xt7msb3wtd0h_49 https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7msb3wtd0h/data/mets.xml https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7msb3wtd0h/data/72m2.dao.xml unknown 166 Cubic Feet 381 document boxes, seven textile items, three map folders, one artwork archival material 72m2 English University of Kentucky The physical rights to the materials in this collection are held by the University of Kentucky Special Collections Research Center. Contact the Special Collections Research Center for information regarding rights and use of this collection. Frederick Moore Vinson papers Economic stabilization. Elections -- United States -- Congresses. Judges -- Correspondence. Judges -- United States. Judicial opinions Judicial process -- United States Legislators -- Correspondence. New Deal, 1933-1939. World War, 1914-1918 -- Veterans. World War, 1939-1945. Lee v. Mississippi - no. 91 text Lee v. Mississippi - no. 91 2019 https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7msb3wtd0h/data/72m2/Box_191/Folder_21/Multipage5986.pdf 1947 1947 1947 section false xt7msb3wtd0h_49 xt7msb3wtd0h LEE 1). MISSISSIPPI.

The Mississippi Supreme Court afﬁrmed the conviction
on appeal, rejecting petitioner’s contention that the
introduction of the testimony in question contravened
his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. It stated
that the conduct of the two unidentiﬁed ofﬁcers alleged
to have struck and threatened petitioner was, if true,
indefensible and warranted condemnation. But it felt
that “the issue of fact as well as credibility was for the
trial judge upon such preliminary qualiﬁcation, and we
are not willing to disturb his conclusion.” — Miss. —,
—, 29 So. 2d 211, 212.

This constitutional contention was treated quite differ-
ently by the court on the ﬁling of a suggestion of error.
It found that petitioner’s testimony at the preliminary
hearing that he had been threatened prior to making the
confession was entirely undisputed in the record. But
it also found that petitioner had steadfastly testiﬁed, both
at the preliminary hearing and at the trial on the merits
before the jury, that he did not in fact admit to the city
detectives that he had committed the crime. The court
then stated: “If the accused had not denied having made
any confession at all, we would feel constrained to reverse
the conviction herein because of the fact that his testi-
mony as to the threat made to him during the forenoon
by the plain clot-hes men is wholly undisputed, the jailer
not having been asked about this threat, and having
testiﬁed only that he was not struck by anyone in his
presence after his arrest. for this crime. But, we think
that one accused of crime cannot be heard to say that
he did not make a confession at all, and at the same time
contend that an alleged confession was made under the
inducement of fear.” —— Miss. —, —, 30 So. 2d 74, 75.
The suggestion of error was accordingly overruled.

The incomplete record before us precludes our deter-
mination of whether petitioner did deny in the trial

LEE 1). MISSISSIPPI. 3

court that he had confessed the crime.1 But assuming
that he did so testify, we cannot agree with the court
below that he was thereby estopped from asserting his
constitutional right to due process of law. The impor—
tant fact is that the oral confession was introduced,
admitted and used as evidence of petitioner’s guilt. Not
only may this confession have been influential in inducing
the jury’s verdict, but it formed an essential part of the
evidentiary basis of the conviction now under review.
His alleged denial of the confession went only to the
original issue of whether he actually made the confession,
an issue that is no longer open. That question was at
most a disputed one; but the jury resolved the matter
against petitioner and, like the court below, we accept
that determination. The sole concern now is with the
validity of the conviction based upon the use of the oral
confession.

The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
invalidates a state court conviction grounded in whole
or in part upon a confession which is the product of other
than reasoned and voluntary choice.2 A conviction re—

1The transcript of the trial on the merits is not before us. At
the preliminary hearing on the voluntariness of the confession, the
transcript of which is before us, petitioner stated in regard to the
alleged confession: “I dOn’t know what all he asked and all I said,
but I didn’t admit I did it.” He also denied having confessed various
details of the crime. Such testimony, however, might be construed
as nothing more than a layman’s inexact way of stating that his
answers did not amount to a voluntary confession. But in the
absence of the complete record, we express no opinion on the
matter.

2Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278; Chambers V. Florida, 309
U. S. 227; Canty Y. Alabama, 309 U. S. 629; White v. Texas, 309
U. S. 631, 310 U. S. 530; Lomax V. Tamas, 313 U. S. 544; Vernon
v. Alabama, 313 U. S. 547; Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219;
Ward v. Texas, 316 U. S. 547; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143,

4 LEE 1). MISSISSIPPI.

sulting from such use of a coerced confession, however, is
no less void because the accused testiﬁed at some point
in the proceeding that he had never in fact confessed,
voluntarily or involuntarily. Testimony of that nature
can hardly legalize a procedure which conﬂicts with the
accepted principles of due process. And since our consti-
tutional system permits a conviction to be sanctioned only
if in conformity with those principles, inconsistent testi—
mony as to the confession should not and cannot preclude
the accused from raising the due process issue in an appro—
priate manner. White v. Texas, 310 U. S. 530, 531—532.
Indeed. such a foreclosure of the right to complain “of a
wrong so fundamental that it made the whole proceeding
a mere pretense of a trial and rendered the conviction and
sentence wholly void.” Brow-21y. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278,
286. would itself be a denial of due process of law.

The judgment below must be reversed. Since the Mis—
sissippi Supreme Court upheld the conviction solely be—
cause it thought petitioner was not entitled to raise the
constitutional issue, we remand the case to that court
so that it may deﬁnitively express its views on that

issue.
Reversed.

327 U. S. 274; Lyons V. Oklahoma. 322 U. S. 596; Malinski v. New
York. 324 U. S. 401; Haley v. Ohio, — U. S. —.

See, in general, Boskcy and Pickering, “Federal Restrictions on
State Criminal Procedure," 13 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 266, 282—295.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 91.—OCTOBER TERM, 1947.

Albert Lee, Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to the
2). Supreme Court of the State

State of Mississippi. 0f Mississippi.

[January 19, 1948.]

MR. JUSTICE MURPHY delivered the opinion of the
Court.

This case involves a question of procedure under the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. Does a defendant in a
state criminal proceeding lose the right to contend that
a confession was coerced because of his testimony that the
confession was in fact never made?

Petitioner, a 17—year—old Negro, was indicted by a
grand jury in Mississippi on a charge of assault with
intent to ravish a female of previous chaste character.
During the course of the trial, the state offered the testi—
mony of two city detectives as to an alleged oral confession
obtained by them from petitioner. Objection was made
that this confession had been secured as the result of
duress, threats and violence inﬂicted upon petitioner by
two unidentiﬁed police ofﬁcers several hours prior to the
confession. The jury retired and a preliminary hearing
was held before the trial judge as to the voluntariness
of this confession. After various witnesses appeared, in—
cluding the petitioner himself, the judge concluded that
the confession was voluntary and that the testimony in
relation thereto was admissible. This testimony proved
to be the crucial element leading to the jury’s conviction
of petitioner. His sentence was ﬁxed at 18 years in
prison.

LEE 1). MISSISSIPPI.

This constitutional contention was treated quite differ—
ently by the court on the ﬁling of a suggestion of error.
It found that petitioner’s testimony at the preliminary
hearing that he had been threatened prior to making the
confession was entirely undisputed in the record. But
it also found that petitioner had steadfastly testiﬁed, both
at the preliminary hearing and at the trial on the merits
before the jury, that he did not in fact admit to the city
detectives that he had committed the crime. The court
then stated: “If the accused had not denied having made
any confession at all, we would feel constrained to reverse
the conviction herein because of the fact that his testi-
mony as to the threat made to him during the forenoon
by the plain clothes men is wholly undisputed, the jailer
not having been asked about this threat, and having
testified only that he was not struck by anyone in his
presence after his arrest for this crime. But, we think
that one accused of crime cannot be heard to say that
he did not make a confession at all, and at the same time
contend that an alleged confession was made under the
inducement of fear.” —— Miss. —, —, 30 So. 2d 74, 75.
The suggestion of error was accordingly overruled.

The incomplete record before us precludes our deter-
mination of whether petitioner did deny in the trial

LEE 1). MISSISSIPPI. 3

court that he had confessed the crime.1 But assuming
that he did so testify, we cannot agree with the court
below that he was thereby estopped from asserting his
constitutional right to due process of law. The impor-
tant fact is that the oral confession was introduced,
admitted and used as evidence of petitioner’s guilt. Not
only may this confession have been inﬂuential in inducing
the jury’s verdict, but it formed an essential part of the
evidentiary basis of the conviction now under review.
His alleged denial of the confession went only to the
original issue of whether he actually made the confession,
an issue that is no longer open. That question was at
most a disputed one; but the jury resolved the matter
against petitioner and, like the court below, we accept
that determination. The sole concern now is with the
validity of the conviction based upon the use of the oral
confession.

1The transcript of the trial on the merits is not before us. At
the preliminary hearing on the voluntariness of the confession, the
transcript of which is before us, petitioner stated in regard to the
alleged confession: “I don’t know what all he asked and all I said,
but I didn’t admit I did it.” He also denied having confessed various
details of the crime. Such testimony, however, might be construed
as nothing more than a layman’s inexact way of stating that his
answers did not amount to a voluntary confession. But in the
absence of the complete record, we express no opinion on the
matter.

2Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278; Chambers V. Florida, 309
U. S. 227; Canty v. Alabama, 309 U. S. 629; White v. Texas, 309
U. S. 631, 310 U. S. 530; Lomaa: v. Texas, 313 U. S. 544; Vernon
v. Alabama, 313 U. S. 547; Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219;
Ward v. Texas, 316 U. S. 547; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143,

4 LEE 1). MISSISSIPPI.

sulting from such use of a coerced confession, however, is
no less void because the accused testiﬁed at some point
in the proceeding that he had never in fact confessed,
voluntarily or involuntarily. Testimony of that nature
can hardly legalize a procedure which conﬂicts with the
accepted principles of dueprocess. And since our consti—
tutional system permits a conviction to be sanctioned only
if in conformity with those principles, inconsistent testi—
mony as to the confession should not and cannot preclude
the accused from raising the due process issue in an appro-
priate manner. White v, Texas, 310 U. S. 530, 531—532.
Indeed. such a foreclosure of the right to complain “of a
wrong so fundamental that it made the whole proceeding
a mere pretense of a trial and rendered the conviction and
sentence wholly void,” Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278,
286, would itself be a denial of due process of law.

The judgment below must be reversed. Since the Mis—
sissippi Supreme Court upheld the conviction solely be—
cause it thought petitioner was not entitled to raise the
constitutional issue. we remand the case to that court
so that it may deﬁnitively express its views on that
issue.

Reversed.

327 U. S. 274; Lyons v. Oklahoma. 322 U. S. 596; Malinski v. New
York. 324 U. S. 401; Haley v. Ohio. — U. S. —.

See, in general, Boskey and Pickering, “Federal Restrictions on
State Criminal Procedure," 13 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 266, 282—295.

January 17, 1&3: EWEDJ
MI? "15!“!!!

CHAHBERSDFTHE
, a ,/ CHIEF JUSTICE
' Memorandum to the Conference:

No. 91 — Lee v. Mississippi

I am making several minor changes in my opinion to!
meet various suggestions that have been made to me. The

parts of the opinion which have been changed will now read:

The important fact is that the oral confession was
introduced, admitted and used as evidence of
petitioner's guilt. Not only may this confession have
been influential in inducting the jury's verdict, but
it formed an essential part of the evidentiary basis
of the conviction now under review. His alleged denial
of the confession went only to the original issue of
whether he actually made the confession, an issue that
is no longer open. That question was at most a diSputed'
one; but the jury resolved the matter against-
petitioner and, like the court below, we accept that
determination. The sole concern now is with the
validity of thy confession based upon the use of the
oral confession.,

The due process clause of the Fpurteenth Amend-
ment invalidates a state court conviction grounded in
whole or in part upon a confession which is the product
of other than reasoned and voluntary choice. A
conviction resulting from the use of a coerced
confession, however, is no less void because the
accused testified at some point in the proceeding that
he had never in fact confessed, voluntarily or
involuntarily. Testimony of that nature can hardly
legalize a procedure which conflicts with the accepted
principles of due process. And since our constbtutional
system requires that a conviction be sanctioned only if
in conformity with those principles, inconsistent
testimony should not and cannot preclude the accused
from raising the due process issue in an appropriate
manner. . . .

Frank Murphy

«mm-y 15, 19M

Dou- Frank:

HO! N0. 91 '- 10.”. 8““ Of
liaeissippt

Recirculation of, J

I agno-

Gd.

Kr. Justin ﬂux-my

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 91.—OCTOBER TERM, 1947.

Albert Lee, Petitioner. On \Vrit of Certiorari to the
7). Supreme Court of the State
State of NIississippi. 0f B’ﬁSSiSSlDPi-

[January —, 1948.]

MR. JUSTICE MURPHY delivered the opinion of the
Court.

This case involves a question of air procedure under
the due process clause (f the Fourteenth Amendment of
the 'L'nited States Constitution. Does a defendant in a
state criminal proceeding lose the right to contend that
a confession was coerced because of an inconsistent claim
that the confession was in fact never made?

Petitioner. a 17-year—old Negro, was indicted by a
grand jury in Mississippi on a charge of assault with
intent to ravish a female of previous chaste character.
l‘)uring the course of the trial. the state offered the testi—
mony of two city detectives as to an alleged confession
obtained by them from petitioner. Objection was made
that this confession had been secured as the result of
duress. threats and violence inflicted upon petitioner by
two unidentiﬁed police officers several hours prior to the
confession. The jury retired and a preliminary hearing:
was held before the trial judge as to the voluntariness
of this confession. After various witnesses appeared, in-
cluding the petitioner himself. the judge concluded that
the confession was voluntary and that the testimony in
relation thereto was admissible. This testimony proved
to be the crucial element leading to the jury’s conviction
of petitioner. His sentence was fixed at 13 years in
prison.

91
LEE 1). MISSISSIPPI.

The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the conviction
on appeal. brushing aside petitioner's contention that the
introduction of the testimony in question contravened
his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. It stated
that the conduct of the two unidentiﬁed officers alleged
to have struck and threatened petitioner was. if true.
indefensible and warranted condemnation. But it felt
that “the issue of fact as well as credibility was for the
trial judge upon such preliminary qualiﬁcation. and we
are not willing to disturb his conclusion.” — Miss. ——-.
—. 20 So. 2d 211. 212.

This constitutional contention was treated quite differ—
ently by the court on the ﬁling of a suggestion of error.
It found that petitioner’s testimony at the preliminary
hearing that he had been threatened prior to making the
confession was entirely undisputed in the record. But
it also found that petitioner had steadfastly testified. both
at the preliminary hearing and at the trial on the merits
before the jury. that he did not in fact admit to the city
detectives that he had connnitted the crime. The court
then stated: “If the accused had not denied having made
any confession at all. we would feel constrained to reverse
the conviction herein because of the fact that his testi—
mony as to the threat made to him during the forenoen
by the plain-clothes men is wholly undisputed. the jailer
not having been asked about this threat. and havingr
testiﬁed only that he was not struck by anyone in his
presence after his arrest for this crime. But. we think
that one accused of crime cannot be heard to say that
he did not make a confession at all. and at the same time
contend that an alleged confession was made under the
inducement of fear.” — Miss. —. —. 90 So. 2d 7—1. 75.
The suggestion of error was accordingly overruled.

"he incmnplete record before us precludes our deter—
mination of whether petitioner did deny in the trial

LEE 2). MISSISSIPPI. 3

court that he had confessed the crime.1 But assuming;
that he did so testify, we cannot agree with the court
below that he was thereby estopped from asserting his
constitutional right to due process of law. The impor—
tant fact is that the oral confession was introduced.
admitted and used as evidence of petitioners guilt. And
it formed an essential part of the evidentiary basis of
the conviction now under review. His alleged denial of
the confession went only to the original issue of whether
he actually made the confession. an issue that is no longer
open. That question was at most a disputed one: but
the jury resolved the matter against petitioner and its
determination must be accepted since there is substantial
supporting" evidence. The sole concern now is with the
validity of the conviction based upon the use of the oral
confession.

l'l‘hc transcript of the trial on the merits is not before us. At
the prcliminarv hearing.r on the voluntarint-ss of the confession, the
transcript of which is before us. petitioner stated in regard to the
alleged confession: "I don't know what all he asked and all I said,
but I didn't admit I did it." llc also denied having: confessed various
details of the crime. Such testimonv, however, might be construed
as nothingr more than a layman's inexact way of stating that his
answers did not amount to a voluntary confession. But in the
absence of the complete record. we express no opinion on the
matter.

'-'])’rott'n v. .l/ixsissippi. 297 I'. S. 27S: ('ltrtn/ht‘rs \'. Florida. 309
l'. S. 2‘27; ('tmtt/ \'. Alabama, 300 l'. S. 1321'; ”Wife v. Turns. 309
l'. S. Hill, 310 l'. S. 530; Lot/Hu- \’. Tort/s. 313 17. S. 5-H; Vernon
v. Alabama. 2-11.”; ll. S. 547; Ltstnlm V. ('II/ffornin. 314 U. S. 219;
ll'arl/ \'. Toms. Ill 3 ll. 5. .347: gls‘ltcreft v. 'l't‘niicsst‘c. 322 I'. S. 145;,

91
4 LEE 1). MISSISSIPPI.

is a reﬂection of the fundamental notions of fairness and
justice which are among the ingredients of the due process
clause. A conviction resulting from the use of a coerced
confession. however. is no less void because the accused
testiﬁed at some point in the proceeding that he had
never in fact confessed. Testimony of that nature. in—
consistent though it may be alongside the constitutional
claim. can hardly legalize a procedure wiheh conﬂicts
with the accepted principles of due process. And since
it is so important to our constitutional way of life that
a conviction be sanctioned only if in conformity with
those principles. inconsistent testimony should not and
cannot preclude the accused from raising the due process
issue in an appropriate manner. White v. Texas, 310
1'. S. 530. 531. Indeed. such a foreclosure of the right
to complain “of a wrong so fundamental that it made
the whole proceeding a mere pretense of a trial and
rendered the conviction and sentence wholly void.” Brown.
v. ill'issi.s-sippi, 2.07 l'. S. 278, 286. would itself be a denial
of due process of law.

The judgment below must be reversed. Since the Mis—
sissippi Supreme Court upheld the conviction solely be—
cause it thought petitioner was not entitled to raise the
constitutional issue. we remand the ease to that court
so that it may definitively express its views on that
issue.

Reversed.

5137 l'. S. 27-1; [if/nus v. ()/.'/u/m)m/. 3132 l'. S. 590: .l/(II'I'ns/rz' \'. Near
Yaw/(.334 ll. 5.401; Hn/r'j/ V. ()/1.iu.——« l'.2<.——.

See, in general, Iloskey and Pickering. “Federal Restrictions on
State Criminal Procedure," 13 l'. of (hi. l.. lcv. ‘Jllfi, 282—295.

RECEIVED

DEC 30 ID 59 AH "17

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITEIEBZHFESS OF THE
{S‘HIEF JUSTICE

No. 91.—OCTOBER TERM, 1947.

Albert Lee. Petitioner. On “'rit of Certiorari to the
v. Supreme Court of the State
State of Mississippi. 0f MiSSiSSiPI)i-

[January , 1948.]

MR. JUSTICE MURPHY delivered the opinion of the
Court.

This case brings into focus again the impact of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the use
of an allegedly coerced confession in a state criminal
proceeding.

Petitioner. a 17-year old Negro. was indicted by a grand
jury in Mississippi on a charge of assault with intent to
ravish a female of previous chaste character. During the
course of the trial. the state offered the testimony of two
city detectives as to an alleged confession obtained by
them from petitioner. Objection was made that this
confession had been secured as the result of duress. threats
and violence inﬂicted upon petitioner by police ofﬁcers
several hours prior to the confession. The jury retired
and a preliminary hearing was held before the trial judge
as to the \r'olnntariness of this confession. After various
witnesses appeared. the judge concluded that the con-
fession was voluntary and that the testimony in relation
thereto was admissible.

The crucial element leading to the jury‘s conviction of
petitioner proved to be the testimony as to this confession.
His sentence was ﬁxed at 18 years in prison. The Mis—
sissippi Supreme Court afﬁrmed the conviction on appeal.
Punishing aside petitioner's contention that the introduc-
tion of the testimony in question contravened his rights
under the l“ourtcentli Amendment. _ Miss. —. 29 So.

91
2 LEE 7;. MISSISSIPPI.

2d 211. This constitutional issue was reexamined on the
ﬁling of a suggestion of error. but the same conclusion was
reached. Miss. —. 30 So. 2d 74. We granted cer-
tiorari to test the result in the light of Brown, V. illissis-
sippi, 297 If. S. 278, and succeeding cases in this Court.1

The essential facts regarding the confession are uncon-
tradicted. Petitioner was arrested by the police of
Jackson. Mississippi. about midnight. June (3. 1.044.
Shortly thereafter he was placed in the city jail. The
following afternoon, a little after ‘2 o'clock. petitioner was
taken from his cell into the “Work Room." some six by
eight feet in size. The door was closed and he was there-
upon questioned by two detectives. Rogers and McLeod.
at least. one of whom was armed. Other ofﬁcers were
present during part of the questioning.

Rogers told petitioner that a free and voluntary state—
ment by him was desired and that anything he might
say could be used against him in court. No threats or
promises were made and no Violence was inﬂicted during
this period. Petitioner then made what purported to be
a voluntary confession. detailing the crime of assault with
intent, to rape. But when he was requested to sign the
statement his reply was. “I will sign it if you make me.”
While admitting that Rogers and McLeod had treated
him properly. he claimed that he had been mistreated by
certain unidentiﬁed police ofﬁcers that morning. Rogers
and McLeod immediately ceased all efforts to obtain
petitioner's signature to the confession. Even though

‘ ('llambcrs \'. Florida. 309 U. S. 227; ("data \'. Alabama. 30!) If. S.
($20; ll'ln’tc v. Turns. 30!) U. S (331, 310 U. S. 5330; Lamar \'. Tt‘l‘ll8.
313 l'. S. 544; l’ermm V. Alabama. 313 U. S. 54-7; Liscnba \'. ('afi-
forum. I‘ll-l IT. S. 219; ll'arr/ \'. Tt’l'lIS. 3316 U. S. 547; xix/(craft \‘.
'l't'nmwsm: 322 IT. S. 143, 327 U. S. 274; Lyons \'. Okla/zonal. 322
II. S. Bllti; .llalinalri V. New Yor/r. 324 U. S. 401.

See, in general, lioskey and Pickering, “Federal Restrictions on
State Criminal Procedure," 13 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 2615, 2S2—2tlf).

LEE 1). MISSISSIPPI. 3

petitioner exhibited no bruises or other injuries, Rogers
stated that “he wouldn’t take a statement under those
conditions from anybody.” Petitioner was then returned
to his cell and no other confession was ever made.

At the trial petitioner appeared as a witness on his own
behalf and described the events of the morning preceding
the alleged confession. He testiﬁed that between 9:00
and 9:30 that morning, after being fingerprinted. he had
been taken from his cell and brought to the jailer’s room.
There he was questioned by two heavy—set police ofﬁcers
in plain clothes whose identity he did not know. Neither
Rogers nor McLeod was present. One of the unidentified
ofﬁcers had a slip of paper with pencil marks on it. Peti—
tioner's foot was compared with the marks on the paper
and the ofﬁcer commented, “It ﬁts all right, this is the
one." Petitioner responded, “No. sir, you have the wrong
one, I didn’t do anything." Upon reiterating his inno-
cence. petitioner was struck by the ofﬁcer’s ﬁst. He fell
back. The ofﬁcer pulled him up close again and asked.
“Did you do it?” Again petitioner replied, “No. sir.”
Once more the ofﬁcer struck with his ﬁt’sutfthis time
hitting petitioner's stomach. Finally, the ofﬁcer shoved
him away with the remark, “If you go down stairs and
say you didn’t do it. it will be mighty bad for you.”
Petitioner was then taken back to his cell, where he re—
mained until the questioning in the afternoon by Rogers
and AVIcLeod. He testiﬁed that. as a result of the fore—
going incident, “I was really scared when I went down
there [to be questioned by Rogers and McLeod] after the
man told me it would be i’nighty bad for me.”

At one point in his testimony. in answer to a question
whether the jailer was present at the morning session,
petitioner stated. “I don’t recall, I am pretty sure he was
in there." Young, the jailer, was subsequently called as
a witness. The police records indicated that he had been

91
4 LEE 1). MISSISSIPPI.

011 duty June 7, 1944, the day in question, but he could
not recall any of the events that took place on that day.
He was able to say little more than that petitioner’s face
was familiar and that petitioner had been in the jail at
some time. He was certain that petitioner had never
been struck in his presence, though he did not testify that
he was actually present at any time during the period
in the morning when petitioner said he was struck and
threatened. Moreover, he admitted that other business
might well have called him away from any questioning
that might have taken place in his presence. Young also
conceded that police officers, in self-defense, had slapped
and struck prisoners in his presence.

On the original appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court
stated that the conduct of the two unidentiﬁed plain-
clothes officers, if true, was indefensible and warranted
condemnation. But it felt that “the issue of fact as
well as credibility was for the trial judge upon such pre—
liminary qualiﬁcation. and we are not willing to disturb
his conclusion.” Miss. at —, 29 So. 2d at 212. In
its opinion on the suggestion of error, however, the court
recognized that petitioner’s testimony as to the threat
was “wholly undisputed in this record.” Indeed, it ad-
mitted that but for one factor it “would feel constrained
to reverse the conviction herein because of the fact that
his testimony as to the threat made to him during the
forenoon by the plain-clothes men is wholly undisputed.
the jail .r not having been asked about this threat. and
having testified only that he was not struck by anyone
in his presence after his arrest for this crime.” ~— Miss.
at —. 3’() So. 2d at 75. The sole factor that was thought
to preclude a reversal of the conviction was petitioner’s
denial at the trial that he had in fact confessed the crime
to Rogers and McLeod in the afternoon. In the court’s
View. one cannot claim that a confession was coerced
and at the same time assert that no confession was ever

91
LEE 2). MISSISSIPPI, :3

made. Such an inconsistent position was held to render
futile any attempt to have the confession labeled invol—
untary and therefore void.

Our prime duty in this case is to make an independent
examination of the evidence relating to the voluntariness
of the confession. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227.
228—229. And since the evidence is undisputed in all
material respects. the performance of this duty is unaf—
fected by the trial judge’s conclusion that the confession,
was in fact voluntary. Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S.
219, 238. In this Court resides the function of ultimately
determining whether acknowledged circumstances are
such as to make the admission of a confession a denial
of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.

The uncontroverted evidence in this proceeding leads
us but to one conclusion. That evidence demonstrates
that petitioner’s confession was thoroughly impregnated
with coercion and that its admission was inconsistent with
petitioner’s constitutional rights. It was undenied that.
approximately ﬁve hours prior to the confession, peti—
tioner was struck twice by an unidentiﬁed ofﬁcer and was
threatened that it would be “mighty bad” for him if
he did not confess. The jailer, the sole witness produced
who might have disputed petitioner’s story, stated only
that petitioner never was struck in his presence. But
he was unable to remember whether he was present at
the time when the blows and threat were said to have
occurred. Hence there was no evidence whatever con—
tradicting the claim that two blows were actually struel'
at the time in question. As to the threat. the Mississippi
Supreme (“ourt correctly pointed out that petitioner’s
testimony was “wholly undisputed in this record.”

It is clear. moreover. that t1 9 coercive effects of the
blows and threat continued until the oral confession was
made to Rogers and McLeod some ﬁve hours later. Peti—

91
6 LEE v. MISSISSIPPI,

tioner testiﬁed that the events of the forenoon made him
“really scared” when he was questioned in the afternoon.
Independent evidence as to what transpired at the after-
noon session gave sub