xt7msb3wtd0h_49 https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7msb3wtd0h/data/mets.xml https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7msb3wtd0h/data/72m2.dao.xml unknown 166 Cubic Feet 381 document boxes, seven textile items, three map folders, one artwork archival material 72m2 English University of Kentucky The physical rights to the materials in this collection are held by the University of Kentucky Special Collections Research Center. Contact the Special Collections Research Center for information regarding rights and use of this collection. Frederick Moore Vinson papers Economic stabilization. Elections -- United States -- Congresses. Judges -- Correspondence. Judges -- United States. Judicial opinions Judicial process -- United States Legislators -- Correspondence. New Deal, 1933-1939. World War, 1914-1918 -- Veterans. World War, 1939-1945. Lee v. Mississippi - no. 91 text Lee v. Mississippi - no. 91 2019 https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7msb3wtd0h/data/72m2/Box_191/Folder_21/Multipage5986.pdf 1947 1947 1947 section false xt7msb3wtd0h_49 xt7msb3wtd0h LEE 1). MISSISSIPPI. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on appeal, rejecting petitioner’s contention that the introduction of the testimony in question contravened his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. It stated that the conduct of the two unidentified officers alleged to have struck and threatened petitioner was, if true, indefensible and warranted condemnation. But it felt that “the issue of fact as well as credibility was for the trial judge upon such preliminary qualification, and we are not willing to disturb his conclusion.” — Miss. —, —, 29 So. 2d 211, 212. This constitutional contention was treated quite differ- ently by the court on the filing of a suggestion of error. It found that petitioner’s testimony at the preliminary hearing that he had been threatened prior to making the confession was entirely undisputed in the record. But it also found that petitioner had steadfastly testified, both at the preliminary hearing and at the trial on the merits before the jury, that he did not in fact admit to the city detectives that he had committed the crime. The court then stated: “If the accused had not denied having made any confession at all, we would feel constrained to reverse the conviction herein because of the fact that his testi- mony as to the threat made to him during the forenoon by the plain clot-hes men is wholly undisputed, the jailer not having been asked about this threat, and having testified only that he was not struck by anyone in his presence after his arrest. for this crime. But, we think that one accused of crime cannot be heard to say that he did not make a confession at all, and at the same time contend that an alleged confession was made under the inducement of fear.” —— Miss. —, —, 30 So. 2d 74, 75. The suggestion of error was accordingly overruled. The incomplete record before us precludes our deter- mination of whether petitioner did deny in the trial LEE 1). MISSISSIPPI. 3 court that he had confessed the crime.1 But assuming that he did so testify, we cannot agree with the court below that he was thereby estopped from asserting his constitutional right to due process of law. The impor— tant fact is that the oral confession was introduced, admitted and used as evidence of petitioner’s guilt. Not only may this confession have been influential in inducing the jury’s verdict, but it formed an essential part of the evidentiary basis of the conviction now under review. His alleged denial of the confession went only to the original issue of whether he actually made the confession, an issue that is no longer open. That question was at most a disputed one; but the jury resolved the matter against petitioner and, like the court below, we accept that determination. The sole concern now is with the validity of the conviction based upon the use of the oral confession. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment invalidates a state court conviction grounded in whole or in part upon a confession which is the product of other than reasoned and voluntary choice.2 A conviction re— 1The transcript of the trial on the merits is not before us. At the preliminary hearing on the voluntariness of the confession, the transcript of which is before us, petitioner stated in regard to the alleged confession: “I dOn’t know what all he asked and all I said, but I didn’t admit I did it.” He also denied having confessed various details of the crime. Such testimony, however, might be construed as nothing more than a layman’s inexact way of stating that his answers did not amount to a voluntary confession. But in the absence of the complete record, we express no opinion on the matter. 2Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278; Chambers V. Florida, 309 U. S. 227; Canty Y. Alabama, 309 U. S. 629; White v. Texas, 309 U. S. 631, 310 U. S. 530; Lomax V. Tamas, 313 U. S. 544; Vernon v. Alabama, 313 U. S. 547; Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219; Ward v. Texas, 316 U. S. 547; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143, 4 LEE 1). MISSISSIPPI. sulting from such use of a coerced confession, however, is no less void because the accused testified at some point in the proceeding that he had never in fact confessed, voluntarily or involuntarily. Testimony of that nature can hardly legalize a procedure which conflicts with the accepted principles of due process. And since our consti- tutional system permits a conviction to be sanctioned only if in conformity with those principles, inconsistent testi— mony as to the confession should not and cannot preclude the accused from raising the due process issue in an appro— priate manner. White v. Texas, 310 U. S. 530, 531—532. Indeed. such a foreclosure of the right to complain “of a wrong so fundamental that it made the whole proceeding a mere pretense of a trial and rendered the conviction and sentence wholly void.” Brow-21y. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278, 286. would itself be a denial of due process of law. The judgment below must be reversed. Since the Mis— sissippi Supreme Court upheld the conviction solely be— cause it thought petitioner was not entitled to raise the constitutional issue, we remand the case to that court so that it may definitively express its views on that issue. Reversed. 327 U. S. 274; Lyons V. Oklahoma. 322 U. S. 596; Malinski v. New York. 324 U. S. 401; Haley v. Ohio, — U. S. —. See, in general, Boskcy and Pickering, “Federal Restrictions on State Criminal Procedure," 13 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 266, 282—295. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 91.—OCTOBER TERM, 1947. Albert Lee, Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to the 2). Supreme Court of the State State of Mississippi. 0f Mississippi. [January 19, 1948.] MR. JUSTICE MURPHY delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves a question of procedure under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Does a defendant in a state criminal proceeding lose the right to contend that a confession was coerced because of his testimony that the confession was in fact never made? Petitioner, a 17—year—old Negro, was indicted by a grand jury in Mississippi on a charge of assault with intent to ravish a female of previous chaste character. During the course of the trial, the state offered the testi— mony of two city detectives as to an alleged oral confession obtained by them from petitioner. Objection was made that this confession had been secured as the result of duress, threats and violence inflicted upon petitioner by two unidentified police officers several hours prior to the confession. The jury retired and a preliminary hearing was held before the trial judge as to the voluntariness of this confession. After various witnesses appeared, in— cluding the petitioner himself, the judge concluded that the confession was voluntary and that the testimony in relation thereto was admissible. This testimony proved to be the crucial element leading to the jury’s conviction of petitioner. His sentence was fixed at 18 years in prison. LEE 1). MISSISSIPPI. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on appeal, rejecting petitioner’s contention that the introduction of the testimony in question contravened his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. It stated that the conduct of the two unidentified officers alleged to have struck and threatened petitioner was, if true, indefensible and warranted condemnation. But it felt that “the issue of fact as well as credibility was for the trial judge upon such preliminary qualification, and we are not willing to disturb his conclusion.” — Miss. —, —, 29 So. 2d 211, 212. This constitutional contention was treated quite differ— ently by the court on the filing of a suggestion of error. It found that petitioner’s testimony at the preliminary hearing that he had been threatened prior to making the confession was entirely undisputed in the record. But it also found that petitioner had steadfastly testified, both at the preliminary hearing and at the trial on the merits before the jury, that he did not in fact admit to the city detectives that he had committed the crime. The court then stated: “If the accused had not denied having made any confession at all, we would feel constrained to reverse the conviction herein because of the fact that his testi- mony as to the threat made to him during the forenoon by the plain clothes men is wholly undisputed, the jailer not having been asked about this threat, and having testified only that he was not struck by anyone in his presence after his arrest for this crime. But, we think that one accused of crime cannot be heard to say that he did not make a confession at all, and at the same time contend that an alleged confession was made under the inducement of fear.” —— Miss. —, —, 30 So. 2d 74, 75. The suggestion of error was accordingly overruled. The incomplete record before us precludes our deter- mination of whether petitioner did deny in the trial LEE 1). MISSISSIPPI. 3 court that he had confessed the crime.1 But assuming that he did so testify, we cannot agree with the court below that he was thereby estopped from asserting his constitutional right to due process of law. The impor- tant fact is that the oral confession was introduced, admitted and used as evidence of petitioner’s guilt. Not only may this confession have been influential in inducing the jury’s verdict, but it formed an essential part of the evidentiary basis of the conviction now under review. His alleged denial of the confession went only to the original issue of whether he actually made the confession, an issue that is no longer open. That question was at most a disputed one; but the jury resolved the matter against petitioner and, like the court below, we accept that determination. The sole concern now is with the validity of the conviction based upon the use of the oral confession. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment invalidates a state court conviction grounded in whole or in part upon a confession which is the product of other than reasoned and voluntary choice.2 A conviction re- 1The transcript of the trial on the merits is not before us. At the preliminary hearing on the voluntariness of the confession, the transcript of which is before us, petitioner stated in regard to the alleged confession: “I don’t know what all he asked and all I said, but I didn’t admit I did it.” He also denied having confessed various details of the crime. Such testimony, however, might be construed as nothing more than a layman’s inexact way of stating that his answers did not amount to a voluntary confession. But in the absence of the complete record, we express no opinion on the matter. 2Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278; Chambers V. Florida, 309 U. S. 227; Canty v. Alabama, 309 U. S. 629; White v. Texas, 309 U. S. 631, 310 U. S. 530; Lomaa: v. Texas, 313 U. S. 544; Vernon v. Alabama, 313 U. S. 547; Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219; Ward v. Texas, 316 U. S. 547; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143, 4 LEE 1). MISSISSIPPI. sulting from such use of a coerced confession, however, is no less void because the accused testified at some point in the proceeding that he had never in fact confessed, voluntarily or involuntarily. Testimony of that nature can hardly legalize a procedure which conflicts with the accepted principles of dueprocess. And since our consti— tutional system permits a conviction to be sanctioned only if in conformity with those principles, inconsistent testi— mony as to the confession should not and cannot preclude the accused from raising the due process issue in an appro- priate manner. White v, Texas, 310 U. S. 530, 531—532. Indeed. such a foreclosure of the right to complain “of a wrong so fundamental that it made the whole proceeding a mere pretense of a trial and rendered the conviction and sentence wholly void,” Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278, 286, would itself be a denial of due process of law. The judgment below must be reversed. Since the Mis— sissippi Supreme Court upheld the conviction solely be— cause it thought petitioner was not entitled to raise the constitutional issue. we remand the case to that court so that it may definitively express its views on that issue. Reversed. 327 U. S. 274; Lyons v. Oklahoma. 322 U. S. 596; Malinski v. New York. 324 U. S. 401; Haley v. Ohio. — U. S. —. See, in general, Boskey and Pickering, “Federal Restrictions on State Criminal Procedure," 13 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 266, 282—295. January 17, 1&3: EWEDJ MI? "15!“!!! CHAHBERSDFTHE , a ,/ CHIEF JUSTICE ' Memorandum to the Conference: No. 91 — Lee v. Mississippi I am making several minor changes in my opinion to! meet various suggestions that have been made to me. The parts of the opinion which have been changed will now read: The important fact is that the oral confession was introduced, admitted and used as evidence of petitioner's guilt. Not only may this confession have been influential in inducting the jury's verdict, but it formed an essential part of the evidentiary basis of the conviction now under review. His alleged denial of the confession went only to the original issue of whether he actually made the confession, an issue that is no longer open. That question was at most a diSputed' one; but the jury resolved the matter against- petitioner and, like the court below, we accept that determination. The sole concern now is with the validity of thy confession based upon the use of the oral confession., The due process clause of the Fpurteenth Amend- ment invalidates a state court conviction grounded in whole or in part upon a confession which is the product of other than reasoned and voluntary choice. A conviction resulting from the use of a coerced confession, however, is no less void because the accused testified at some point in the proceeding that he had never in fact confessed, voluntarily or involuntarily. Testimony of that nature can hardly legalize a procedure which conflicts with the accepted principles of due process. And since our constbtutional system requires that a conviction be sanctioned only if in conformity with those principles, inconsistent testimony should not and cannot preclude the accused from raising the due process issue in an appropriate manner. . . . Frank Murphy «mm-y 15, 19M Dou- Frank: HO! N0. 91 '- 10.”. 8““ Of liaeissippt Recirculation of, J I agno- Gd. Kr. Justin flux-my SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 91.—OCTOBER TERM, 1947. Albert Lee, Petitioner. On \Vrit of Certiorari to the 7). Supreme Court of the State State of NIississippi. 0f B’fiSSiSSlDPi- [January —, 1948.] MR. JUSTICE MURPHY delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves a question of air procedure under the due process clause (f the Fourteenth Amendment of the 'L'nited States Constitution. Does a defendant in a state criminal proceeding lose the right to contend that a confession was coerced because of an inconsistent claim that the confession was in fact never made? Petitioner. a 17-year—old Negro, was indicted by a grand jury in Mississippi on a charge of assault with intent to ravish a female of previous chaste character. l‘)uring the course of the trial. the state offered the testi— mony of two city detectives as to an alleged confession obtained by them from petitioner. Objection was made that this confession had been secured as the result of duress. threats and violence inflicted upon petitioner by two unidentified police officers several hours prior to the confession. The jury retired and a preliminary hearing: was held before the trial judge as to the voluntariness of this confession. After various witnesses appeared, in- cluding the petitioner himself. the judge concluded that the confession was voluntary and that the testimony in relation thereto was admissible. This testimony proved to be the crucial element leading to the jury’s conviction of petitioner. His sentence was fixed at 13 years in prison. 91 LEE 1). MISSISSIPPI. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on appeal. brushing aside petitioner's contention that the introduction of the testimony in question contravened his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. It stated that the conduct of the two unidentified officers alleged to have struck and threatened petitioner was. if true. indefensible and warranted condemnation. But it felt that “the issue of fact as well as credibility was for the trial judge upon such preliminary qualification. and we are not willing to disturb his conclusion.” — Miss. ——-. —. 20 So. 2d 211. 212. This constitutional contention was treated quite differ— ently by the court on the filing of a suggestion of error. It found that petitioner’s testimony at the preliminary hearing that he had been threatened prior to making the confession was entirely undisputed in the record. But it also found that petitioner had steadfastly testified. both at the preliminary hearing and at the trial on the merits before the jury. that he did not in fact admit to the city detectives that he had connnitted the crime. The court then stated: “If the accused had not denied having made any confession at all. we would feel constrained to reverse the conviction herein because of the fact that his testi— mony as to the threat made to him during the forenoen by the plain-clothes men is wholly undisputed. the jailer not having been asked about this threat. and havingr testified only that he was not struck by anyone in his presence after his arrest for this crime. But. we think that one accused of crime cannot be heard to say that he did not make a confession at all. and at the same time contend that an alleged confession was made under the inducement of fear.” — Miss. —. —. 90 So. 2d 7—1. 75. The suggestion of error was accordingly overruled. "he incmnplete record before us precludes our deter— mination of whether petitioner did deny in the trial 91 LEE 2). MISSISSIPPI. 3 court that he had confessed the crime.1 But assuming; that he did so testify, we cannot agree with the court below that he was thereby estopped from asserting his constitutional right to due process of law. The impor— tant fact is that the oral confession was introduced. admitted and used as evidence of petitioners guilt. And it formed an essential part of the evidentiary basis of the conviction now under review. His alleged denial of the confession went only to the original issue of whether he actually made the confession. an issue that is no longer open. That question was at most a disputed one: but the jury resolved the matter against petitioner and its determination must be accepted since there is substantial supporting" evidence. The sole concern now is with the validity of the conviction based upon the use of the oral confession. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment invalidates a state court conviction grounded in whole or in part upon a confession which is the product of other than reasoned and volunta '37 choice? This invalidation l'l‘hc transcript of the trial on the merits is not before us. At the prcliminarv hearing.r on the voluntarint-ss of the confession, the transcript of which is before us. petitioner stated in regard to the alleged confession: "I don't know what all he asked and all I said, but I didn't admit I did it." llc also denied having: confessed various details of the crime. Such testimonv, however, might be construed as nothingr more than a layman's inexact way of stating that his answers did not amount to a voluntary confession. But in the absence of the complete record. we express no opinion on the matter. '-'])’rott'n v. .l/ixsissippi. 297 I'. S. 27S: ('ltrtn/ht‘rs \'. Florida. 309 l'. S. 2‘27; ('tmtt/ \'. Alabama, 300 l'. S. 1321'; ”Wife v. Turns. 309 l'. S. Hill, 310 l'. S. 530; Lot/Hu- \’. Tort/s. 313 17. S. 5-H; Vernon v. Alabama. 2-11.”; ll. S. 547; Ltstnlm V. ('II/ffornin. 314 U. S. 219; ll'arl/ \'. Toms. Ill 3 ll. 5. .347: gls‘ltcreft v. 'l't‘niicsst‘c. 322 I'. S. 145;, 91 4 LEE 1). MISSISSIPPI. is a reflection of the fundamental notions of fairness and justice which are among the ingredients of the due process clause. A conviction resulting from the use of a coerced confession. however. is no less void because the accused testified at some point in the proceeding that he had never in fact confessed. Testimony of that nature. in— consistent though it may be alongside the constitutional claim. can hardly legalize a procedure wiheh conflicts with the accepted principles of due process. And since it is so important to our constitutional way of life that a conviction be sanctioned only if in conformity with those principles. inconsistent testimony should not and cannot preclude the accused from raising the due process issue in an appropriate manner. White v. Texas, 310 1'. S. 530. 531. Indeed. such a foreclosure of the right to complain “of a wrong so fundamental that it made the whole proceeding a mere pretense of a trial and rendered the conviction and sentence wholly void.” Brown. v. ill'issi.s-sippi, 2.07 l'. S. 278, 286. would itself be a denial of due process of law. The judgment below must be reversed. Since the Mis— sissippi Supreme Court upheld the conviction solely be— cause it thought petitioner was not entitled to raise the constitutional issue. we remand the ease to that court so that it may definitively express its views on that issue. Reversed. 5137 l'. S. 27-1; [if/nus v. ()/.'/u/m)m/. 3132 l'. S. 590: .l/(II'I'ns/rz' \'. Near Yaw/(.334 ll. 5.401; Hn/r'j/ V. ()/1.iu.——« l'.2<.——. See, in general, Iloskey and Pickering. “Federal Restrictions on State Criminal Procedure," 13 l'. of (hi. l.. lcv. ‘Jllfi, 282—295. RECEIVED DEC 30 ID 59 AH "17 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITEIEBZHFESS OF THE {S‘HIEF JUSTICE No. 91.—OCTOBER TERM, 1947. Albert Lee. Petitioner. On “'rit of Certiorari to the v. Supreme Court of the State State of Mississippi. 0f MiSSiSSiPI)i- [January , 1948.] MR. JUSTICE MURPHY delivered the opinion of the Court. This case brings into focus again the impact of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the use of an allegedly coerced confession in a state criminal proceeding. Petitioner. a 17-year old Negro. was indicted by a grand jury in Mississippi on a charge of assault with intent to ravish a female of previous chaste character. During the course of the trial. the state offered the testimony of two city detectives as to an alleged confession obtained by them from petitioner. Objection was made that this confession had been secured as the result of duress. threats and violence inflicted upon petitioner by police officers several hours prior to the confession. The jury retired and a preliminary hearing was held before the trial judge as to the \r'olnntariness of this confession. After various witnesses appeared. the judge concluded that the con- fession was voluntary and that the testimony in relation thereto was admissible. The crucial element leading to the jury‘s conviction of petitioner proved to be the testimony as to this confession. His sentence was fixed at 18 years in prison. The Mis— sissippi Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on appeal. Punishing aside petitioner's contention that the introduc- tion of the testimony in question contravened his rights under the l“ourtcentli Amendment. _ Miss. —. 29 So. 91 2 LEE 7;. MISSISSIPPI. 2d 211. This constitutional issue was reexamined on the filing of a suggestion of error. but the same conclusion was reached. Miss. —. 30 So. 2d 74. We granted cer- tiorari to test the result in the light of Brown, V. illissis- sippi, 297 If. S. 278, and succeeding cases in this Court.1 The essential facts regarding the confession are uncon- tradicted. Petitioner was arrested by the police of Jackson. Mississippi. about midnight. June (3. 1.044. Shortly thereafter he was placed in the city jail. The following afternoon, a little after ‘2 o'clock. petitioner was taken from his cell into the “Work Room." some six by eight feet in size. The door was closed and he was there- upon questioned by two detectives. Rogers and McLeod. at least. one of whom was armed. Other officers were present during part of the questioning. Rogers told petitioner that a free and voluntary state— ment by him was desired and that anything he might say could be used against him in court. No threats or promises were made and no Violence was inflicted during this period. Petitioner then made what purported to be a voluntary confession. detailing the crime of assault with intent, to rape. But when he was requested to sign the statement his reply was. “I will sign it if you make me.” While admitting that Rogers and McLeod had treated him properly. he claimed that he had been mistreated by certain unidentified police officers that morning. Rogers and McLeod immediately ceased all efforts to obtain petitioner's signature to the confession. Even though ‘ ('llambcrs \'. Florida. 309 U. S. 227; ("data \'. Alabama. 30!) If. S. ($20; ll'ln’tc v. Turns. 30!) U. S (331, 310 U. S. 5330; Lamar \'. Tt‘l‘ll8. 313 l'. S. 544; l’ermm V. Alabama. 313 U. S. 54-7; Liscnba \'. ('afi- forum. I‘ll-l IT. S. 219; ll'arr/ \'. Tt’l'lIS. 3316 U. S. 547; xix/(craft \‘. 'l't'nmwsm: 322 IT. S. 143, 327 U. S. 274; Lyons \'. Okla/zonal. 322 II. S. Bllti; .llalinalri V. New Yor/r. 324 U. S. 401. See, in general, lioskey and Pickering, “Federal Restrictions on State Criminal Procedure," 13 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 2615, 2S2—2tlf). 91 LEE 1). MISSISSIPPI. 3 petitioner exhibited no bruises or other injuries, Rogers stated that “he wouldn’t take a statement under those conditions from anybody.” Petitioner was then returned to his cell and no other confession was ever made. At the trial petitioner appeared as a witness on his own behalf and described the events of the morning preceding the alleged confession. He testified that between 9:00 and 9:30 that morning, after being fingerprinted. he had been taken from his cell and brought to the jailer’s room. There he was questioned by two heavy—set police officers in plain clothes whose identity he did not know. Neither Rogers nor McLeod was present. One of the unidentified officers had a slip of paper with pencil marks on it. Peti— tioner's foot was compared with the marks on the paper and the officer commented, “It fits all right, this is the one." Petitioner responded, “No. sir, you have the wrong one, I didn’t do anything." Upon reiterating his inno- cence. petitioner was struck by the officer’s fist. He fell back. The officer pulled him up close again and asked. “Did you do it?” Again petitioner replied, “No. sir.” Once more the officer struck with his fit’sutfthis time hitting petitioner's stomach. Finally, the officer shoved him away with the remark, “If you go down stairs and say you didn’t do it. it will be mighty bad for you.” Petitioner was then taken back to his cell, where he re— mained until the questioning in the afternoon by Rogers and AVIcLeod. He testified that. as a result of the fore— going incident, “I was really scared when I went down there [to be questioned by Rogers and McLeod] after the man told me it would be i’nighty bad for me.” At one point in his testimony. in answer to a question whether the jailer was present at the morning session, petitioner stated. “I don’t recall, I am pretty sure he was in there." Young, the jailer, was subsequently called as a witness. The police records indicated that he had been 91 4 LEE 1). MISSISSIPPI. 011 duty June 7, 1944, the day in question, but he could not recall any of the events that took place on that day. He was able to say little more than that petitioner’s face was familiar and that petitioner had been in the jail at some time. He was certain that petitioner had never been struck in his presence, though he did not testify that he was actually present at any time during the period in the morning when petitioner said he was struck and threatened. Moreover, he admitted that other business might well have called him away from any questioning that might have taken place in his presence. Young also conceded that police officers, in self-defense, had slapped and struck prisoners in his presence. On the original appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court stated that the conduct of the two unidentified plain- clothes officers, if true, was indefensible and warranted condemnation. But it felt that “the issue of fact as well as credibility was for the trial judge upon such pre— liminary qualification. and we are not willing to disturb his conclusion.” Miss. at —, 29 So. 2d at 212. In its opinion on the suggestion of error, however, the court recognized that petitioner’s testimony as to the threat was “wholly undisputed in this record.” Indeed, it ad- mitted that but for one factor it “would feel constrained to reverse the conviction herein because of the fact that his testimony as to the threat made to him during the forenoon by the plain-clothes men is wholly undisputed. the jail .r not having been asked about this threat. and having testified only that he was not struck by anyone in his presence after his arrest for this crime.” ~— Miss. at —. 3’() So. 2d at 75. The sole factor that was thought to preclude a reversal of the conviction was petitioner’s denial at the trial that he had in fact confessed the crime to Rogers and McLeod in the afternoon. In the court’s View. one cannot claim that a confession was coerced and at the same time assert that no confession was ever 91 LEE 2). MISSISSIPPI, :3 made. Such an inconsistent position was held to render futile any attempt to have the confession labeled invol— untary and therefore void. Our prime duty in this case is to make an independent examination of the evidence relating to the voluntariness of the confession. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227. 228—229. And since the evidence is undisputed in all material respects. the performance of this duty is unaf— fected by the trial judge’s conclusion that the confession, was in fact voluntary. Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 238. In this Court resides the function of ultimately determining whether acknowledged circumstances are such as to make the admission of a confession a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The uncontroverted evidence in this proceeding leads us but to one conclusion. That evidence demonstrates that petitioner’s confession was thoroughly impregnated with coercion and that its admission was inconsistent with petitioner’s constitutional rights. It was undenied that. approximately five hours prior to the confession, peti— tioner was struck twice by an unidentified officer and was threatened that it would be “mighty bad” for him if he did not confess. The jailer, the sole witness produced who might have disputed petitioner’s story, stated only that petitioner never was struck in his presence. But he was unable to remember whether he was present at the time when the blows and threat were said to have occurred. Hence there was no evidence whatever con— tradicting the claim that two blows were actually struel' at the time in question. As to the threat. the Mississippi Supreme (“ourt correctly pointed out that petitioner’s testimony was “wholly undisputed in this record.” It is clear. moreover. that t1 9 coercive effects of the blows and threat continued until the oral confession was made to Rogers and McLeod some five hours later. Peti— 91 6 LEE v. MISSISSIPPI, tioner testified that the events of the forenoon made him “really scared” when he was questioned in the afternoon. Independent evidence as to what transpired at the after- noon session gave sub