xt7msb3wtd0h_51 https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7msb3wtd0h/data/mets.xml https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7msb3wtd0h/data/72m2.dao.xml unknown 166 Cubic Feet 381 document boxes, seven textile items, three map folders, one artwork archival material 72m2 English University of Kentucky The physical rights to the materials in this collection are held by the University of Kentucky Special Collections Research Center.  Contact the Special Collections Research Center for information regarding rights and use of this collection. Frederick Moore Vinson papers Economic stabilization. Elections -- United States -- Congresses. Judges -- Correspondence. Judges -- United States. Judicial opinions Judicial process -- United States Legislators -- Correspondence. New Deal, 1933-1939. World War, 1914-1918 -- Veterans. World War, 1939-1945. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents - no. 34 text McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents - no. 34 2019 https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7msb3wtd0h/data/72m2/Box_207/Folder_3/Multipage6199.pdf 1949 1949 1949 section false xt7msb3wtd0h_51 xt7msb3wtd0h 44

SWEATT t‘. PAINTER. 5

such a substantial and signiﬁcant segment of society

z excluded, we cannot conclude that the education offered

3 petitioner is substantially equal to that which he would

: receive if admitted to the University of Texas Law
1 School.

It. may be argued that excluding petitioner from that
school is no different from excluding white students from
the new law school. This contention overlooks realities.

. It is unlikely that a member of a group so decisively in

' the majority, attending a school with rich traditions and

5 prestige which only a history of consistently maintained
excellence could command, would claim that the oppor-
tunities afforded him for legal education were unequal
to those held open to petitioner. That such a claim,
if made, would be dishonored by the State, is no answer.
“Equal protection of the laws is not achieved through
indiscriminate imposition of inequalities.” Shelley v.
Kraemcr, 334 U. S. 1, 22 (1948).

It. is fundamental that these cases concern rights which
are personal and present. This Court has stated unani—
mously-that “The State must provide [legal education]
for [petitioner] in conformity with the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and provide it as
soon as it does for applicants of any other group.” Sipuel
Y. Board of Regents, 332 U. S. 631, 633 (1948). That.
case “did not present the issue whether av‘srtlate might-
not satisfy the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment by establishing a separate law school for
Negroes.” Fisher '\‘. Hurst, 333 U S. 147, 150 (1048).
In ilII'ssouri (it: rel. Gaines Y. Canada, 305 U. S. 337, 351
(1938). the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Hughes,
dtﬁ‘ared that “. . . petitioner’s right. was a personal one.
It was as an individual that. he was entitled to the equal
protection of the laws, and the State was bound to furnish
him within its borders facilities for legal education sub-
stantially equal to those the State there afforded for

 

 rp . ; ;Z
.L .

From: Clark; J

RECE‘VED a I i I Circula‘ted: ,7/7/{OH
A?“ 7 3 3“ PM '50 Recirculated:...._..,_..

~ ‘ - lE
023'.
SUPREME C(ﬁlREIF 6555qu UNITED STATES

Nos. 34 AND 44-.—OC'I‘0131~:I:TERM, 1949.

G. “V. McLaurin. Apyellantgl

34; 1'. On Appeal From the

Oklahoma. State Regents for [illited States District
Higher Education, Board of Court f0? the “5090111
Regents of [’nja—ngjty of District of Oklahoma.
Oklahoma, et al.

Heman Marion Sweatt,
Petitioner, On ll'rit of Certiorari to
44 1'. the Supreme Court of
Theophilus thckel Painter. l} 9 State Of Texas.
et a1.

[April —, 1950.]

hIemorandnm to the Conference from MR. JUSTICE
CLARK.

Since these cases arise in “my” part of the country
it is proper and I hope helpful for me to express some
Views concerning them:

1. The “horribles” following reversal of the cases pic-
tured by the States. excepting Oklahoma. are highly
exaggerated. There would be no “incidents,” in my opin—
ion. if the cases are limited to their facts, 1'. 6., graduate
schools. Oklahoma was frank enough to admit this. Its
concern was the extension of the doctrine to the ele—
mentary and secondary schools. Certainly this is not,
required now. I would be opposed to such extension at
this time and would vote against taking a case involving
same. Perhaps at. a later date our judicial discretion will
lead us to hear such a case.

2. The issue of Plcssy v. F(’I‘(/u807’1,}8 application to these
cases must be met. The only way to avoid it in chalt

 

 34 & 44—MEMO.
2 MCLAURIN v. OKLA. STATE REGENTS.

is to remand for ﬁndings re the new law school; and
that would really be deciding against. petitioner’s con—
tention that however similar the two schools may be,
they can’t be “equal” when segregated.

3. I think chatt should be reversed. There are two
courses:

(a) Overrule Plcssy v. Ferguson, which would carry
with it subsequent, cases based on that doctrine. I am
opposed to this course.

(b) Hold Plcssg] not applicable because it. does not
involve education; and state that the cases cited therein
are not apposite to the Sweet! case. Distinguish Gaines
as holding the State cannot avoid its obligation by fur—
nishing funds for its Negro citizens to attend out—of—state
institutions. Gong Linn, involved elementary schools.
and merely held the State was not obliged to furnish
separate facilities for each race. Fisher and its compan-
ion Sipucl are not. controlling for the question of “separate
but equal” was excepted in the Fisher opinion.1

There are good reasons for us not to extend the Plcssy
doctrine to graduate schools. I am opposed to such an
extension. Limitation to graduate schools ignores. of
course, the inﬂuence of segregation upon children’s minds
when they are four or ﬁve years old; but I see no reason
why we should not concern ourselves here with the equal-
ity of education rather than social recognition. These
are, after all, education cases. And it is entirely possible
that Negroes in segregated grammar schools being taught-
arithmetic, spelling, geography, etc., would receive skills
in these elementary subjects equivalent; to those of seg-

1“The petition for certiorari in Sipucl v. Board of Regents, did
not present the issue whether a state might not satisfy the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by establishing a
separate law school for Negroes.“ Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U. S. 1-17,
150.

 

 34 & 44—MEMO.
MCLAURIN v. OKLA. STATE REGENTS. 3

regated white students, assuming equality in the texts,
teachers, and facilities.

But it is obvious to me that the same would not. apply
to graduate schools. There are many reasons: (1) white
schools have higher standing in the community as well
as nationally, which means much to the graduate pro—
fessional man; (2) the older and larger college has more
alumni, which gives the graduate more professional op—
portunities; (3) the larger and older school attracts bet—
ter professors; (4) competition among schools is much
keencr in the older and more established school, thus
affording a wider professional competition; (5:) the larger
and older institution attracts a. cross section of the entire
State in its student. body affords a wider exchange of
ideas and, in the combat, of ideas. furnishes a greater
variety of minds, backgrounds and opinions which is most-
important in the professions; (6) it takes years and years
to establish a professional school of top rank. affording
law reviews, competitions, medals, societies, etc, which a
Negro school would never attain; (7) acquaintance is
important in the professions and segregation prevents it,
thus depriving the Negro of many state-wide oppor—
tunities. These and other reasons are those which I am
sure have led all but nine of the States to abandon the
“separate but equal” doctrine at the graduate level.

4. ilIcLaun'n can, I think, be handled rather summarily.
Some of the reasons for reversing Sweatt—particularly
the seventh listed above—apply to 11! cLaurin. Besides,
once a Negro has been admitted he is obviously handi—
capped psychologically by being subject to all sorts of
restriction. Discrimination in the cafeteria, library and
class room would certainly hurt one’s ability to concen—
trate on the business at hand. Alternatively, reversal
could be placed upon the ground that. there is no evidence
of the reasonableness of the classiﬁcation based on race——

 

 3l 8' éé‘MEMO.
4 MCLAFRIN '2‘. OKLA. STATE RECLNTS.

there is no contention th: any disturbance would result
if the rules were not aln‘ogated. This latter ground
would, of course, leave the door open to contentions by
other States that disorders would result—and perhaps
even encourage the staging of those disorders.

I join with those who would reverse these cases upon
the ground that segregated graduate, education denies
equal protection of the laws. I would follow the lead of
the Congress in the only graduate school which it sup-
ports in the District of Columbia. Howard llniversitv,
which is not segregated. As to the elementary schools in
the District. I leave them to the Congress and the Fifth
Amendment, at least for the present.

If some say this undermines Plessy then let it fall,
as have many Nineteenth Century oracles.

 

 c >6

L”

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 34.—OCTOBER TERM, 1949.

G. W. McLaurin, Appellant,
1). On Appeal From the
Oklahoma State Regents for United States Dl'Stl‘iCt
Higher Education, Board of Court f01‘ the “VCStE‘I‘H
Regents of ~University of District Of Oklahoma.
Oklahoma, et. al.

[May —, 1950.]

MR. CHIEF J CSTICE VINSON delivered the opinion of the
Court.

In this case. we are faced with the question whether a
state may, after admitting a student to graduate instruc—
tion in its state university, afford him different treatment
from other students solely because of his race. We de—
cide only this issue; see Sweatt y. Painter, ante, p. —.

Appellant is a Negro citizen of Oklahoma. Possessing
a Master‘s Degree, he applied for admission to the Uni-
yersity of Oklahoma in order to pursue studies and courses
leading to a Doctorate in Education. At that time. his
application was denied, solely because of his race. The
school authorities were required to exclude him by the
Oklahoma. statutes. 70 Okla. Stat. §§ 455, 456, 457 (19—11).
which made it a misdemeanor to maintain or operate,
teach or attend a school at which both whites and Negroes
are enrolled or taught. Appellant ﬁled a complaint re-
questing injunctive relief, alleging that. the action of the
school authorities and the statutes upon which their
action was based were unconstitutional and deprived him
of the equal protection of the laws. Citing our decisions
in Missouri or rel. Gaines V. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938),
and Sipacl v. Board of Regents, 332 U. S. 631 (1948).
the statutory three-judge District Court held that the

 

 34
2 MCLAFRIN e. OKLA. STATE REGENTS.

State had a constitutional duty to provide him with the
education he sought as soon as it provided that education
for applicants of any other group. It further held that
to the extent the Oklahoma statutes denied him admis-
sion they were unconstitutional and void. On the as-
sumption, howeven that the State would follow the con-
stitutional mandate, the court refused to grant the
injunction, retaining jurisdiction of the cause with full
power to issue any necessary and proper orders to secure
McLaurin the equal protection of the laws.

Following this decision, the Oklahoma legislature
amended these statutes to permit the admission of Ne—
groes to institutions of higher learning attended by white
students. in cases where such institutions offered courses
not available in the Negro schools. The amendment
provided. however, that in such cases the program of
instruction “shall be given at such colleges or institutions
of higher education upon a segregated basis.”1 Appel—
lant was thereupon admitted to the University of Okla-
homa Graduate School. In apparent conformity with
the amendment his admission was made subject to “such
rules and regulations as to segregation as the President
of the Ifniversity shall consider to afford Mr. G. W. Me—

1 The amendment adds the following proviso to each of the sec—
tions relating to mixed schools: “Provided, that the provisions of
this Section shall not apply to programs of instruction leading to a
particular degree given at State owned or operated colleges or insti-
tutions of higher education of this State established for and/or used
by the white race, where such programs of instruction leading to a
particular degree are not given at colleges or institutions of higher
education of this State established for and/or used by the colored
race: provided further, that said programs of instruction leading to
a particular degree shall be given at such colleges or institutions of
higher education upon a segregated basis." Okla. Stat. Ann. tit 70,
§§-t:’>5, .156, 457 (1950). Segregated basis is deﬁned as "classroom
instruction given in separate classrooms, or at separate times.” It].
§‘15;').

 

 34
MCLAL'RIN v. OKLA. STATE REGENTS. 3

Laurin substantially equal educational opportunities as
are afforded to other persons seeking the same education
at the Graduate College.” a. condition which does not
appear to have been withdrawn. Thus he was required
to sit. apart at a designated desk in an anteroom adjoining
the classroom; to sit at a designated desk on the mezza—
nine floor of the library, but not to use the desks in the
regular reading room; and to sit at a designated table
and cat, at. a different time from the other students in
the school cafeteria.

To remove these conditions, appellant filed a motion
to modify the order and judgment of the District Court.
That, court held that such treatment did not Violate the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment and denied the
motion. This appeal followed.

In the interval between the decision of the court below
and the hearing in this Court, the treatment afforded
appellant was altered. For some time. the section of
the classroom in which appellant sat was surrounded by
a rail on which there was a sign stating‘ “Reserved For
Colored,” but these have been removed. He is now
assigned to a seat in the classroom in a row speciﬁed
for colored students; he is assigned to a table in the
library on the main floor; and he is permitted to eat.
at the same time in the cafeteria as other students,
although here again he is assigned to a special table.

It is apparent that the separations imposed by the State
in this case are less tangible than symbolic. McLaurin
uses the same classroom, library and cafeteria as students
of other races; there is no indication that the seats to
which he is assigned inﬁlese Viiooms..arepecul-iarl-y-removed

.sfrom those of other students. He may wait in line in the
cafeteria and there stand and talk with his fellow students,
but while he eats he must remain apart.

[ Whether these restrictions reflect a general purpose to
stigmatize a. speciﬁc group or a particular attempt to

 

 34
4 MCLAURIN v. OKLA. STATE REGENTS.

attain technical compliance with the state statutes. they
can have but one effect: to serve as a reminder that the
state considers McLaurin different from his white fellows.
The reminder may be a fence and sign. a line painted
on the floor, or assignment to a particular row of seats.
It is the presence, not the nature, of the reminder which
is signiﬁcant. It requires no great knowledge of human
behavior to recognize the psychological handicaps to ef—
fective study which are necessarily imposed upon a gradu-
ate student who is set apart and distinguished because of
his race, a. factor over which he has no control and which
he could not alter if he so desired.

Our society grows increasingly complex, and our need
for trained leaders increases correspondingly. Appel-
lant’s case represents, perhaps, the epitome of that need,
for he is attempting to obtain an advanced degree in
education, to become, by deﬁnition, a leader and trainer
of others. Those who will come under his guidance and
inﬂuence must be directly affected by the education he
receives. Their own education and development will
necessarily suffer to the extent that his training is unequal
to that of his classmates. State—imposed restrictions
which produce such expanding inequalities cannot be
sustained.

It may be argued that appellant will be in no better
position when these restrictions are removed, for he may
still be set apart by his fellow students, This we think
irrelevant. There is a vast difference—a Constitutional
difference—between restrictions imposed by the state
which prohibits the intellectual commingling of students.
and the refusal of individuals to commingle where the
state presents no such bar. Shelley v. Kracmer, 334.- U. S.
1, 13—14 (1948). The removal of the state restrictions
will not necessarily abate individual and group predilec—
tions, prejudices and choices. But at the very least, the
state will not be depriving appellant of the opportunity

 

 34
MCLAURIN e. OKLA. STA TE REGENTS. 5

to secure acceptance by his fellow students on his own
merits.

We conclude that the conditions under which this ap—
pellant is required to receive his education deprive him
of his personal and present right to the equal protection
of the laws. See Szeeatt v. Painter, ante, p. —. We
hold that under these circumstances the Fourteenth
Amendment precludes differences in treatment by the
state based upon race. Appellant having been admitted
to a state-supported graduate school‘ must receive the
same treatment at the hands of the state as students of
other races. The judgment is

Reversed.

 

 //14(z 4"“;

.y"....—.— -»1—

we?“

A
\1\\\ 159%?
C“ if“; 3

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. SleC'mBEit TERM, 1949.

G. 11'. Mellanrin, Appellant.
'11. On Appeal From the
Oklahoma State Regents for 1'11119tlSt11t05 District
Higher Education. Board of Court 101‘ 1110 “VCS‘L'OI‘H
Relieuts of University of District of Oklahoma.
Oklahoma. et al.

{Mm—1930.]

3111. Crime Ji‘s'i‘ice Yixsox delivered the opinion of the
Court.

In this case. we are faced with the question whether a
state may. after admitting a student to graduate instruc—
tion in its state university. afford him different treatment
from other students solely because of his race. We de-
cide only this issue; see Stvcaz‘t V. Painter, ante, p. —.

Appellant is a Negro citizen of Okl lahoma. Possessine
a Master‘s Degiee he applied toi admission to the [ni—
\ cr sity of O‘ {lahoma 111 order t0])111\11(3 studies and com ses
leadingr to a Doctomte in Education. At th at time. his
application was denied, solely because of his race. The
school authorities were requi1 ed to exclude him by the
Oklahoma statutes 70 Okla. Stat. §§455 436 437 (1941)
which made it a misdemeanor to maintain o1 opeiate,
teach or attend a school at which both whites and Negroes
are enrolled or taught. Appellant ﬁled a complaint re-
questing injunctire relief, alleging that the action of the
school authorities and the statutes upon which their
action was based were unconstitutional and deprived him
of the equal protection of the laws. Citing our decisions
in JIissouri er rel. Gaines Y. Canada, 30-3 U. S. 337 (1938),
and 81])ch Y. Board of Regents, 332 U. S. 631 (1948),

Ea statutory three-judge District Court held that the

 

 3t
MCLAI‘RIN t‘. OKLA. s'ixvi‘i: RE :ENTS. 3

Laurin substantially equal educ; tional opportunities as
are afforded to other persons seeking the same education
at the Graduate (,‘t>llcge." a condition which does not
appear to have been withdrawn. Thus he was required
to sit apart at a designated des { in an anteroom adjoining
the classroom; to sit at a designated desk on the mezza-
nine ﬁoor of the library. but not to use the desks in the
regular reading room; and to sit at a designated table
5 and to eat a a different time from the other students in
the school cafeteria.

To remove these comlitions. appellant ﬁled a motion
to modify the order and judgment of the District Court.
That- court held that such treatment did not violate the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment and denied the
motion. This appeal followed.

In the interval between the decision of the court below
and the hearing in this. Court. the treatment afforded
appellant was: altered. For some time. the section of
the classroom in which appellant sat was surrounded by
a rail on which there was a sign stating. “Reserved For
Colored." but these have be‘n removed. He is now
assigned to a seat in the classroom in a row specified
for colored students: he is assigned to a table in the
library on the main floor: and he is permitted to eat
at the same time in the cafeteria as other students,
although here again he is, assigned to a special table.

lt ista])parcntlthat the separations imposedby the State
in this, case arefless' tangible tl‘an symbolic) )IeLaurii
uses the same classroom. library and cafeteria as students
of other races: there is: no indication that the seats to

i which he '5: assigned in these rooms have any disadvantage
of location. He may vait in line in the cafeteria and
there stand and talk with his fellow students. but while
he ‘ats he must remain apart.

These restrictions were obviously imposed in order to

‘ comply. as nearly as could be. with the statutory require—

 

 Missing Page(s)

 Bl
MCLAI’RIN r. OKLA. STATE REGENTS. 5

of his personal and present right to the equal protection
of the laws. See Szccalt V. Painter, ante, p. —. “'0
hold that under these circumstances the Fourteenth
Amendment precludes differences in treatment by the
state based upon race. Appellant. having been admitted
to a state—supported graduate school, must receive the
same treatment at the hands of the state as students of
other races. The judgment is

Reversed.

 

  

 17/?» —

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 34,—OCTOBER TERM, 1949.

G. \V. McLaurin, Appellant.
1‘. On .Appeal From the
Oklahoma State Regents for ['nited States DiStl‘iCt
Higher Education, Board of €011” f01 the “YQSJECI‘H
Regents of Eniyersity of D15t110t0f0k13l10111€1

Oklahoma, et al.
[June —. 1950.]

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE YINsON delivered the opinion of the
Court.

In this case. we are faced with the question whether a
state may, after admitting a student to graduate instruc—
tion in its state university, afford him different treatment
from other students solely because of his race We de-
cide only this issue; see Swec
I Appellant 1s a l\egro citizen of Oklahoma Possessing
a1 Maste1 s Deg”,1ee he applied fo1 admission to the 1111—
v e1 sity of Oklahoma 111 01de1 to pu1sue studies and courses
leading to a Doct01 ate in Education. At that time, his
application was denied solely because of his 1ace. The
school autl1o1ities 11 em 1equ11 ed to exclude him by the
Oklahoma statutes. 7O Okla. Stat. §§ 455, 456, 4:57 (1941),
which made it a misdemeanor to maintain or operate,
teach or attend a school at which both whites and Negroes
are enrolled or taught. Appellant filed a. complaint re— :
questing injunctive relief. alleging that. the action of the
school authorities and the statutes upon which their 1
action was based were unconstitutional and deprived him .2
of the equal protection of the laws. Citing our decisions ‘
in Missouri c1? rcl. Gaines Y. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938),
and Sipch v. Board of chenls, 332 U. S. 631 (1048),
a statutory three-judge District Court held that the

 

 34
2 MCLAURIN '1). OKLA. STATE REGENTS.

State had a constitutional duty to provide him with the
education he sought as soon as it provided that education
for applicants of any other group. It further held that.

to the extent. the Oklahoma statutes denied him admis- f
sion they were unconstitutional and void. On the as?1

sumption, however, that the State would follow the con—
stitutional mandate, the court refused to grant the
injunction, retaining jurisdiction of the cause with full
power to issue any necessary and proper orders to secure
McLaurin the equal protection of the laws.

Following this decision, the Oklahoma legislature
amended these statutes to permit the admission of Ne—
groes to institutions of higher learning attended by white
students, in cases where such institutions offered courses
not available in the Negro schools. The amendment
provided. however, that in such cases the program of
instruction “shall be given at such colleges or institutions

. . - . l
of higher education upon a. segregated basis."l Appel— g
lant. was thereupon admitted to the University of Olilil- :

homa Graduate School. In apparent conformity with
the amendment, his admission was made subject to “such
rules and regulations as to segregation as the President
of the University shall consider to afford Mr. G. XV. Me—

1 The amendment adds the following proviso to each of the sec-
tions relating to mixed schools: “Provided, that the provisions of
this Section shall not apply to programs of instruction leading to a
particular degree given at State owned or operated colleges or insti—
tutions of higher education of this State established for and/or used
by the white race, where such programs of instruction leading to a
particular degree are not given at colleges or institutions of higher
education of this State established for and/or used by the colored
race; provided further, that said programs of instruction leading to
a particular degree shall be given at such colleges or institutions of
higher education upon a segregated basis” Okla. Stat. Ann. tit, 70,
§§-15:3, 456, ~15? {1050). Segregated basis is: defined as “classroom
instruction given in separate classrooms, or at separate times.” Id.
§ 455.

 

 l
l
l
1

34
MCLAURIN v. OKLA. STATE REGENTS. 3

Laurin substantially equal educational opportunities as
are afforded to other persons seeking the same education
at the Graduate College,” a condition which does not.

' appear to have been withdrawn. Thus he was required

to sit apart at a designated desk in an anteroom adjoining
the classroom; to sit at a designated desk on the mezza—
nine floor of the library, but not to use the desks in the
regular reading room; and to sit at a designated table
and to eat at a different time from the other students in
the school cafeteria. I

To remove these conditions, appellant filed a motion
to modify the order and judgment of the District Court.
That court held that such treatment did not violate the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment and denied the
motion. This appeal followed.

In the interval between the decision of the court below
and the hearing in this Court, the treatment afforded
appellant was altered. For some time, the section of
the classroom in which appellant sat was surrounded by
a rail on which there was a sign stating. “Reserved For
Colored.” but. these have been removed. He is now
assigned to a seat in the classroom in a. row speciﬁed
for colored students; he is assigned to a table in the
library on the main ﬂoor; and he is permitted to eat
at the same time in the cafeteria as other students,
although here again he is assigned to a special table.

It is said that the separations imposed by the State
in this case are in form merely nominal. McLaurin
uses the same classroom, library and cafeteria as students
of other races; there is no indication that the seats to
which he is assigned in these rooms have any disadvantage
of location. He may wait in line in the cafeteria and
there stand and talk with his fellow students, but while
he eats he must remain apart.

These restrictions were obviously imposed in order to
comply, as nearly as could be, with the statutory require-

 

 34
4 McLAI‘RIN 7). OKLA. STATE REGENTS.

ments of Oklahoma. But they signify that the State.
in administering the facilities it affords for professional
and graduate study, sets McLaurin apart from the other
students. The result is that appellant is handicapped
in his pursuit of effective graduate instruction. Such re—
strictions impair and inhibit his ability to study. to engage

in discussions and exchange views with other students,
and, in general. to learn his profession.

Our society grows increasingly complex. and our need
for trained leaders increases correspondingly. Appel—
lant's case represents, perhaps. the epitome of that need,
for he is attempting to obtain an advanced degree in
education, to become, by deﬁnition, a leader and trainer
of others. Those who will come under his guidance and
inﬂuence must be directly affected by the education he
receives. Their own education and development will
necessarily suffer to the extent that his training is unequal
to that of his classmates. State—imposed restrictions
which produce such inequalities cannot be sustained.

It may be argued that appellant will be in no better
position when these restrictions are removed, for he may
still be set apart by his fellow students. This we think___
irrelevant. Therehis a vast difference—a Constitutional"
diﬁglence~between restrictions imposed by the state
which prohibit the intellectual commingling of students,
and the refusal of individuals to commingle where the
state presents no such bar. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S.
1, 13—14 (1948). The removal of the state restrictions
will not necessarily abate individual and group predilec-
tions, prejudices and choices. But at the very least, the
state will not be depriving appellant of the opportunity
to secure acceptance by his fellow students on his own
merits.

We conclude that the conditions under which this ap-
pellant is required to receive his education deprive him
of his perggnal and present right to the equal protection

 

 34

MCLAL’RIN v. OKLA. STATE REGENTS. 5

of the laws. See chatt V. Painter, ante, p. —-——. We
hold that under these circumstances the Fourteenth
Amendment in‘eeludes differences in treatment by the
state based upon race. Appellant. having been admitted
to a state—supported graduate school, must receive the
same treatment at the hands of the state as students of
other races. The judgment is

Ret'crscd.

 

 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 3~l.—OC"rOEEu Tenn. 1940.

G. KY. McLau'in. Appellant.
'2‘. On Appeal Fron the

Oklahoma State Regents for lvliiﬁ‘tl States DiSU'iC‘t
Higher Educa ion. Board of Court for the \\ estern
Regents of Ivnivel‘sity of Distl‘iCt Of L)kl2lh()lllﬂ.

Oklahoma, et al.
Ditty ~, 19.30.]

Mu. CHIEF Jt‘s'riei; Vixsox delivered the opinion of the
Court.

In this case, we are faced with the question whether a
state may, after admitting a student to graduate instruc—
tion in its state university. afford him different treatment
from other students solely because of his race. We de—
cide only this issue; see Szccalt Y. Painter, ante. p. —.

Appellant is a Negro citizen of Oklahoma.

versity of Oklahoma in order to pursue studies and courses
leading to a Doctorate in Education. At that time. his
application was denied. solely because of his race. The
school authorities were required to exclude him by the
Oklahoma statutes. 70 Okla. Stat. §§ 455. 4:36. 457 (1941),
which made it a misdemeanor to maintain or operate,
teach or attend a school at which both whites and Negroes
are enrolled or taught. Appellant ﬁled a complaint re—
questing injunctive relief. alleging that the action of the
school authorities and the statutes upon which their
action was based were unconstitutional and deprived him
of the equal protection of the laws. Citing our decisions
in .Missouri av rel. Gaines V. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938),
and 81szch V. Board of Regents, 332 U. S. 631 (1948),
l a statutory three-judge District Court held that the

 

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