xt7msb3wtd0h_7 https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7msb3wtd0h/data/mets.xml https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7msb3wtd0h/data/72m2.dao.xml unknown 166 Cubic Feet 381 document boxes, seven textile items, three map folders, one artwork archival material 72m2 English University of Kentucky The physical rights to the materials in this collection are held by the University of Kentucky Special Collections Research Center. Contact the Special Collections Research Center for information regarding rights and use of this collection. Frederick Moore Vinson papers Economic stabilization. Elections -- United States -- Congresses. Judges -- Correspondence. Judges -- United States. Judicial opinions Judicial process -- United States Legislators -- Correspondence. New Deal, 1933-1939. World War, 1914-1918 -- Veterans. World War, 1939-1945. Associate Justices - Robert Jackson text Associate Justices - Robert Jackson 2019 https://exploreuk.uky.edu/dips/xt7msb3wtd0h/data/72m2/Box_161/Folder_7/Multipage989.pdf 1946-1953 1953 1946-1953 section false xt7msb3wtd0h_7 xt7msb3wtd0h

Justice Douglas
I O .
inyured Again
PORTLAND. Ore, July 18 (Km—A
horse again has upset Supreme
Court Justice William 0. Douglas'
mountain climbing plans. '
Last year a horse rolled on him, ‘
putting him in a hospital for weeks.
Today he reported that a horse
kicked him in the shin last week‘
while at his Wallowa mountain
summer home. He had planned to
climb Mount St. Helens this week
end. but the leg is a bit lame.

Supreme Court of the United States

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Memorandum

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ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRE‘I‘ARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON. D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Deuglas.

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he Czechoslovak Ambassador presents his complimente
to His Excellency; the Secretary of State. and with
rererencc to the Department of State‘s note No. 093.50F2/ E
1947 dated May as, 1947 has the honor to more Hie Excedé
enoy that the President of the Czechoslovak Republic, t
Dr. Edvard Beneé has awarded the medal of the Czechoslovak:
, ,
Order or the White Lion to Mrs. Elsie Douglas, secretary
to Mr. Justice. Robert H. Jackson, and to transmit herewit;
the insignia of the decoration together with a diploma
to be held in the custody of the Department of State for
Mrs. Douglas until she is legally entitled to receive it.‘
An acknowledgement of receipt is also enclosed and the

Ambassador will highly appreciate having it returned after

Mrs. Douglae' signature has been affixed.

Enclosures 3.

Czechoslovak Embassy,
Washington, D. 0.
September 30, 1947.

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HAHﬂEIRSS OF THE
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DIRECTOR

ELMORE WH ITEHU RST
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS
SUPREME COURT BUILDING

WASHINGTON 13, D. C.
WILL SHAFROTH

CHIEF OF THE DIVISION OF
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CHIEFJUSTICE

ADDRESS
BY

MR. .IUsTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON
Associate Justice) Supreme Court of the United States

A T

THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
Mayflower Hotel
\Vzisliirigt(in, D. C.

Thursday, illay 20, 1948

Mr. President and Fellow Members of the American Law
Institute:

It is an honor to greet this body of lawyers and a
pleasure to see old personal friends as you gather for
a work session in the Nation’s Capital. It is altogether
appropriate, of course, that a member of the Supreme
Court participate in the welcoming rites. You represent
the legal profession in a great undertaking to restate
the law; I am sure it has not escaped your attention that
the institution of which I am a member is actively engaged
in the same enterprise. The consideration that you show

me on this occasion I take to be an example of the ﬁne

sportsmanship which should prevail among competitors.

I was told by your president that “too elaborate an
address is unnecessary.” Your president is a master of
the art of dressing up his desire for brevity in the cloak
of forbearance for the speaker. But I shall say a few
of the things that are on my mind, in spite of the admo-

nition.

Some of us who began attending these sessions close
to a quarter of a century ago look back on those days
with a certain nostalgia. Perhaps we were all a little
naive; perhaps I was more naive than the others. But
as I remember it now, what may be called the “climate
of opinion” at those earlier gatherings was quite different

than it is today. The labor on restatement of the law

was commenced on the assumption that the body of

private law as embodied in court decisions was reasonably
settled and fairly stable—at least, that most of it would
hold good while the restatement was being formulated.
Of course, we knew that from time to time particular
decisions would be overruled and that some rules of law
would and ought to be changed by legislation. But we
did not anticipate any fundamental change in the atti—
tude of courts to the law itself, or toward its development
with traditional regard for its continuity which is a char—
acteristic of the common law method.

A few days ago, however, Lord MacMillan, known
pleasantly to many of us, in lecturing on “Law and Cus—
tom” at St. Andrews University said something that may
awaken a response in you. It was this:

“The lover of our ancient laws and institutions,
which we have inherited from our fathers, cannot
but look on with some dismay at the process which
we see daily in operation around us whereby the
customary common law of the land, which has served
us so well in the past, is being more and more super-

seded by a system of laws which have no regard for

, 3

the usages and customs of the people, but are dictated

by ‘ideologiCal theories’.’

“There will soon be little of the common law left
either in England or in Scotland, and the Statute-
book and the vast volumes of statutory rules and
orders will take its place. The work of our courts
is more and more concerned with the interpretation
of often unintelligible legislation, and less and less
concerned with the discussion and development of
legal principles. Advocacy has consequently lost
much of its intellectual interest and scope.”

When I read that, I could not help but think of our
own Mr. Justice Cardozo, whose reverence for the com-
mon law and common law methods was so poignantly
expressed in his address at our third annual meeting
almost 25 years ago. On that occasion he compared the
common law to a magical coat described by one of
Swift’s characters—a coat which, it was said, would grow
in the same proportions as the body of the wearer. Mr.
Justice Cardozo said with some feeling that the common
law had done just that—and that it was “still a good
coat”—“far too good to be thrown away.”

It is not easy from where I sit to judge whether Lord
MacMillan’s present fears or Judge Cardozo’s earlier
hopes represent current conditions in this country as a
whole. The Supreme Court. except incidentally and not
too successfully. was never an expounder of the common
law. By Eric Railroad V. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, and

related cases, and by its practice of declining to review

4 _

state law questions in diversity cases, the Supreme Court
has closed its own door to independent speculation as
to common law principles. What, therefore, appears to
me as a decline in the place of the common law in our
scheme of things may be a Washington disturbance which
does not reach state courts or other federal courts. But
I suspect it is a part of a more or less world—wide impa—
tience with the gradual and deliberate pace of growth
under the judicial process.

The titanic struggle for power now being waged be—
tween nations and between classes within the nations is
as much one to change legal systems as to change political
or economic systems. This involves far more than chang—
ing rules of property to achieve greater socialization, far
more than imposing a Continental system of judicial
procedure, far more than setting up a secret political
police force. It goes to the very nature of the court
itself and would alter the foundation on which our
Western civilization has built its legal systems.

The concept which dominates all Communist teaching
has been stated by Soviet authority in these simple words:

“The Court has been, and still remains, as it ought to

be according to its nature,—namely, one of the organs

of governmental power, a weapon in the hands of the
ruling class for the purpose of safeguarding its interests.”
The most striking feature of this concept is its primitive
mingling in the court of the two functions that Western
civilization years ago divided between the courts and the

legislature. This is not surprising, for it comes to Us.

from a country whose legal institutions are at least 300
years behind the Western world in legal development and
which has had little experience with representative legis—
latures. It comes from a people whom the Renaissance,
the Reformation and the great democratic awakening that
followed our own and the French Revolution, have never
touched. Their history has no Magna Charta, no Bill
of Rights. Their heroes include no Lord Chief Justice
Coke to remind the Czar that he rules “under God and
the law,” no Jefferson, no Montesque. Lenin, Stalin and
their compatriots stepped into a system of customary law
deeply inﬂuenced by centuries of absolutism, and their
View of the function of a court, instead of being an ad-
vance over ours, is simply an adherence to an old
authoritarian practice.

Of course, we democratic peoples recognize that the
policy of the law is, and should be, made by what you
may call a “ruling class.” Under our own system, legis-
lation is shaped by a majority of the representatives of
majorities of electors in the various constituencies. Our
concept of the court presupposes its acceptance of deci-
sions on policy by the legislative majorities that from
time to time prevail, except where an overriding policy is.
set forth in the Constitution.

But when a ruling majority has put its commands in-
statutory form, we have considered that the interpreta-
tion of their fair meaning and their application to indi-

vidual cases should be made by, judges as independent

of politics as humanly possible and not serving the inter»

ests of the class for whom, or a majority by whom,
legislation is enacted.

The danger of the competition between our Western
and the Eastern concept of courts is that the latter is so
much easier to apply. To carry out the Soviet concep-
tion requires a judge only to know which side he is on.
But to observe the democratic separation of functions so
as to leave policy making to the political bodies and make
the function of interpretation a professional matter,
requires training, constant intellectual effort, deliberation
and detachment. And it is guided and aided by the expe—
rience of generations of common law judges found in the
precedents.

But as the courts are obligated by the principles of our

representative government to independence in construing

the language of statutes, so they owe a similar obligation

of ﬁdelity to the legislative bodies in applying their poli-
cies. If the separation of functions is to be observed, it
is necessary that the utmost clarity prevail in the com—
munication of the legislative will as to policy. I read
from time to time of laws enacted by Congress of which
it is said it will require several years to learn how the
courts will apply them and what meaning courts will
give to them. Then, too, I occasionally learn of a statute
that means one thing one year and another the next.
This seems to be accepted as necessary and usual, but it
really indicates that there is something wrong in the
process by which law is communicated in this country.

It will not do to blame all of this confusion on bad

draftsmanship, appropriate as that criticism may be at
times. It will not do to blame it all on the English

language for its inexactness and lack of precision.

The unfortunate fact is that neither Congress in the

choice of language it will use, nor the Courts in the mean-
ings they will ascribe to Congress, have really effective
guidance from consistently accepted principles of inter—
pretation. Of course, a complete and automatic code of
interpretation is not possible. But in its one hundred and
ﬁfty years of interpreting federal statutes, the Supreme
Court has been less willing to commit itself to considered
guides to interpretation than have many of the State
Courts. Neither has Congress undertaken to formulate
any comprehensive rules on this subject. For the indi-
vidual Justice to be left so much at large presents oppor-
tunity and temptation to adopt interpretations that ﬁt
his predilections as to what he would like the statute to
mean if he were a legislator. Indeed, sometimes there is
not much else to guide him.

The subject is too large and complicated for compre-
hensive treatment on this occasion. It involves incon—
sistent practices on such vexing problems as these: When
will rc-enactment. of a statute carry adoption of previous
administrative regulations or court decision? When will
consideration of a statute without changing it mean Con-
gressional approval of prior judicial interpretation?
Statutes that impose criminal and civil penalties or create
liabilities, or all of these, are sometimes said to be con-

strued strictly, sometimes liberally, and sometimes a mid—

dle course is taken. Should there be a prescribed, uniform
approach to such statutes and, if so, what should it be?
What attitudes should be taken toward statutes that con-
travene common—law doctrine in a federal system where

there is no general federal common law? How far will we

go to construe a law so as to avoid raising a constitutional

question? How shall our construction differ in the case
of what lately is called “humanitarian legislation” from
other enactments, which by contrast must be regarded as
“inhumanitarian,"—the tax laws perhaps,—and how
shall we as judges distinguish the one from the other?

I, like other opinion writers, have resorted not infre—
quently to legislative history as a guide to the meaning
of statutes. I am coming to think it is a badly overdone
practice, of dubious help to true interpretation and one
which poses serious practical problems for a large part of
the legal profession. The British courts, with their long
accumulation of experience, consider Parliamentary pro-
ceedings too treacherous a ground for interpretation of
statutes and refuse to go back of an Act itself to search
for unenacted meanings. They thus follow Mr. Justice
Holmes’ statement, made, however, before he joined the
Supreme Court, that “We do not inquire what the legis-
lature meant, we ask only what the statute means.”

And, after all, should a statute mean to a court What
was in the minds but not put into the words of men behind
it, or should it mean what its language reasonably con-

veys to those who are expected to obey it?

The Constitution evidently intended Congress itself to
reduce the conﬂicting and tentative views of its members
to an agreed formula. It was expected to speak its will
with considerable formality, after deliberation assured by
three readings in each House. Its exact language requires
Executive approval, or enough suppOrt to override a veto.
How far, then, should this formal text and context be
qualiﬁed or ampliﬁed by expressions of one or several
Congressmen in reports or debates which did not ﬁnd
place in the enactment itself?

There is a tendency to decrease the measure of the
ambiguity which originally justiﬁed resort to legislative
history. But even if the ambiguity is genuine and sub-
stantial, do we ﬁnd more solid ground by going back of
it? It is a poor cause that cannot ﬁnd some plausible»
support in legislative history, which often includes tenta-
tive rather than ﬁnal Views of legislators or leaves mis-
interpretation unanswered lest more deﬁnite statements
imperil the chance of passage.

The custom of remaking statutes to ﬁt their histories

has gone so far that a formal Act, read three times and

voted on by Congress and approved by the President, is
no longer a safe basis on which a lawyer may advise his
client, or a lower court decidena case. This has very
practical consequences to the profession. The lawyer
must consult all of the committee reports on the Bill,
and on all its antecedents, and all that its supporters.

and opponents said in debate, and then predict What,

part of the conﬂicting views will likely appeal to a major-

ity of the Court. Only the lawyers of the Capital or

the most prosperous ofﬁces in the large cities can have
all the necessary legislative material available. The aver-
age law ofﬁce cannot afford to collect, house and index
all this material. Its use by the Court puts knowledge
of the law practically out of reach of all except the Gov-
ernment and a few law ofﬁces.

But perhaps the most unfortunate consequence of
resort to legislative history is that it introduces the policy
controversies that generated the Act into the deliberations
of the Court itself.

There is no greater aid to law enforcement, and t0 the
judicial process generally, than clear understanding of
what the law requires. This, no doubt, is what led Mr.
Justice Cardozo to describe your restatement project as
a “high enterprise.” Confusion or conflict in compre—
hending the meaning of the law, while sometimes inevi—
table, should be reduced by every possible device. then
Congress has in mind one thing. and its enactments are
given different meanings in the courts, it results in repeal—
ers and amendments. sometimes retroactive and in con—
fusion, litigation and controversies that weaken and dis—
credit not only the judicial process but the law in general,
and government itself. Yet, as matters stand today, I
do not see how Congress can know, even roughly, the
effect that will ultimately be given to any language it

may use. And I do not see how the bar can, with any

large measure of conﬁdence, advise clients in complicated
business transactions what their liabilities or duties are.

Though it would not dispel all the doubts which are
inherent in the situation, it would help give objectivity
to the process of interpretation and assurance to drafting
of statutes, if we could have general acceptance by the
Bench as well as the Bar of a few basic principles of statu-
tory construction. Perhaps the Institute could devise a
disinterested restatement that would commend itself as
an acceptable standard for enactment by Congress, or for
application by the courts.

Perhaps the situation requires an approach such as
was adopted in devising the Federal Rules. Do not mis-
understand me~I am not now naive enough to think
that if any such course were agreed upon nothing would
be left to what Mr. Justice Cardozo called those “tentative
gropings, those cautious experiments, those provisional
hypotheses, that. are part of the judicial process.” I know

that such full agreement is beyond the power of even

this distinguished group of lawyers. And I suspect that,

even if that millennium did arrive, we judges would
perhaps slowly, but ever so surely, demonstrate that
either because of its legislative history or despite it,
“millennium" in fact, or in juridical contemplation at
least, means much less than a thousand years.
Nevertheless. the problem confronts judges. and par-
ticularly Federal judges, every day; and it is worthy of
any effort you might deem proper to make its eventual

solution more likely and more immediate.

But I must not further Offend against your president’s
injunction against an elaborate speech.

It is a ﬁne thing that we have these meetings of our
profession. Here we can haul each other over the coals
and focus attention on trends of ill onien for the profes-
sion. And not least important is the fact that we can

liquidate our conﬂicts and worries in social sessions.

There, in those more mellow moments, we may continue

discussion of this. or of less baffling subjects.

CH/H BE; HSUF T
CFHEF JUST“:

:Suprrmt Gaunt of tho Ilnih’h Sindee
lﬂaehinghmll G.

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Decembcer l3, 191$ '

The Chief Justice.

My dear Mr. Chief Justice:

At Saturday's conference there were two cases in
which I did not vote, not having hard argument and not having
had time to read the briefs‘

In No. 65, Chicagol MillwailkeeL etc. v. Acme Freight
my vote is to REVERSE.

In No. 59, Marzani v. United States, my vote is to
AFFIRM. I agree with Judge Hand, in United States v. Gottfried
165 F. 2d, 360, and this Court apparently agreed with him in
denying certiorari and rehearing, that the statute of limita-
tions extended the time in this case, which disposes of all
except trivial questions on which.I would affirm.

Sincerely yours,

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES <-

No. llS.——OCT()BER TERM, 1949.

("apitol Greyhound Lines, Penn—
sylvania Greyhound Lines.
lnc.. and Red Star Motor

Coaches, lnc.. Appellants, Appeal from the Court

of Appeals of the

2).
State of Maryland.

Arthur H. Brice. Commissioner
of Motor Vehicles. State of
Maryland.

[October A, 1949.]

MR. .lus'rICE JACKsON, dissenting.

This appeal challenges a new type of taxing statute by
which a State undertakes to tax the conduct of interstate
commerce. The statute provides that every motor ve—
hicle driven or moved upon a highway within the State
must be registered and have a. certiﬁcate of title and then
grants certain exemptions, including one for non—resi—
dents. The non—resident does not become entitled to an
exemption. however, if he is “engaged in the business
of transporting persons or property for hire, wholly or
partly upon or over the public highways of the State, over
fixed routes, or between ﬁxed termini." The tax is made
applicable to any vehicle in interstate transportation, even
if no intrastate business is done and no matter how few
miles the vehicle travels over the highways of the State.
The tax is not measured by either the use of the highways
or the revenues attributable to commerce within the
State; inst ~ad, it is a tax of 2% 011 the fair market, value
of the vehicle when titled.

No previous decision of this Court approves this type
of statute. and the questions which it raises under the
(,‘onnnerce (‘lause of the (‘onstitution are at least debat-

118—DISSENTING
2 GREYHOUND LINES v. COMMISSIONER.

able. however we may ultimately decide them. Though
the appellant‘s jurisdictional statement has been on file
for upwards of three months. the State has filed no re—
sponse or contention that a substantial question is not
presented. The judgment appealed from is one which
reverses the judgment of another state court, which sus-
tained appellant's contention that the statute violates the
Federal Constitution. Both courts carefully examined
decisions of this Court and arrived at opposing conclusions
as to the validity of the tax. Such disagreement does not
suggest a question lacking in importance or substance.
I think we should note probable jurisdiction and hear
argument on the merits.

trom: JACKSON, J.
cireolated:

3rcuTated: ____________________

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 118.~O("roBi:R TERM, 1049.

(‘apitol Greyhound Lines, Penn—
sylvania Greyhound Lines.
Inc., and Red Star Motor

Coaches. Inc.. Appellants, Appeal from the Court

of Appeals of the

2).
State of Maryland.

Arthur H. Brice, (‘ommissioner
of Motor Vehicles. State of
Arlaryland.

[October A, 1949.]

Mn. JUSTICE JACKSON, dissenting.

This appeal challenges a new type of taxing statute by
which a State undertakes to tax the conduct of interstate
commerce. The statute provides that every motor ve—
hicle driven or moved upon a highway within the State
must be registered and have a certiﬁcate of title and then
grants certain exemptions, including one for non—resi-
dents. The non-resident does not become entitled to an
exemption. however, if he is “engaged in the business
of transporting persons or property for hire. wholly or
partly upon or over the public highways of the State, over +1.4“
fixed routes. or between fixed termini," The tax is made
appli‘ sable to any vehicle in interstate transportation, even
if no intrastate business is done and no matter how few
miles the vehicle travels over the highways of the State.
The tax is not measured by either the use of the highways
or the revenues attributable to commerce within the
State: instead. it is a tax of 2% on the fair market value
of the vehicle when titled.

No previous decision of this Court approves this type
of statute. and the questions which it raises under the
(‘ommeree (‘lause of the (‘onstitution are at, least debat-

118—DISSENTING
2 GREYHOUND LINES v. COMMISSIONER.

able, however we may ultimately decide them. Though
the appellantyjurisdictional statement has been on ﬁle
for upwards of three months, the State has filed no re-
sponse or contention that a substantial question is not
presented. The judgment. appealed from is one which
reverses the judgment of another state court, which sus—
tained ap})ellantFHcontentiou that the statute violates the
Federal (‘onstitutioir Both courts carefully examined
decisions of this (‘ourt and arrived at Opposing conclusions
as to the validity of the tax. Such disagreement does not
suggest a question lacking in importance or substance.
I think we should note probable jurisdiction and hear
argument on the merits.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED ATES [6.4% C}

No. 118.—-O("roni<:n TERM, 1949.

Capitol Greyhound Lines. Penn—
sylvania Greyhound Lines.
lnc.. and Red Star Motor

Coaches, Inc.. Appellants, Appeal from the Court

of Appeals of the

1.7. State Of NIarylalld.

Arthur H. Brice. Commissioner
of Motor Vehicles, State of
Maryland.

I October —, 1940.]

MR. .li's’rICE JACKSON, dissenting.

This appeal challenges a new type of taxing statute by
which a State undertakes to tax the conduct of interstate
commerce. The statute provides that every motor ve-
hicle driven or moved upon a highway within the State
must be registered and have a certiﬁcate of title and then
grants certain exemptions. including one for non—resi—
dents. The non-resident does not become entitled to an
exemption. however, if he is “engaged in the business
of transporting persons or property for hire. wholly or
partly upon or over the public highways of the State, over
fixed routes. or between ﬁxed termini.” The tax is made
applicable to any vehicle in interstate transportation, even
if no intrastate business is done and no matter how few
miles the vehicle travels ovcr’the highways of the State.
The tax is not measured by either the use of the highways
or the revenues attributable to commerce within the
State; instead. it is a tax of 2% on the fair market value
of the vehicle when titled.

No previous decision of this Court approves this type
of statute. and the questions which it raises under the
(‘ommeree (‘lause of the Constitution are at least debat—

(J.

Fr”

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Noa ___, October Term, l9h9

United States of America, ex rel.
Ellen Knauff, Petitioner,

v. On Application for Stay.

and Edward J. Shaughnessy, as
District Director of the Immigra~
tion and Naturalization Service
for the New York District, and

to whomsoever may have the cus“
tody of the body of hllen Knauff;

(Lay 17, 1950)

By Mr. Justice Jackson,

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Howard McGrath, Attorney General 3
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As Circuit Justice for the Second Circuit, it is my almost
invariable practice to refuse stays which the Court of Appeals
or its judges have denied. This because they are closer to the
facts, have heard the merits fully argued, and because I have
confidence that they would grant stays in worthy cases. This
rare departure from practice may call for a word of explanation.

The decision of the Court of Appeals denying petitioner
relief on habeas corpus was handed down yesterday and, about

four o'clock yesterday afternoon, stay was denied. The court

suggested to counsel that he could apply ”at Washington” for a

stay and counsel announced a purpose to do so. Immediately,
however, the Department of Justice notified petitioner to be
ready to be shipped on a commercial plane leaving New York this
morning at eleven o'clockﬁ This scarcely gave counsel time
to prepare an application for stay here and no time for me to
hold a hearing on it, As the case comes to me, I am informed
that preparations are complete at the airport to deport her in
a matter of minutes.

Bundling this woman onto an airplane to get her out of
this country within hours after the decision of the Court of
Appeals, if accomplished, would have two consequences. First,

it probably would defeat this Court's jurisdiction to consider

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her petition for review. Second, it would circumvent any
action by Congress —— which the Department has vigorously

opposed ~- to cancel her exclusion, already unanimously taken

by the House of Representatives. In this connection, the

Department of Justice was given hearing by a subcommittee of
the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives° After
considering the objections of the Department of Justice, the
Committee nevertheless reported favorably on the bill and the
House of Representatives, with rare unanimity, decided the
exclusion order should be cancelled. That bill, together with
a like measure introduced in the Senate, is now before the
Senate Judiciary Committee for consideration. There appears
also to have been an agreement by the Department with the
Congress to withhold action under such circumstances, but I
have been unable in the time allowed to ascertain its text.

If the Department had at any time shown even probable
grounds to believe that presence of this woman a few days
more in this country might jeopardize national security, even
infinitestimally, I should refuse the stay. But the Department
of Justice has not only had opportunity, it has been importuned
to show courts or Congress any reason for its exclusion order.

Not only is the petitioner unable to learn what the
Specific charges against her are, but neither can the courts
which are asked to play at least a consenting part in her ex—
clusion, nor the Congress, which is in the midst of an effort
to stop it. It overtaxes credulity to believe that it would
jeopardize the security of the United States to impart to
coordinate branches of the Government some inkling of the
charges against this woman.

That the purpose of this haste to rush her out of the
country is to defeat any effort to have this Court review her

present habeas corpus proceeding, appears from statements

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apparently made to the press by the Government's counsel in
the Court of Appeals. We are not ordinarily satisfied with
newspaper evidence, but the speed of events has left no time
for verification. The statements of several r