xt7msb3wtd0h_50 https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7msb3wtd0h/data/mets.xml https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7msb3wtd0h/data/72m2.dao.xml unknown 166 Cubic Feet 381 document boxes, seven textile items, three map folders, one artwork archival material 72m2 English University of Kentucky The physical rights to the materials in this collection are held by the University of Kentucky Special Collections Research Center.  Contact the Special Collections Research Center for information regarding rights and use of this collection. Frederick Moore Vinson papers Economic stabilization. Elections -- United States -- Congresses. Judges -- Correspondence. Judges -- United States. Judicial opinions Judicial process -- United States Legislators -- Correspondence. New Deal, 1933-1939. World War, 1914-1918 -- Veterans. World War, 1939-1945. People of the State of Illiois, ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education - no. 90 text People of the State of Illiois, ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education - no. 90 2019 https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7msb3wtd0h/data/72m2/Box_192/Folder_14/Multipage6018.pdf 1947 1947 1947 section false xt7msb3wtd0h_50 xt7msb3wtd0h W3; 19,48

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 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 90.—OCTOBER TERM, 1947.

People of the State of Illinois ex rel.
Vashti McCollum, Appellant, Appeal from the
7). Supreme Court of

Board of Education of School Dis— th‘? State Of 111i-
trict No. 71, Champaign County, 11015-
Illinois et al.

[lVIarch —, 1948.]

MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case relates to the power of a State to utilize its
tax—supported public school system in aid of religious
instruction insofar as that power may be restricted by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal
Constitution.

The appellant, Vashti McCollum, began this action for
mandamus against the Champaign Board of Education
in the Circuit Court of Champaign County, Illinois. Her
asserted interest was that of a resident and taxpayer of
Champaign and of a parent whose child was then enrolled
in the Champaign public schools. Illinois has a compul—
sory education law which, with exceptions, requires par—
ents to send their children, aged seven to sixteen, to its
tax—supported public schools where the children are to
remain in attendance during the hours when the schools
are regularly in session. Parents who violate this law
commit a misdemeanor punishable by fine unless the
children attend private or parochial schools which meet
educational standards fixed by the State. District boards
of education are given general supervisory powers over
the use of the public school buildings within the school
districts. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, ch. 122, §§ 123, 301.

Appellant’s petition for mandamus alleged that reli-
gious teachers, employed by private religious groups, were
permitted to come weekly into the school buildings during

RECEIVED

MR 3 m 23. AH ’dfl

CHAMBERS DFTHEJ
CHIEFJUSTICE

 

 90
2 MCCOLLUM 1). BOARD OF EDUCATION.

the regular hours set apart for secular teaching, and then
and there for a period of thirty minutes substitute their
religious teaching for the secular education provided under
the compulsory education law. The petitioner charged
that this joint public school—religious group program vio—
lated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution. The prayer of her petition was that
the Board of Education be ordered to “adopt and enforce
rules and regulations prohibiting all instruction in and
teaching of all religious education in all public schools
in Champaign District Number 71, . . . and in all public
school houses and buildings in said district when occu—
pied by public schools.”

The board first moved to dismiss the petition on the
ground that under Illinois law appellant had no standing
to maintain the action. This motion was denied. An
answer was then filed, which admitted that regular weekly
religious instruction was given during school hours to
those pupils whose parents consented and that those
pupils were released temporarily from their regular secular
classes for the limited purpose of attending the religious
classes. The answer denied that this coordinated pro—
gram of religious instruction violated the State or Federal
Constitution. Much evidence was heard, findings of fact
were made, after which the petition for mandamus was
denied on the ground that the school’s religious instruc-
tion program violated neither the federal nor state con-
stitutional provisions invoked by the appellant. On ap-
peal the State Supreme Court affirmed. 396 Ill. 14:,
Appellant appealed to this Court under 28 F. S. C.
§ 341: (a). and we noted probable jurisdiction. 332
If. S..—

The appellee presses a motion to dismiss the appeal
on several grounds. the first of which is that the judgment
of the State Supreme Court does not draw in question
the “validity of a statute of any State” as required by

 

 90

MCCOLLUM 1). BOARD OF EDUCATION. 3

28 U. S. C. § 344 (a). This contention rests on the ad-
mitted fact that the challenged program of religious
instruction was not expressly authorized by statute. But
the State Supreme Court has sustained the validity of
the program on the ground that the Illinois statutes
granted the board authority to establish such a program.
This holding is sufficient to show that the validity of an
Illinois statute was drawn in question within the meaning
of 28 U. S. C. § 344: (a). Hamilton V. University of Cali—
fornia, 293 U. S. 245, 258. A second ground for the
motion to dismiss is that the appellant lacks standing
to maintain the action, a ground which is also without
merit. Coleman V. illiller, 307 U. S. 4:33, 443, 445, 464.
A third ground for the motion is that the appellant failed
properly to present in the State Supreme Court her chal-
lenge that the state program violated the Federal Con—
stitution. But in View of the express rulings of both

state courts on this question, the argument cannot be
successfully maintained. The motion to dismiss the
appeal is denied.

Although there are disputes between the parties as to
various inferences that may or may not properly be drawn
from the evidence concerning the religious program, the
following facts are shown by the record without dispute.1

1 Appellant, taking issue with the facts found by the Illinois courts,
argues that the religious education program in question is invalid
under the Federal Constitution for any one of the following reasons:
(1) In actual practice certain Protestant groups have obtained an
overshadowing advantage in the propagation of their faiths over
other Protestant sects; (‘2) the religious education program was
voluntary in name only because in fact subtle pressures were brought
to bear on the students to force them to participate in it; and (3) the
power given the school superintendent. to reject teachers selected
by religious groups and the power given the local Council on Religious
Education to determine which religious faiths should participate in
the program was a prior censorship of religion.

In View of our decision we find it unnecessary to consider these
arguments or the disputed facts upon which they depend.

 

 90
4 MCCOLLUM 1). BOARD OF EDUCATION.

In 1940 interested members of the Jewish, Roman Cath-
olic, and a few of the Protestant faiths formed a voluntary
association called the Champaign Council on Religious
Education. They obtained permission from the Board
of Education to offer classes in religious instruction to
public school pupils in grades four to nine inclusive.
Classes were made up of pupils whose parents signed
printed cards requesting that their children be permitted
to attend; '"' they were held weekly, thirty minutes for
the lower grades, forty—five minutes for the higher.
The council employed the religious teachers at no ex—
pense to the school authorities, but the instructors were
subject to the approval and supervision of the super—
intendent. of schools.“ The classes were taught in three

3 The Supreme Court described the request card system as follows:
“. . . . Admission to the classes was to be allowed only upon the
express written request of parents, and then only to classes desig—
nated by the parents . . . . Cards were distributed to the. parents
of elementary students by the j'tul'ilic-school teachers requesting them
to indicate whether they desired their children to receive religious
education. After being filled out, the cards were returned to the
teachers of religious education classes either by the public-school
teachers or the children . . . .” On this subject the trial court found
that ". . . those students who have obtained the written consent of
their parents therefor are released by the school authorities from
their secular work, and in the grade schools for a period of thirty
minutes' instruction in each week during said school hours, and
forty—live minutes duringr each week in the junior high school, receive
training in religious education . . . . Certain cards are used for ob-
taining permission of parents for their children to take said religious
instruction courses, and they are made available, through the ottices
of the superintendent of schools and through the hands of principals
and teachers to the pupils of the school district. Said cards are
prepared at the cost of the council of religious education. The
handling and distribution of said cards does not interfere with
the duties or suspend the regular secular work of the employees of
thedefendant . . . .”

3 The State Supreme Court said: “The record further discloses that
the teachers conducting the religious classes were not teachers in the

 

 90
MCCOLLUM 1). BOARD OF EDUCATION. 5

separate religious groups by Protestant teachers,” Cath-
olic priests, and a Jewish rabbi, although for the past
several years there have apparently been no classes in—
structed in the Jewish religion. Classes were conducted
in the regular classrooms of the school building. Stu—
dents who did not choose to take the religious instruction
were not released from public school duties; they were
required to leave their classrooms and go to some other
place in the school building for pursuit of their secular
studies. On the other hand, students who were released
from secular study for the religious instructions were re—
quired to be present at the religious class. Reports of
their presence or absence were to be made to their secular
teachers.5

public schools but were subject to the approval and supervision of the
superintendent . . . .” The trial court found: “Before any faith or
other group may obtain permission from the defendant for the simi—
lar, free and equal use of rooms in the public school buildings said
faith or group must make application to the superintendent of schools
of said School District Number 71, who in turn will determine whether
or not it, is practical for said group to teach in said school system.”
The president of the local school board testified: “. . . The l’rotes-
tants would have one group and the Catholics, and would be given a
room where they would have the class and we would go along with
the plan of the religious people. They were all to be treated alike,
with the understanding that the teachers they would bring into
the school were approved by the superintendent . . . . The
superintendent was the last word so far as the individual was con-
cerned . . . .”

" There were two teachers of the Protestant faith. One was a
Presbyterian and had been a foreign missionary for that church.
The second testified as follows: “I am affiliated with the Christian
church. I also work in the Methodist Church and I taught at the
Presbyterian. I am married to a Lutheran.”

7’The director of the Champaign Council on Religious Education
testified: “. . . If any pupil is absent we turn in a slip just like any
teacher would to the superintendent's office. The slip is a piece of
paper with a number of hours in the school day and a square, and
the teacher of the particular room for the particular hour records the

 

 90
MCCOLLUM 1). BOARD OF EDUCATION.

The foregoing facts, without reference to others that
appear in the record, show the use of tax—supported prop-
erty for religious instruction and the close cooperation
between the school authorities and the religious council
in promoting religious education. The operation of the
state’s compulsory education system thus assists and is
integrated with the program of religious instruction car—
ried on by separate religious sects. Pupils compelled
by law to go to school for secular education are released
in part from their legal duty upon the condition that
they attend the religious classes. This is beyond all
question a utilization of the tax—established and tax—
supported public school system to aid religious groups to
spread their faith. And it falls squarely under the ban
of the First Amendment (made applicable to the States
by the Fourteenth) as we interpreted it in Everson V.
Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1. There we said:
“Neither a State nor the Federal Government can set up
a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religious, or prefer one religion over another.6
Neither can force or influence a person to go to or to
remain away from church against his will, or force him
to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person

abseiitees. It has their names and the grade and the section to which
they belong. It is the same sheet that the geography and history
teachers and all the other teachers use, and is furnished by the
school . . . .”

“ The dissent, agreed to by four judges, said: “The problem then
cannot be cast in terms of legal discrimination or its absence. This
would be true even though the state in giving aid should treat all
religious instruction alike . . . . Again, it was the furnishing of
‘eoiitributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he
disbelieves’ that the fathers outlawed. That consequence and effect
are not removed by multiplying to all—inclusiveness the sects for
which support is exacted. The Constitution requires, not compre-
hensive identification of state with religion, but complete separa-
tion.” Eucrson V. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 59, GO.

 

 90
MCCOLLUM 1). BOARD OF EDUCATION. 7

can be punished for entertaining or for professing re—
ligious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-
attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can
be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
Whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may
adopt to teach or practice religion.7 Neither a State nor
the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, par-
ticipate in the affairs of any religious organizations or
groups, and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the
clause against establishment of religion by law was in-
tended to erect ‘a wall of separation between Church and
State.’ ” The majority in the Everson case, and the
minority as shown by quotations from the dissenting
views in our notes 6 and 7, agreed that the First Amend-
ment's language, properly interpreted, had erected a wall
of separation between Church and State. They disagreed
as to the facts shown by the record and as to the proper

application of the First Ainencliiient’s language to those
facts.

Recognizing that the Illinois program is barred by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments if we adhere to the
views expressed both by the majority and the minority
in the E verson, case, counsel for the respondents challenge
those views as dicta and urge that we reconsider and
repudiate them. They argue that historically the
Amendment was intended to forbid only government pref-
erence of one religion over another, not an impartial
governmental assistance of all religions. In addition they

7 The dissenting judges said: “In view of this history no further
proof is needed that the Amenchnent forbids any appropriation, large
or small, from public funds to aid or support any and all religious
exercises . . . . Legislatures are free to make and courts to sustain,
appropriations only when it can be found that in fact. they do not
aid, promote, encourage or sustain religious teachings 0r Observances,
be the amount large or small.” Evcrson v. Board of Education, 330
U. S. 1, 41, 5243.

 

 90
8 MCCOLLUM 1). BOARD OF EDUCATION.

ask that we distinguish or overrule our holding in the
Everson case that the Fourteenth Amendment made the
”establishment of religion” clause of the First Amend—
ment applicable as a prohibition against the States.
After giving full consideration to the arguments presented
we are unable to accept either of these contentions.

To hold that a State cannot consistently with the First
and Fourteenth Amendments utilize its public school
system to aid any or all religious faiths or sects in the
dissemination of their doctrines and ideals does not, as
counsel urge, manifest a governmental hostility to reli-
gion or religious teachings. A manifestation of such hos-
tility would be at war with our national tradition as
embodied in the First Amendment’s guaranty of the free
exercise of religion. For the First Amendment rests upon
the premise that both religion and government can best
work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from
the other within its respective sphere. Or, as we said
in the Everson, case, the First Amendment has erected a
wall between Church and State which must be kept high
and impregnable.

Here not only are the state’s tax-supported public
school buildings used for the dissemination of religious
doctrines. The State also affords sectarian groups an in- ’
valuable aid in that it helps to provide pupils for their
religious classes through use of the state’s compulsory
public school machinery. This is not separation of
Church and State. It is union.

The cause is reversed and remanded to the State Su-
preme Court for proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

 

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 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 90,—OCTOBER TERM. 1947.

People of the State of Illinois, ex rel.
Vashti lVIcCollum, Appellant, Appeal from the
1). Supreme Court of

Board of Education of School Dis- t'h‘? State Of 111i-
trict No. 71. Champaign County, “015-
Illinois et al.

[February —. 1948.]

MR. JUSTICE BLACK announced the judgment of the
Court and an opinion in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE and
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS concurred.

This case relates to the power of a State to utilize its
tax-supported public school system in aid of religious
instruction insofar as that power may be restricted by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal
Constitution.

The appellant, Yashti McCollum. began this action for
mandamus against the Champaign Board of Education
in the Circuit Court of Champaign County, Illinois. Her
asserted interest was that of a resident and taxpayer of
Champaign and of a parent whose child was then enrolled
in the Champaign public schools. Illinois has a compul-
sory education law which. with exceptions, requires par-
ents to send their children. aged seven to sixteen. to its
tax-supported public schools where the children are to
remain in attendance during the hours when the schools
are regularly in session. Parents who violate this law
commit a misdemeanor punishable by fine unless the
children attend private or parochial schools which meet
educational standards fixed by the State. District boards
of education are given general supervisory powers over
the use of the public school buildings within the school
districts. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, ch. 122, §§ 123. 301.

Appellant's petition for mandamus alleged that reli-
gious teachers, employed by private religious groups, were

RECEIVED

FEB 5 223 PH ’48

CHAMBERS OF THE
CHIEF JUSTICE

 

 ’365k‘5fl‘h03...

. ‘1 .;
Uinate@.—- 6.5- ;a :

Baal?

 

 January 22, 191:8

Dear Hugo:
Re: No, 90 - People of State of 1211.,
Ex Rel. Vashti lioCollum,

V.
36.. of Ed. of School Dist.
NO. '71, etc-

Reoircuhtion of J 20 8.

Ingres.

6.21.

Kr. Justice Black

 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES RECEIVED

N0. 90.—OCTOBER TERM, 1947. JAN 2' m 16 A” 9'”

People of the State of Illinois, ex rel. CHAM B ERS 0 F TH E
Vashti McCollum, Appeal from .- thgm EF J U S“ C E
1). Supreme Court of

Board of Education of School Dis- th‘? State Of 11h"
trict No. 71, Champaign County, r1015-
Illinois et :11.

[February , 1.048.]

MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case relates to the power of a State to utilize its
tax—supported public school system in aid of religious
instruction insofar as that power may be restricted by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal
Constitution.

The appellant, Vashti McCollum, began this action for
mandamus against the Champaign Board of Education
in the Circuit Court of Champaign County. Illinois. Her
asserted interest was that of a resident and taxpayer of
Champaign and of a parent whose child was then enrolled
in the Champaign public schools. Illinois has a compul-
sory education law which. with exceptions. requires par—
ents to send their children. aged seven to sixteen, to its
tax-supported public schools where the children are to
remain in attendance during the hours when the schools
are regularly in session. Parents who Violate this law
commit a misdemeanor punishable by fine unless the
children attend private or parochial schools which meet
educational standards fixed by the State. District boards
of education are given general supervisory powers over
the use of the public school buildings within the school
districts. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, ch. 122, §§ 123, 301.

Appellant’s petition for mandamus alleged that reli-
gious teachers, employed by private religious groups, were

 

 90
2 MCCOLLUM 1). BOARD OF EDUCATION.

permitted to come weekly into the school buildings during

the regular hours set apart for secular teaching, and then
and there for a period of thirty minutes substitute their
religious teaching for the secular education provided under
the compulsory education law. The petitioner charged
that this joint public school—religious group program vio—
lated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States (,‘onstitution. The prayer of her petition was that
the Board of Education be ordered to .“adopt and enforce
rules and regulations prohibiting all instruction in and
teaching of all religious education in all public schools
in (lhampaign District Number 71, . . . and in all public
school houses and buildings in said district when occu-
pied by public schools.”

The board first moved to dismiss the petition on the
ground that under Illinois law appellant had no standing
to maintain the action. This motion was denied. An
answer was then filed, which admitted that regular weekly
religious instruction was given during school hours to
those pupils whose parents consented and that those
pupils were released temporarily from their regular secular
classes for the limited purpose of attending the religious
classes. The answer denied that this coordinated pro-
gram of religious instruction violated the State or Federal
Constitution. Much evidence was heard, findings of fact
were made. after which the petition for mandamus was
denied on the ground that the school’s religious instruc—
tion program violated neither the federal nor state con-
stitutional provisions invoked by the appellant. On ap-
peal the State Supreme Court affirmed. 396 Ill. 14.
Appellant appealed to this Court under ‘28 U. S. C. §344
(al. and we noth probable jurisdiction. -— U. S. —.

The appellce presses a motion to dismiss the appeal
on several grounds, the first of which is that the judgment
of the State Supreme Court does not draw in question
the “validity of a statute of any State” as required by

 

 90
MCCOLLUM v. BOARD OF EDUCATION. 8

28 U. S. C. § 344 (a). This contention rests on the ad—
mitted fact that the challenged program of religious
instruction was not expressly authorized by statute. But
the State Supreme Court has sustained the validity of
the program on the ground that the Illinois statutes
granted the board authority to establish such a program.
This holding is sufficient to show that the validity of an
Illinois statute was drawn in question within the meaning
of 28 U. S. C. § 344 (a). Hamilton. v. University of Cali—
fornia, 293 U. S. 245, 258. A second ground for the
motion to dismiss is that the appellant lacks standing
to maintain the action. a ground which is also without
merit. Coleman. V. ilI'illcr, 307 U. S. 433, 443, 445, 464.
A third ground for the motion is that the appellant failed
properly to present in the State Supreme Court her chal—
lenge that the state program violated the Federal Con-
stitution. But in view of the express rulings of both

state courts on this question, the argument cannot be
successfully maintained. The motion to dismiss the
appeal is denied.

Although there are disputes between the parties as to
various inferences that may or may not properly be drawn
from the evidence concerning the religious program, the
following facts are shown by the record without dispute.1

1 Appellant, taking issue with the facts found by the Illinois courts,
argues that the religious education program in question is invalid
under the Federal Constitution for any one of the following reasons:
(I) In actual practice certain l’rotestant groups have obtained an
(wershadowing advantage in the propagation of their faiths over
other l’rotestant sects; (2) the religious education program was
voluntary in name only because in fact subtle pressures were brought
to bear on the students to force them to participate in it; and (3) the
posver given the school supt.‘rintendent to reject teacher‘s selected
by religious groups and the power given the local Council on Religious
Education to determine which religious faiths should participate in
the program was a prior censorship of religion.

In view of our decision we find it unnecessary to consider these
arguments or the disputed facts upon which they depend.

 

 90
4 MCCOLLUM 1). BOARD OF EDUCATION.

In 1940 interested members of the Jewish, Roman Cath-
olic. and a few of the Protestant faiths formed a voluntary
association called the Champaign Council on Religious
Education. They obtained permission from the Board
of Education to offer classes in religious instruction to
public school pupils in grades four to nine inclusive.
Classes were made up of pupils whose parents signed
printed cards requesting that their children be permitted
to attend; "' they were held weekly, thirty minutes for
the lower grades, forty—five minutes for the higher.
The council employed the religious teachers at no ex—
pense to the school authorities. but the instructors were
subject to the approval and supervision of the super—
intendent, of schools.” The classes were taught in three

3 The Supreme Court described the request card system as follows:

". . . . Admission to the classes was to be allowed only upon the
express written request of parents, and then only to classes desig—

nated by the parents . . . . Cards were distributed to the parents
ol' elementary students by the public—school teachers requesting them
to indicate whether they desired their children to receive religious
education. After being filled out, the cards were returned to the
teachers of religious education classes either by the public-school
teachers or the children . . . 1" ()n this subject the trial court found
that . . those students who have obtained the written consent of
their parents therefor are released by the school authorities from
their secular work, and in the grade schools for a period of thirty
minutes‘ instruction in each week during said school hours, and
forty—live minutes during each week in the junior high school, receive
training in religious education . . . . Certain cards are used for ob-
taining permission of parents for their children to take said religious
instruction courses, and they are made available through the otlices
ot' the superintendent of schools and through the hands of principals
and teachers to the pupils of the school district. Said cards are
prepared at the cost of the council of religious education. The
handling and distribution of said cards does not interfere with
the duties or suspend the regular secular work of the employees of
thedefendant . . . g"

i‘ The State Supreme Court said: "The record further discloses that
the teachers conducting the religious classes were not teachers in the

 

 90
MCCOLLUM 1). BOARD OF EDUCATION. 5

separate religious groups by Protestant teachers,‘ Cath—
olic priests, and a Jewish rabbi, although for the past
several years there have apparently been no classes in—
structed in the Jewish religion. Classes were conducted
in the regular classrooms of the school building. Stu—
dents who did not choose to take the religious instruction
were not released from public school duties; they were
required to leave their classrooms and go to some other
place in the school building for pursuit of their secular
studies. On the other hand, students who were released
from secular study for the religious instructions were re—
quired to be present at the religious class. Reports of
their presence or absence were to be made to their secular ‘
teachers.“

public schools but were subject to the approval and supervision of the
superintendent . . . The trial court t'ound: ”Before any faith or
other group may obtain permission from the del'endant for the simi-
lar, tree and equal use of rooms in the public school buildings said
l'aith or group must make application to the superintendent of schools
of said School Dist rict Number Tl, who in turn will determine whether
or not it is practical for said group to teach in said school system.”
The president of the local school board testilied: “. . . The l’rotes—
tants would have one group and the Catholics, and would be given a
room where the_v would have the class and we would go along with
the plan ol' the religious people. They were all to be treated alike,
with the understanding that the teachers they would bring into
the school were approved by the superinteiulent . . . . The
superintendent was the last word so far as the individual was con—
cerned . . . ."

‘There were two teachers of the Protestant faith. One was a
Presbyterian and had been a foreign missionary for that church.
The second testified as follows: “I am affiliated with the Christian
church. I also work in the Methodist Church and I taught at the
Presbyterian. Iain married to a Lutheran.”

7‘Tlie director of the Chainpaign Council on Religious Education
testitied: . . It any pupil is absent we turn in a slip just like any
teacher would to the superintendent's otlice. The slip is a piece of

paper with a number of hours in the school day and a square, and
the teacher of the particular room for the particular hour records the

 

 90

MCCOLLUM 1}. BOARD OF EDUCATION.

The foregoing facts, without reference to others that
appear in the record, show the use of tax—supported prop—
erty for religious instruction and the close cooperation
between the school authorities and the religious council
in promoting religious education. ~ The operation of the
state’s compulsory education system thus assists and is
integrated with the program of religious instruction car—
ried on by separate religious sects. Pupils compelled
by law to go to school for secular education are released
in part from their legal duty upon the condition that
they attend the religious classes. This is beyond all
question a utilization of the tax—established and tax—
supported public school system to aid religious groups to
spread their faith. And it falls squarely under the ban
of the First Amendment (made applicable to the States
by the Fourteenth) as we interpreted it in Evcrson V.
Board of Erliu'ation, 330 U. S. 1. There we said:
“Neither a State nor the Federal Government can set, up
a. church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religious. or prefer one religion over another.”
Neither Han force or influence a person to go to or to
remain away from church against his will, or force him
to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person

absentees. It has their names and the grade and the section to which
they belong: it is the same sheet that the geography and history

teachers and all the other teat-11ers use, and is furnished by the