xt7msb3wtd0h_64 https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7msb3wtd0h/data/mets.xml https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7msb3wtd0h/data/72m2.dao.xml unknown 166 Cubic Feet 381 document boxes, seven textile items, three map folders, one artwork archival material 72m2 English University of Kentucky The physical rights to the materials in this collection are held by the University of Kentucky Special Collections Research Center. Contact the Special Collections Research Center for information regarding rights and use of this collection. Frederick Moore Vinson papers Economic stabilization. Elections -- United States -- Congresses. Judges -- Correspondence. Judges -- United States. Judicial opinions Judicial process -- United States Legislators -- Correspondence. New Deal, 1933-1939. World War, 1914-1918 -- Veterans. World War, 1939-1945. Zorsch v. Clauson - no. 431 text Zorsch v. Clauson - no. 431 2019 https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7msb3wtd0h/data/72m2/Box_227/Folder_4/Multipage8031.pdf 1951 1951 1951 section false xt7msb3wtd0h_64 xt7msb3wtd0h 32;“. L2¢M.Mmﬁu "NV

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April 26, 1952

In No. 431, Zoreoh v. Gleason, I am adding at the
end of Footnete 8 the following:

See 333 U.s. at 225 where it was said. ”Of course,
'reieased time’ as a generalized conception, undefined by
differentiating particularities, is not an issue for
Constitutional adjudication. Lccal pregrems differ from
each other in many and caucial respecte.... It is only
when challenge is made to the share that the public schools
have in the execution of a particular 'releesed time' program
that close Judicial scrutiny is demanded of the exact relation
between the religious instruction and the public educational

system in the specific situation before the Court."

William 0. Douglas

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 431.—OCTOBER TERM, 1951.

T essim Zorach and Esta Gluck,
Appellants,
1).

Andrew G. Clauson, J12, Maxi- on Appeal From the
milian Moss, Anthony Cam— Court Of Appeals 0f
pagna, Harold C. Dean, the State Of New
George A. Timone and James York.

Marshall, Constituting The
Board of Education of The
City of New York, et al.

[April 28, 1952.]

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the
Court.

New York City has a program which permits its public
schools to release students during the school day so that
they may leave the school buildings and school grounds
and go to religious centers for religious instruction or de-
votional exercises. A student is released on written re-
quest of his parents. Those not released stay in the class-
rooms. The churches make weekly reports to the schools,
sending a list of children who have been released from pub-
lic school but who have not reported for religious
instruction.1

1 The New York City released time program is embodied in the
following provisions:

(a) N. Y. Education Law §3210 subdiv. 1 (b), which provides
that “Absence for religious observance and education shall be per-
mitted under rules that the commissioner shall establish.”

(b) Regulations of the Commissioner of Education of the State
of New York, Art. 17, 9 154 (l N. Y. Ofﬁcial Code Comp. 683), which
provide for absence during school hours for religious observance and

431
ZORACH v. CLAUSON.

This “released time” program involves neither religious
instruction in public school classrooms nor the expendi—
ture of public funds. All costs, including the application
blanks, are paid by the religious organizations. The case
is therefore unlike illcCollunt V. Board of Education, 333
U. S. 203, which involved a “released time” program from
Illinois. In that case the classrooms were turned over to
religious instructors \Ve accordingly held that the pro—
gram yiolated the First Amendment 3 which (by reason of
the Fourteenth Amendment)” prohibits the states from
establishing religion or prohibiting its free exercise.

education outside the school grounds [p.‘ll'. 1], where conducted by or
under the control of a duly constituted religious body [par. 2].
Students must obtain written requests from their parents or guardians
to be excused for such training lpar. 17], and must register for the
trainingr and haye a copy of their registration filed with the public
school authorities l'par. 3‘]. \Yeekly reports of their attendance at
such religious schools must be tiled with their principal or teacher
[’par. -l l. ()nly one hour a week is to be allowed for such training,
at the end of a class session l'par. 5 l, and where more than one reli—
gions school is conducted, the hour of release shall be the same for all
religious schools l'par. til.

(c) Regulations of the Board of Education of the City of New
York, which provide similar rules supplementing the State Com~
Inissiont-r's regulations, with the followingr significant amplifications:
No announcement of any kind will be made in the, public schools
relative to the program [rule 1']. The religious organizations and
parents will assume full responsibility l‘or attendance at the religious
schools and will explain any lailnres to attend on the weekly attend-
ance reports [rule 3}]. Students who are released will be dismissed
from school in the u~-ual way lrule Bl. There shall be no comment
by any principal or teacher on attendance or nonattendance of any
pupil upon religious instruction [rule 0'].

3']‘he l’irst .\niendment reads in relevant part, “Congress shall
Inalo' no law respectingr an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
Ille ['I‘ee exercise Iliet't'ol'."

‘7 See Stroutbcrg/ \‘. (it/(forum, 283 IV. R. 35!); ('anttcc/l y. Connect!—

Cid, Silt) l’. Bttti; .ljlll't/tlt'li' V. [’cnnsyimnia, 319 'L'. b. 105.

431
ZORACH v. CLAUSON. 3

Appellants, who are taxpayers and residents of New
York City and whose children attend its public schools,4
challenge the present law, contending it is in essence not
different from the one involved in the M'cCollum case.
Their argument, stated elaborately in various ways, re—
duces itself to this: the weight and influence of the school
is put behind a program for religious instruction; public
school teachers police it, keeping tab on students who are
released ; the classroom activities come to a halt while the
students who are released for religious instruction are on
leave; the school is a crutch on which the churches are
leaning for support in their religious training; without the
cooperation of the schools this “released time” program,
like the one in the lllcCollum case, would be futile and in—
effective. The New York Court of Appeals sustained the
law against this claim of unconstitutionality. 303 N. Y.
161, 100 N. E. 2d 463. The case is here on appeal. 28
L. S. C. § 1257 (2).

The briefs and arguments are replete with data bear-
ing on the merits of this type of “released time” program.
Views pro and con, are expressed, based on practical
experience with these programs and with their im—
plications." We do not stop to summarize these materials

‘1 No problem of thi< Court's jurisdiction is posed in this case since,
unlike the appellants in Dorcmus '\'. Board of Education, 342 U. S.
429, appellants here are parents of children currently attending schools
subject to the released time program. They alleged in their complaint
that the cti'cct of this program is to coerce them into releasing their
children for religious instruction under a system which promotes
divisiveness in religious views.

5See, (i. gt. l’ieckes, Weekday Religious Education (National Con-
lerencc ot' (‘hristians and Jews, Human Relations Pamphlet No. 6);
Butts, American Tradition in Religion and Education, pp. 188, 190;
Moehlmau, The \Vall of Separation between Church and State, pp.
123, 155 li'.: llochlman, The Church as Educator, pp. 10? it; Moral
and Spiritual Values in the Public Schools (Educational Policies Com—

431
4 ZORACH v. CLAUSON.

nor to burden the opinion with an analysis of them. For
they involve considerations not germane to the narrow
constitutional issue presented. They largely concern the
wisdom of the system, its efﬁciency from an educational
point of view, and the political considerations which have
motivated its adoption or rejection in some communities.
Those matters are of no concern here, since our problem
reduces itself to whether New York by this system has
either prohibited the “free exercise” of religion or has
made a law “respecting an establishment of religion"
within the meaning of the First Amendment.

It takes obtuse reasoning to inject any issue of the
“free exercise” of religion into the present case. No one
is forced to go to the religious classroom and no religious
exercise or instruction is brought to the classrooms of the
public schools. A student need not take religious instruc-
tion. He is left to his own desires as to the manner or

time of his religious devotions. if any.

There is a suggestion that the system involves the use
of coercion to get public school students into religious
classrooms. There is no evidence in the record before us
that supports that conclusion.“ The present record in—
deed tells us that the school authorities are neutral in

mission, 1951); Newman, The Sectarian Invasion of Our Public
Schools; l’ublic School Time for Religious Education, 1‘3 Jewish Edu—
cation 130 (January, 1941); Religious Instruction On School Time,
7 Frontiers of Democracy 72 (1940); Released Time for Religious
Education in New York City’s Schools t Public Education Association,
June 30, 1943); teleased Time for Religious Education in New York
City’s Schools (Public Education Association, June 30, 1915); lite-
lcased Time for lteligious Education in New York City Schools (Pub-
lic Education Associtdion, 1.049); 2 Stokes, Church and State in the
United States, pp. {LS—548; The Status Of Religious Education In
The Public Schools (National Education Association).

G Nor is there any indication that the public schools enforce attend—
ance at religious schools by punishing absentccs from the released
time programs for truancy.

431

ZORACH o. CLAUSON. 5

this regard and do no more than release students whose
parents so request. If in fact coercion were used, if it
were established that any one or more teachers were using
their office to persuade or force students to take the reli-
gious instruction, a wholly different case would be
presented.T Hence we put aside that claim of coercion
both as respects the “free exercise” of religion and “an
establishment of religion” within the meaning of the First
Amendment.

Moreover. apart from that claim of coercion. we do
not see how New York by this type of “released time”
program has made a law respecting an establishment
of religion within the meaning of the First Amend—
ment. There is much talk of the separation of Church and
State in the history of the Bill of Rights and in the deci—
sions clustering around the First Amendment. See E ver-
son. V. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1; ﬁfeCotlum V. Board

of Education, supra. There cannot be the slightest doubt
that the First Amendment reﬂects the philosophy that

7 Appellant; contend that they should have been allowed to proye
that the system is in fact administered in a coerciye manner. The
New York Court of Appeals declined to grant a trial on this issue,
noting, inter alia. that appellants had not properly raised their claim
in the manner required by state practice. 5‘ 3 N. Y. 161, 174, 100
N. F. 2d lot-3, too. This independent state ground for decision pre—
chides appellants from raising the issue of inaladministration in this:
pI‘Utft‘t‘tlllliL See Louisville tt' Naslmille R. ('0. V. ll'oodford, 234
17. S. lo, 51; Atlantic Coast Line ll. ('0. Y. Mints. 242 U. S. 532, 535;
American Surety ('0. Y. Baldwin, 237 U. S. 156, 160.

The only allegation in the complaint that bears on the issue is
that the operation of the program "has resulted and inevitably results
in the exercise of pressure and coercion upon parents and children
to secure attendance by the children for religious instruction.” But
this charge does not even implicate the. school authorities. It there—
fore cannot be the basis for holding that the New York Court of
Appeals under the guise of local practice defeated a federal right
in the manner condemned by Brown V. Western R. Co. of Alabama,

A) n

ooS U. S. 294, and related cases.

431

6 ZORACH 1). CLAUSON.

Church and State should be separated. And so far as in-
terference with the “free exercise” of religion and an
“establishment” of religion are concerned, the separation
must be complete and unequivocal. The First Amend-
ment within the scope of its coverage permits no excep-
tion; the prohibition is absolute. The First Amendment,
however, does not say that in every and all respects there
shall be a separation of Church and State. Rather, it
studiously deﬁnes the manner, the specific ways, in which
there shall be no concert or union or dependency one on
the other. That is the common sense of the matter.
Otherwise the state and religion would be aliens to each
other—hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly. Churches
could not be required to pay even property taxes. Munic—
ipalities would not be permitted to render police or ﬁre
protection to religious groups. Policemen who helped pa—
rishioners into their places of worship would violate the
Constitution. Prayers in our legislative halls; the ap—
peals to the Almighty in the messages of the Chief Exec—
utive; the proclamations making Thanksgiving Day a
holiday; “so help me God" in our courtroom oaths—
these and all other references to the Almighty that run
through our laws, our public rituals, our ceremonies
would be ﬂouting the First Amendment. A fastidious
atheist or agnostic could even object to the supplication
with which the Court opens each session: “God save the
United States and this Honor: ble Court.”

To make the assumption that Church and State must
always be at arms length and never cooperate would be
to assume that our government was formed to promote
the cause of the atheist and the agnostic; that we are a
godless people; that religion is taboo in public institu—
tions; that any weight or support which a teacher or a
governor or a mayor gives to a religious program is illegal.

\Ye would have to press the concept of separation of
Church and State to these extremes to condemn the pres-
ent law on constitutional grounds. The nulliﬁcation of

431
ZORACH v. CLAUSON. 7

this law would have wide and profound effects. A Catho—
lic student applies to his teacher for permission to leave
the school during hours on a Holy Day of Obligation to
attend a mass. A Jewish student asks his teacher for per-
mission to be excused for Y om Kippur. A Protestant
wants the afternoon off for a family baptismal ceremony.
In each case the teacher requires parental consent in writ-
ing. In each case the teacher, in order to make sure the
student is not a truant, goes further and requires a report
from the priest, the rabbi, or the minister. The teacher in
other words cooperates in a religious program to the extent
of making it possible for her students to participate in it.
Whether she does it occasionally for a few students, regu-
larly for one, or pursuant to a systematized program de—
signed to further the religious needs of all the students
does not alter the character of the act.

We are a religious people whose institutions presup—
pose a Supreme Being. XVe guarantee the freedom to
worship as one chooses. We make room for as wide
a variety of sects and creeds as the spiritual needs of man
deem necessary. We sponsor an attitude on the part of
government that shows no partiality to any one group
and that lets each ﬂourish according to the zeal of its ad-
herents and the appeal of its dogma. When the state
encourages religious instruction or cooperates with reli—
gious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public
events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our tradi-
tions. For it then respects the religious nature of our
people and accommodates the public service to their
spiritual needs. To hold that it may not would be to
ﬁnd in the Constitution a requirement that the govern-
ment show a callous indifference to religious groups.
That would be preferring those who believe in no religion
over those who do believe. Government may not ﬁnance
religious groups nor undertake religious instruction nor
blend secular and sectarian education nor use secular in-
stitutions to force one or some religion on any person.

431
8 ZORACH v. CLAI’SON.

But we ﬁnd no constitutional requirement which makes it
necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to
throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective
scope of religious inﬂuence. The government must be
neutral when it comes to competition between sects. It
may not thrust any sect on any person. It may not make
a religious observance compulsory. It may not coerce
anyone to attend church, to observe a religious holiday, or
to take religious instruction. But it. can close its doors
or suspend its operations as to those who want to repair
to their religious sanctuary for worship or instruction.
No more than that is undertaken here.

This program may be unwise and improvident from an
educational or a community viewpoint. That appeal is
made to us on a theory, previously advanced, that each
case must be decided on the basis of “our own preposses—
sions." See illcCollum v. Board of Education, supra, p.
238. Our individual preferences, however, are not the
constitutional standard. The constitutional standard is
the separation of Church and State. The problem, like
many problems in constitutional law, is one of degree.
Sec JIcC’ollum v. Board of Education, supra, p. 231.

In the ﬂIcColZum case the classrooms were used for
religious instruction and the force of the public school was
used to promote that instruction. Here, as we have said,
the public schools do no more than accommodate their
schedules to a program of outside religious instruction.
\Ve follow the McCoZlum case.8 But we cannot expand

SThree of its—TUE CHIEF JL’sTICE, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and
Mn. .li's'ricr. BURTON—who join this opinion agreed that the “re-
leased time" program involved in the McCoZlum case was unconsti—
tutional. It was our view at the time that the present type of
“released time" program was not prejudged by the McCollum case,
a conclusion emphasized by the reservation of the question in the
separate opinion by MR. va'riei; Fruxnrvn’rnn in which MR. JUS-
TIL'E 3L'Ii'i'ox joined. Sec 333 U. S. 225.

431

ZORACH v. CLAUSON. 9

it to cover the present released time program unless sepa—
ration of Church and State means that public institu-
tions can make no adjustments of their schedules to
accommodate the religious needs of the people. We can—
not read into the Bill of Rights such a philosophy of
hostility to religion.

Aﬂirmcd.

moﬁmnwmmEo
‘ “S mumquzu

E. E mm 2 mm E

amimomm

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 431.—OCT0BER TERM, 1951.

Tessim Zorach and Esta Gluck,
Appellants,

7).

Andrew G. Clauson, Jr., Maxi— on Appeal From the
milian h‘Ioss, Anthony Cam— Court Of Appeals 0f
pagna, Harold C. Dean, the State Of New
George A. Timone and James York.

Blarshall, Constituting The
Board of Education of The
City of New York, et al.

[April —, 1952.]

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the
Court.

New York City has a program which permits its public
schools to release students during the school day so that
they may leave the school buildings and school grounds
and go to religious centers for religious instruction or de—
votional exercises. A student is released on written re-
quest of his parents. Those not released stay in the class-
rooms. The churches make weekly reports to the schools,
sending a. list of children who have been released from pub—
lic school but who have not reported for religious
instruction.1

1 The New York City released time program is embodied in the
following" provi.

431
ZORACH v. CLAUSON. 3

Appellants, who are taxpayers and residents of New
York (‘ity and whose children attend its public schools,“
challenge the present law, contending it is in essence not;
different from the one involved in the ilIcCollum case.
Their argument, stated elaborately in various ways, re—
duces itself to this: the weight and influence of the school
is put behind a program for religious instruction; public
school teachers police it, keeping tab on students who are
released; the classroom activities come to a halt while the
students who are released for religious instruction are on
leave; the school is a crutch on which the churches are
leaning for support in their religious training; without the
cooperation of the schools this ”released time” program,
like the one in the ilICCOZZum case, would be futile and in—
effective. The New York Court of Appeals sustained the
law against this claim of unconstitutionality. 303 N. Y.
161, 100 N. R. 2d 463. The case is here on appeal. 28
U. S. (I. §1257(2).

The briefs and arguments are replete with data bear-
ing on the merits of this type of “released time” program.
Views pro and con, are expressed, based on practical
experience with these programs and with their ini—
plicatitms." We do not stop to summarize these materials

4 No problem of this Court‘s, jurisdiction is posed in this case since,
unlike the appellants in Dorm/121a v. Board of Education. — U. S.
—, appellants here are parents of children currently attending schools:
subject to the released time program. They alleged in their complaint
that the effect of this program is to coerce them into releasing their
ehildren l'or rell'liotts instruction under a system which promotes
divisiveness in religious views.

r’See, e. (L. lleckes, Weekday lleligious Education (National Con-
ference of ('hristians and Jews, llinnan llelations l’ainphlet, No. til;
Butts, .\nieriean Tradition in Religion and Education, pp. lt\.\‘, ltltl;
Moehhnan, The Wall of Separation between Church and State, pp.
122;, 1.3.") tl'.: Moehlnian, The Church as Educator, pp. ltlii Il'.; Moral
and Spiritual Values in the Public Schools t Educational Policies Com—

431
4 ZORACH v. CLAUSON.

nor to burden the opinion with an analysis of them. F or
they involve considerations not germane to the narrow
constitutional issue presented. They largely concern the
wisdom of the system, its efﬁciency from an educational
point of view, and the political considerations which have
motivated its adoption or rejection in some communities.
Those matters are of no concern here, since our problem
reduces itself to whether New York by this system has
either prohibited the “free exercise” of religion or has
established religion within the meaning of the First
Amendment.

It takes obtuse reasoning to inject any issue of the
“free exercise” of religion into the present case. No one
is forced to go to the religious classroom and no religious
exercise or instruction is brought to the classrooms of the
public schools. A student need not take religious instruc—
tion. He is left to his own desires as to the manner or
time of his religious devotions.

mission, ltlﬁl); Newman, The Seetarian Invasion of Our Public,
Schools: Public School Time for Religious Education, 12 Jewish Elu—
cation li'ltl (January, 104]); lieligious Instruction On School Time,
T Frontiers ol' llemocraev 72 tlthl); lleleased Time tor Religious
liducaiion in New York City's Schools (l’ulilic Education Association,
.luue .‘ltJ, Itl til): lleleased Time for lieligious Education in New York,
('iiv's Schools tl’uhlic J-lducation Association, .lune Ht), lit-tin; lie—
leasell Time l'or lielig'ious l'lducatiou in New York (‘itv Schools tl’ull—
lie lCdui-ation .\ssociaiion, lfllil); 2 Stokes, Church and State in the
l'uited States, pp. Jill—MN; The Status Ol‘ Religious Education To
The Public Schools (National Education .v\ssociatitjnil.

"Nor is ii "I" -:i:\" inlieaii! u that tfzw null? , >(‘llt>')l~ errfori ai‘e'izf
i

am“ Hi F‘ilLl‘rll‘ st ls lav )uuisl ' .

431
ZORACH v. CLAUSON. 5

this regard and do no more than release students whose
parents so request. If in fact coercion were used. if it
were established that any one or more teachers were using
their ofﬁce to persuade or force students to take the reli-
gious instruction, a wholly different case would be
presented.

Nor do we see how New York by this type of “released
time” program has made a law respecting an establish—
ment of religion within the meaning of the First Amend-
ment. There is much talk of the separation of Church and
State in the history of the Bill of Rights and in the deci-
sions clustering around the First Amendment. See E vor—
8027. v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1; illcCollum V. Board
of Education, supra. There cannot be the slightest doubt
that the First Amendment reﬂects the philosophy that
Church and State should be separated. And so far as in—
terference with the “free exercise” of religion and the
“establishment” of religion are concerned, the separation.
must be complete and unequivocal. The First Amend—
ment within the scope of its coverage permits no excep—
tion; the prohibition is absolute. The First Amendment,
however, does not say that in every and all respects there
shall be a separation of Church and State. Rather. it-
studiously deﬁnes the manner, the speciﬁc ways. in which
there shall be no concert or union or dependency one on
the other. That is the common sense of the matter.
Otherwise the state and religion would be aliens to each
other hostile. suspicious. and even unfriendly. Churches
could not be required to pay even property taxes. Blunic—
ipalities would not be permitted to render police or ﬁre
protection to religious groups. Policemen who helped pa—
rishioners into their places of worship would violate the
Constitution. Prayers in our legislative halls; the ap-
pe: ls to the Almighty in the messages of the Chief Exec—
utive; the proclamations making Tllhanksgiving Day a
holiday: “m help me God” in our courtroom oaths~

431
6 Z ORACH v. CLAUSON.

these and all other references to the Almighty that run
through our laws, our public rituals, our ceremonies
would be ﬂouting the First Amendment. A fastidious
atheist or agnostic could even object to the supplication
with which the Court opens each session: “God save the
United States and this Honorable Court.”

To make the assumption that Church and State must
always be at arm’s length and never cooperate would be
to assume that our government was formed to promote
the cause of the atheist and the agnostic; that we are a
godless people; that religion is taboo in public institu—
tions; that any weight or support which a teacher or a
governor or a mayor gives to a religious program is illegal.

We would have to press the concept of separation of
Church and State to these extremes to condemn the pres—
ent law on constitutional grounds. The nulliﬁcation of
this law would have wide and profound effects. A Catho-
lic student applies to his teacher for permission to leave
the school during hours on a Holy Day of Obligation to
attend a mass. A Jewish student asks his teacher for per-
mission to be excused for Yom Kippur. A Protestant
wants the afternoon off for a family baptismal ceremony.
In each case the teacher requires parental consent in writ—
ing. In each case the teacher, in order to make sure the
student is not a truant, goes further and requires a report
from the priest, the rabbi, or the minister. The teacher in
other words cooperates in a religious program to the extent
of making it possible for her students to participate in it.
Whether she does it occasionally for a few students, regu-
larly for one, or pursuant to a systematized program de-
signed to further the religious needs of all the students
does not alter the character of the act.

We are a religious people whose institutions presup—
pose a Supreme Being. \Ve guarantee the freedom to
worship as one chooses. \Vc make room for as wide
a variety of sects and creeds as the spiritual needs of man

431
ZORACH v. CLAUSON. 7

deem necessary. We sponsor an attitude on the part of
government that shows no partiality to any one group
and that lets each ﬂourish according to the zeal of its ad—
herents and the appeal of its dogma. then the state
encourages religious instruction or cooperates with reli—
gious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public
events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our tradi-
tions. For it then respects the religious nature of our
people and accommodates the public service to their
spiritual needs. To hold that it may not would be to
find in the Constitution a requirement that the govern—
ment show a callous indifference to religious groups.
That would be preferring those who believe in no religion
over those who do believe. Government may not ﬁnance
religious groups nor undertake religious instruction nor
blend secular and sectarian education nor use secular in-
stitutions to force one or some religion on any person.
But we find no constitutional requirement which makes it
necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to
throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective
scope of religious inﬂuence. The government must be
neutral when it comes to competition between sects. It
may not thrust any sect on any person. It may not make
a religious observance compulsory. It may not coerce
anyone to attend church, to observe a religious holiday, or .
to take religious instruction. But it can close its doors
or suspend its operations as to those who want to repair :
to their religious sanctuary for worship or instruction