening this or that existing armament by a direct agree- ment of ratios between different countries. We can employ that device again, and keep it at work by attaching to it a continuing organization to ensure that in the future mutual recriminations between the signatories will not be fought out in the yellow press, but that they will be the subject of technical discussion between the signatories themselves. We can have, on the one hand, a technical and definite arithmetical process like the Washington Conference espe— cially in the reduction of naval armaments; but that will not by any means fulfill our obligations and responsibilities. For, if we really propose to get rid of armaments as a menace to peace, we are interested in the land armaments of Europe no matter what protestations we may make. Now, if the European powers proceed with the reduction of their armaments on their own basis, getting rid of their arsenals and reserves of supply, their Armstrongs, their Vickers, Creusots and the like—if they destroy these great arsenals for the production of armaments there, and still have access to Bethlehem Steel and to Detroit and to Pitts— burgh and to Waterbury, Bridgeport and all the rest for [15] private arms, manufactured and shipped through private traders protected by our neutrality even during wartime, then the whole dismantling of arsenals in Europe is a de— lusion and a snare. We must, therefore, face this situation. Do we want them to go on with a fraudulent pretense, fooling their people, while their arms experts from their general staffs make the necessary arrangements by which we become the European arsenal? There is a good deal to be said in favor of this, you know, from the standpoint of the arms traffic. It means very considerable addition to our manufacturing plant; but what does it mean afterwards? What tragedy are we heaping up in store for mankind and what responsibility as a great nation treasuring ideals for l which the blood of our citizens has been shed? That is a challenge to this country. How can we meet it? We can meet it partly by reconsidering our neutrality. We don’t need to participate in the law—enforcing, policing work of the League of Nations in Europe; but we can at least avoid becoming the accomplice of an aggressor. In case there is a war between two powers, both of which have signed an agreement like that of Locarno, the Presi— dent, acting upon joint resolution of both houses of Con- gress, can make proclamation that we shall not become the accomplice of an aggressor, self-confessed through the vio— lation of its own signature, in the refusal to submit its case to peaceful settlement as it had agreed. We can do that without much difficulty, because we have a precedent with reference to the arms traffic for China, in a case where there was internal disturbance, within the country itself. In the plan I propose, we reserve our sovereign rights by making our own President, through proclamation, the organ to establish the fact whether the circumstance has arisen in which an aggressor stands self- confessed by its violation of its own treaty. We reserve all our sovereign rights, but we cease to be the potential accomplice of the aggressor—a potential accomplice so great, so powerful with our resources, that our influence reaches back to the beginning of the planning for peace or war, and neutralizes and, as maintained at present, renders [16] almost nugatory every effort of peacebuilding in Europe itself. We tried to make the world safe for democracy by the way of war, by the sacrifice of our youth on the field of arms, and although the splendor of that sacrifice called out the vibrant spirit of America—you and I have experienced it in these tragic war years—it failed of its larger purposes. Why? Because, while there was Faith and Hope behind it, one cannot save democracy unless one adds to these the third element in the great Christian trinity of Faith, Hope and Charity. Not charity in the sense of liberal giving,