xt7msb3wtd0h_63 https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7msb3wtd0h/data/mets.xml https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7msb3wtd0h/data/72m2.dao.xml unknown 166 Cubic Feet 381 document boxes, seven textile items, three map folders, one artwork archival material 72m2 English University of Kentucky The physical rights to the materials in this collection are held by the University of Kentucky Special Collections Research Center. Contact the Special Collections Research Center for information regarding rights and use of this collection. Frederick Moore Vinson papers Economic stabilization. Elections -- United States -- Congresses. Judges -- Correspondence. Judges -- United States. Judicial opinions Judicial process -- United States Legislators -- Correspondence. New Deal, 1933-1939. World War, 1914-1918 -- Veterans. World War, 1939-1945. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer - nos. 744-745 text Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer - nos. 744-745 2019 https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7msb3wtd0h/data/72m2/Box_227/Folder_2_3/Multipage7839.pdf 1951 1951 1951 section false xt7msb3wtd0h_63 xt7msb3wtd0h SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Nos. 744 AND 745.—OCTOBER TERM, 1951. The Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company, et al., Petitioners, 744 2). On Writs of Certiorari Charles Sawyer. to the United States Court of Appeals Charles Sawyer, Petitioner, for the District of 745 7). Columbia Circuit. The Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company, et al. [June 2, 1952.] MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. We are asked to decide whether the President was act— ing within his constitutional power when he issued an order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take pos— session of and operate most of the Nation’s steel mills. The mill owners argue that the President’s order amounts to lawmaking, a legislative function which the Constitu- tion has expressly confided to the Congress and not to the President. The Government’s position is that the order was made on findings of the President that his action was necessary to avert a national catastrophe which would inevitably result from a stoppage of steel production, and that in meeting this grave emergency the President was acting within the aggregate of his con- stitutional powers as the Nation’s Chief Executive and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States. The issue emerges here from the follow— ing series of events: In the latter part of 1951, a dispute arose between the steel companies and their employees over terms and con- 2 YOUNGSTOWN CO. v. SAWYER. ditions that should be included in new collective bargain- ing agreements. Long—continued conferences failed to re— solve the dispute. On December 18, 1951, the employees’ representative. United Steelworkers of America, C. I. 0., gave notice of an intention to strike when the existing bargaining agreements expired on December 31. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service then in— tervened in an effort to get labor and management to agree. This failing, the President on December 22, 1951, referred the dispute to the Federal Wage Stabilization Board 1 to investigate and make recommendations for fair and equitable terms of settlement. This Board’s report resulted in no settlement. On April 4, 1952, the Union gave notice of a nation—wide strike called to begin at 12:01 a. in. April 9. The indispensability of steel as a component of substantially all weapons and other war materials led the President to believe that the proposed work stoppage would immediately jeopardize our na— tional defense and that governmental seizure of the steel mills was necessary in order to assure the continued avail— ability of steel. Reciting these considerations for his action. the President, a few hours before the strike was to begin, issued Executive Order 10340. a copy of which is attached at the end of this opinion as an appendix. The order directed the Secretary of Commerce to take pos— session of most of the steel mills and keep them run— ning. The Secretary immediately issued his own pos— sessory orders, calling upon the presidents of the var~ ious seized companies to serve as operating managers for the United States. They were directed to carry on their activities in accordance with regulations and direc- tions of the Secretary. The next morning the President sent a message to Congress reporting his action. Cong. Rec, April 9, 1952, p. 3962. Twelve days later he sent 'This llonrd was established under Executive Order 10233, lti Fed. Reg. 3503. YOUNGSTOWN CO. v. SAWYER. 3 a second message. Cong. Rec, April 21, 1952, p. 4192. Congress has taken no action. Obeying the Secretary’s orders under protest, the com— panies brought proceedings against him in the District Court. Their complaints charged that the seizure was not authorized by an act of Congress or by any constitu— tional provisions. The District Court was asked to declare the orders of the President and the Secretary invalid and to issue preliminary and permanent injunctions restrain- ing their enforcement. Opposing the motion for pre- liminary injunction, the United States asserted that a strike disrupting steel production for even a brief period would so endanger the well—being and safety of the Nation that the President had “inherent power” to do what he had done—power ”supported by the Constitution, by his— torical precedent, and by court decisions.” The Govern- ment also contended that in any event no preliminary injunction should be issued because the companies had made no showing that their available legal remedies were inadequate or that their injuries from seizure would be irreparable. Holding against the Government on all points, the District Court on April 30 issued a preliminary injunction restraining the Secretary from “continuing the seizure and possession of the plant . . . and from acting under the purported authority of Executive Order No. 10340.” 103 F. Supp. 569. On the same day the Court of Appeals stayed the District Court’s injunction. — F. 2d —-—. Deeming it best that the issues raised be promptly decided by this Court, we granted certiorari on May 3 and set the cause for argument on May 12. Two crucial issues have developed: First. Should final determination of the constitutional validity of the Presi— dent‘s order be made in this case which has proceeded no further than the preliminary injunction stage? Second. If so, is the seizure order within the constitutional power of the President? YOUNGSTOWN CO. v. SAWYER. I. It is urged that there were non—constitutional grounds upon which the District Court could have denied the pre- liminary injunction and thus have followed the cus— tomary judicial practice of declining to reach and decide constitutional questions until compelled to do so. On this basis it is argued that equity’s extraordinary injunc- tive relief should have been denied because (a) seizure of the companies’ properties did not inflict irreparable dam— ages. and (b) there were available legal remedies adequate to afford compensation for any possible damages which they might suffer. While separately argued by the Gov— ernment, these two contentions are here closely related, if not identical. Arguments as to both rest in large part on the Government’s claim that should the seizure ulti- mately be held unlawful, the companies could recover full compensation in the Court of Claims for the unlawful taking. Prior cases in this Court have cast doubt on the right to recover in the Court of Claims on account of properties unlawfully taken by government officials for public use as these properties were alleged to have been. See c. 9., H006 v. United States, 218 U. S. 322, 335—336; United States v. North American Co, 253 U. S. 330, 333. But see Larson. v. Domestic &‘ Foreign. (7077)., 337 U. S. 682, 701402. Moreover, seizure and governmental op- eration of these going businesses were bound to result in many present and future damages of such nature as to be difficult, if not incapable, of measurement. View- ing the case this way, and in the light of the facts pre- sented, the District Court saw no reason for delaying decision of the constitutional validity of the orders. We agree with the District Court and can see no reason why that question was not ripe for determination on the record presented. We shall therefore consider and determine that question now. YOUNGSTOWN CO. v. SAWYER. II. The President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitu— tion itself. There is no statute that expressly authorizes - the President to take possession of property as he did here. Nor is there any act of Congress to which our attention has been directed from which such a power can fairly be implied. Indeed, we do not understand the Govern- ment to rely on statutory authorization for this seizure. There are two statutes which do authorize the President to take both personal and real property under certain conditions.2 However, the Government admits that these conditions were not met and that the President’s order was not rooted in either of the statutes. The Gov- ernment refers to the seizure provisions of one of these statutes (§ 201 (b) of the Defense Production Act) as “much too cumbersome. involved. and time—consuming for the crisis which was at hand.” Moreover, the use of the seizure technique to solve labor disputes in order to prevent work stoppages was not only unauthorized by any congressional enactment; prior to this controversy, Congress had refused to adopt that method of settling labor disputes. When the Taft- Hartley Act was under consideration in 1947, Congress rejected an amendment which would have authorized such governmental seizures in cases of emergency.3 Ap- parently it was thought that the technique of seizure, like that of compulsory arbitration, would interfere with the process of collective bargaining.4 Consequently, the plan Congress adopted in that Act did not provide for 2The Selective Service Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 60-1, 625—627, 50 U. S. C. App. (Supp. IV) §468; the Defense Production Act of 1950, Tit. II, 64 Stat. 798, as amended, 65 Stat. 138. 393 Cong. Rec. 3637—3645. 4 93 Cong. Rec. 3835—3836. 6 YOUNGSTOWN CO. v. SAWY ER. seizure under any circumstances. Instead, the plan sought to bring about settlements by use of the customary devices of mediation. conciliation, investigation by boards of inquiry, and public reports. In some instances tem- porary injunctions were authorized to provide cooling—off periods. All this failing, the unions were left free to strike if the majority of the employees, by secret ballot, expressed a desire to do so.5 It is clear that if the President had authority to issue the order he did. it must be found in some provisions of the Constitution. And it is not claimed that express constitutional language grants this power to the Presi— dent. The contention is that presidential power should be implied from the aggregate of his powers under the Constitution. Particular reliance is placed on provisions in Article II which say that “the executive Power shall be vested in a President . . .”; that “he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executec ” ; and that he “shall he Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.” The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President’s military power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The Government attempts to do so by citing a number of cases upholding broad powers in mil— itary commanders engaged in day—to—day fighting in a theater of war. Such cases need not concern us here. Even though “theater of war” be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of pri- vate property in order to keep labor disputes from stop— ping production. This is a job for the Nation’s law— makers, not for its military authorities. “Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 152—156. 120 IT. S. (I. (Supp. IV) §§ HI, lTl—lSO. YOUNGSTOWN CO. v. SAWYER. 7 Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several constitutional provisions that grant executive power to the President. In the framework of our Con- stitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the law—making process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to execute. The first section of the first article says that “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . . .” After granting many powers to the Congress, Article I goes on to provide that Congress may “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Govern- ment of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” The President’s order does not direct that a congres— sional policy be executed in a manner prescribed by Con- gress—it directs that a presidential policy be executed in a manner prescribed by the President. The preamble of the order itself, like that of many statutes, sets out rea- sons why the President believes certain policies should be adopted, proclaims these policies as rules of conduct to be followed, and again, like a statute, authorizes a govern- ment official to promulgate additional rules and regula— tions consistent with the policy proclaimed and needed to carry that policy into execution. The power of Congress to adopt such public policies as those proclaimed by the order is beyond question. It can authorize the taking of private property for public use. It can make laws regulating the relationships between employers and employees, prescribing rules designed to settle labor dis— putes, and fixing wages and working conditions in certain 8 YOUNGSTOWN CO. v. SAWYER. fields of our economy. The Constitution does not subject this law-making power of Congress to presidential or mil— itary supervision or control. It is said that other Presidents without congressional authority have taken possession of private business en— terprises in order to settle labor disputes. But even if this be true, Congress has not thereby lost its exclusive constitutional authority to make laws necessary and proper to carry out the powers vested by the Constitu— tion “in the Government of the ['nited States, or any Department or Officer thereof.” The Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good and bad times. It would do no good to recall the historical events, the fears of power and the hopes for freedom that lay behind their choice. Such a review would but confirm our hold— ing that this seizure order cannot stand. The judgment of the District Court is Afirmed. MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER. Although the considerations relevant to the legal en— forcement of the principle of separation of powers seem to me more complicated and flexible than may appear from what MR. JUSTICE BLACK has written, I join his opinion because I thoroughly agree with the application of the principle to the circumstances of this case. Even though such differences in attitude toward this principle may be merely differences in emphasis and nuance, they can hardly be reflected by a single opinion for the Court. Individual expression of views in reaching a common re— sult is therefore important. APPENDIX. April 8, 1952. EXECUTIVE ORDER Directing the Secretary of Commerce to Take Possession of and Operate the Plants and Facilities of Certain Steel Companies Whereas on December 16, 1950, I proclaimed the exist— ence of a national emergency which requires that the mili- tary, naval, air, and civilian defenses of this country be strengthened as speedily as possible to the end that we may be able to repel any and all threats against our na~ tional security and to fulfill our responsibilities in the efforts being made throughout the United Nations and otherwise to bring about a lasting peace; and Whereas American fighting men and fighting men of other nations of the United Nations are now engaged in deadly combat with the forces of aggression in Korea, and forces of the United States are stationed elsewhere over— seas for the purpose of participating in the defense of the Atlantic Community against aggression; and Whereas the weapons and other materials needed by our armed forces and by those joined with us in the de— fense of the free world are produced to a great extent in this country, and steel is an indispensable component of substantially all of such weapons and materials; and Whereas steel is likewise indispensable to the carrying out of programs of the Atomic Energy Commission of vital importance to our defense efforts; and Whereas a continuing and uninterrupted supply of steel is also indispensable to the maintenance of the economy of the United States, upon which our military strength depends; and Whereas a controversy has arisen between certain com— panies in the United States producing and fabricating steel and the elements thereof and certain of their Work— 9 10 YOUNGSTOWN CO. v. SAWYER. ers represented by the United Steelworkers of America. (‘10, regarding terms and conditions of employment; and Whereas the controversy has not been settled through the processes of collective bargaining or through the ef— forts of the Government, including those of the Wage Stabilization Board. to which the controversy was referred on December 22, 1951, pursuant to Executive Order No. 10233, and a strike has been called for 12:01 A. M., April .0. 1952; and Whereas a work stoppage would immediately jeopardize and imperil our national defense and the defense of those joined with us in resisting aggression, and would add to the continuing danger of our soldiers. sailors. and airmen engaged in combat in'the field; and Whereas in order to assure the continued availability of steel and steel products during the existing emergency. it is necessary that the United States take possession of and operate the plants, facilities, and other property of the said companies as hereinafter provided: Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows: 1. The Secretary of Commerce is hereby authorized and directed to take possession of all or such of the plants, facilities. and other property of the companies named in the list attached hereto, or any part thereof, as he may deem necessary in the interests of national defense; and to operate or to arrange for the operation thereof and to do all things necessary for, or incidental to, such operation. 2. In carrying out this order the Secretary of Commerce may act through or with the aid of such public or private instrumentalities or persons as he may designate; and all Federal agencies shall cooperate with the Secretary of YOUNGSTOWN CO. v. SAWYER. 11 Commerce to the fullest extent possible in carrying out the purposes of this order. 3. The Secretary of Commerce shall determine and pre- scribe terms and conditions of employment under which the plants, facilities, and other properties possession of which is taken pursuant to this order shall be operated. The Secretary of Commerce shall recognize the rights of workers to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining, adjustment of grievances, or other mutual aid or protection, provided that such activities do not interfere with the operation of such plants, facilities, and other properties. 4. Except so far as the Secretary of Commerce shall otherwise provide from time to time, the managements of the plants, facilities, and other properties possession of which is taken pursuant to this order shall continue their functions, including the collection and disbursement of funds in the usual and ordinary course of business in the names of their respective companies and by means of any instrumentalities used by such companies. 5. Except so far as the Secretary of Commerce may otherwise direct, existing rights and obligations of such companies shall remain in full force and effect, and there may be made, in due course, payments of dividends on stock and of principal, interest, sinking funds, and all other distributions upon bonds, debentures, and other obligations, and expenditures may be made for other ordinary corporate or business purposes. 6. Whenever in the judgment of the Secretary of Com- merce further possession and operation by him of any plant, facility, or other property is no longer necessary or expedient in the interest of national defense, and the Secretary has reason to believe that effective future oper- 12 YOUNGSTOWN CO. 7;. SAWYER. ation is assured, he shall return the possession and control thereof at the time possession was taken under this order. 7. The Secretary of Commerce is authorized to pre- scribe and issue such regulations and orders not incon- sistent herewith as he may deem necessary or desirable for carrying out the purposes of this order; and he may delegate and authorize subdelegation of such of his func- tions under this order as he may deem desirable. Harry S. Truman. The White House, April 8, 1952. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Nos. 744 AND 745.—OCTOBER TERM, 1951. The Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company, et al., Petitioners, 744 1). On Writs of Certiorari Charles Sawyer. to the United States Court of Appeals Charles Sawyer, Petitioner, for the District of 745 1). Columbia Circuit. The Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company, et al. [June 2, 1952.] MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, concurring. Before the cares of the White House were his own, President Harding is reported to have said that govern- ment after all is a very simple thing. He must have said that, if he said it, as a fleeting inhabitant of fairy- land. The opposite is the truth. A constitutional de- mocracy like ours is perhaps the most difficult of man’s social arrangements to manage successfully. Our scheme of society is more dependent than any other form of gov— ernment on knowledge and wisdom and self-discipline for the achievement of its aims. For our democracy implies the reign of reason on the most extensive scale. The Founders of this Nation were not imbued with the modern cynicism that the only thing that history teaches is that it teaches nothing. They acted on the conviction that the experience of man sheds a good deal of light on his nature. It sheds a good deal of light not merely on the need for effective power, if a society is to be at once cohesive and civilized, but also on the need for limitations on the power of governors over the governed. YOUNGSTOWN CO. v. SAWYER. To that end they rested the structure of our central government on the system of checks and balances. For them the doctrine of separation of powers was not mere theory; it was a felt necessity. Not so long ago it was fashionable to find our system of checks and bal— ances obstructive to effective government. It was easy to ridicule that system as outmoded—too easy. The experience through which the world has passed in our own day has made vivid the realization that the Framers of our Constitution were not inexperienced doctrinaires. These long-headed statesmen had no illusion that our people enjoyed biological or psychological or sociological immunities from the hazards of concentrated power. It is absurd to see a dictator in a representative product of the sturdy democratic traditions of the Mississippi Val- ley. The accretion of dangerous power does not come in a day. It does come, however slowly, from the generative force of unchecked disregard of the restrictions that fence in even the most disinterested assertion of authority. The Framers, however, did not make the judiciary the overseer of our government. They were familiar with the revisory functions entrusted to judges in a few of the States and refused to lodge such powers in this Court. Judicial power can be exercised only as to matters that were the traditional concern of the courts at VVest— Ininster, and only if they arise in ways that to the expert feel of lawyers constitute “Cases” or “Controversies.” Even as to questions that were the staple of judicial business, it is not for the courts to pass upon them unless they are indispensably involved in a conventional litiga— tion. And then, only to the extent that they are so involved. Rigorous adherence to the narrow scope of the judicial function is especially demanded in contro- versies that arouse appeals to the Constitution. The attitude with which this Court must approach its duty when confronted with such issues is precisely the opposite YOUNGSTOWN CO. v. SAWYER. 3 of that normally manifested by the general public. So— called constitutional questions seem to exercise a mes- meric influence over the popular mind. This eagerness to settle—preferably forever—a specific problem on the basis of the broadest possible constitutional pronounce- ments may not unfairly be called one of our minor national traits. An English observer of our scene has acutely described it: “At the first sound of a new argu- ment over the United States Constitution and its in- terpretation the hearts of Americans leap with a fearful joy. The blood stirs powerfully in their veins and a new lustre brightens their eyes. Like King Harry’s men be- fore Harfleur, they stand like greyhounds in the slips, straining upon the start.” The Economist, May 10, 1952, p. 370. The path of duty for this Court, it bears repetition, lies in the opposite direction. Due regard for the im— plications of the distribution of powers in our Constitu— tion and for the nature of the judicial process as the ulti— mate authority in interpreting the Constitution, has not only confined the Court within the narrow domain of appropriate adjudication. It has also led to “a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision.” Brandeis, J ., in Ashwander v. Tennessee Val- ley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 341, 346. A basic rule is the duty of the Court not to pass on a constitutional issue at all, however narrowly it may be confined, if the case may, as a matter of intellectual honesty, be decided without even considering delicate problems of power under the Constitution. It ought to be, but apparently is not a matter of common understanding that clashes between different branches of the government should be avoided if a legal ground of less explosive potentialities is properly available. Constitutional adjudications are apt by ex— posing differences to exacerbate them. YOUNGSTOWN CO. v. SAWYER. So here our first inquiry must be not into the pow- ers of the President, but into the powers of a District Judge to issue a temporary injunction in the circum- stances of this case. Familiar as that remedy is, it re— mains an extraordinary remedy. To start with a con- sideration of the relation between the President’s powers and those of Congress—a most delicate matter that has occupied the thoughts of statesmen and judges since the Nation was founded and will continue to occupy their thoughts as long as our democracy lasts—is to start at the wrong end. A plaintiff is not entitled to an injunc— tion if money damages would fairly compensate him for any wrong he may have suffered. The same considera- tions by which the Steelworkers, in their brief amicus, demonstrate, from the seizure here in controversy, con— sequences that cannot be translated into dollars and cents, preclude a holding that only compensable damage for the plaintiffs is involved. Again, a court of equity ought not to isSue an injunction, even though a plaintiff otherwise makes out a case for it, if the plaintiff’s right to an injunction is overborne by a commanding public interest against it. One need not resort to a large epi- grammatic generalization that the evils of industrial dis- location are to be preferred to allowing illegality to go unchecked. To deny inquiry into the President’s power in a case like this, because of the damage to the public interest to be feared from upsetting its exercise by him, would in effect always preclude inquiry into challenged power, which presumably only avowed great public in- terest brings into action. And so, with the utmost un- willingness, with every desire to avoid judicial inquiry into the powers and duties of the other two branches of the government, I cannot escape consideration of the legality of Executive Order No. 10340. YOUNGSTOWN CO. v. SAWYER. 5 The pole—star for constitutional adjudications is John Marshall’s greatest judicial utterance that “it is a con- stitution we are expounding.” JVIcCulloch v. Illaryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407. That requires both a spacious View in applying an instrument of government “made for an undefined and expanding future,” Hurtado V. California, 110 U. S. 516, 530, and as narrow a delimitation of the constitutional issues as the circumstances permit. Not the least characteristic of great statesmanship which the Framers manifested was the extent to which they did not attempt to bind the future. It is no less incumbent upon this Court to avoid putting fetters upon the future by needless pronouncements today. Marshall’s admonition that “it is a constitution we are expounding” is especially relevant when the Court is required to give legal sanctions to an underlying prin- ciple of the Constitution—that of separation of pow— ers. “The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white.” Holmes, J ., dissenting in Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189, 209. The issue before us can be met, and therefore should be, without attempting to define the President’s pow- ers comprehensively. I shall not attempt to delineate what belongs to him by virtue of his office beyond the power even of Congress to contract; what authority be- longs to him until Congress acts; what kind of problems may be dealt with either by the Congress or by the Presi- dent or by both, cf. La Abra Silver Mine 00. v. United States, 175 U. S. 423; what power must be exercised by the Congress and cannot be delegated to the President. It is as unprofitable to lumptogether in an undiscrim- inating hotch-potch past presidential actions claimed to be derived from occupancy of the office, as it is to con- jure up hypothetical future cases. The judiciary may, 6 YOUNGSTOWN CO. v. SAWYER. as this case proves, have to intervene in determining where authority lies as between the democratic forces in our scheme of government. But in doing so we should be wary and humble. Such is the teaching of this Court’s role in the history of the country. It is in this mood and with this perspective that the issue before the Court must be approached. We must therefore put to one side consideration of what powers the President would have had if there had been no legis— lation whatever bearing on the authority asserted by the seizure, or if the seizure had been only for a short, explicitly temporary period, to be determined automati— cally unless Congressional approval were given. These and other questions, like or unlike, are not now here. I would exceed my authority were I to say anything about them. The question before the Court comes in this setting. Congress has frequently—at least 16 times since 1916— specifically provided for executive seizure of production, transportation, communications, or storage facilities. In every case it has qualified this grant of power with lim- itations and safeguards. This body of enactments— summarized in tabular form in Appendix I—demon— strates that Congress deemed seizure so drastic a power as to require that it be carefully circumscribed Whenever the President was vested with this extraordinary author- ity. The power to seize has uniformly been given only for a limited period or for a defined emergency, or has been repealed after a short period. Its exercise has been restricted to particular circumstances such as “time of war or when war is imminent,” the needs of “public safety” or of “national security or defense,” or “urgent and impending need.” The period of governmental