Pipeville LAWRENCE R. WEBST ATTORNEY AT LAW MAIN STREET P.O. DRAWER 712 PIKEVILLE, KENTUCKY 41501 July 21, 1992 LAWRENCE R. WEBSTER H. MICHAEL LUCAS G. Wix Unthank, Judge P.O. Box 5112 London, Kentucky 40745 -5112 RE: Civil Action No. 91-62 Tract Nos. 1045, 1045E-1, 1045E-2 Dear Judge Unthank: I've copied your jury instructions after comparing them to Palmore's Standard Kentucky jury instructions and find them to be quite acceptable. My secretary has retyped them in their entirety making appropriate blanks on the last page as needed and appropriate. If you have any questions, please feel free to call. Yours truly, HML/jt Encl. cc: Hon. David Y. Olinger, Jr.

P'heville

LAWRENCE R. WEBSTER ATTORNEY AT LAW MAIN STREET P.O. DRAWER 712 PIKEVILLE, KENTUCKY 41501 July 21, 1992 LAWRENCE R. WEBSTER TELEPHONE (606) 437-4029 H. MICHAEL LUCAS G. Wix Unthank, Judge P.O. Box 5112 London, Kentucky 40745 -5112 RE: Civil Action No. 91-62 Tract Nos. 1045, 1045E-1, 1045E-2 Dear Judge Unthank: I've copied your jury instructions after comparing them to Palmore's Standard Kentucky jury instructions and find them to be quite acceptable. My secretary has retyped them in their entirety making appropriate blanks on the last page as needed and appropriate. If you have any questions, please feel free to call. Yours truly, Michael Lucas HML/jt Encl. cc: Hon. David Y. Olinger, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY PIKEVILLE

COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY:

EMINENT DOMAIN

This action by the United States is brought in the exercise of the Federal Government's power of eminent domain. It is sometimes called a condemnation proceeding.

The Government has the right and the power to take private property for public purposes, and that power is essential to the independence of the Government. Otherwise, any landowner could delay or even prevent public improvements, or could force payment of a price exceeding the fair market value of the property taken.

Exercise of the power of eminent domain is subject always, however, to the requirement of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution that payment of "just compensation" shall be made to the owner for all estates or interests in property so taken.

The burden is on the defendant property owner to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence in the case, that the fair market value of his property at the date of taking was as much as he claims. To establish by a preponderance of the evidence in the case means such evidence as, when considered and compared with that

opposed to it, has more convincing force, and produces in your mind belief that what is sought to be proved is more likely true than not true.

"Fair market value" means the price in cash, or its equivalent, that the property would have brought at the time of taking, considering its highest and most profitable use, if then offered for sale in the open market with a reasonable time allowed to find a purchaser.

In other words, "fair market value" means the amount a willing buyer would have paid a willing seller in an arm's length transaction with both parties being fully informed concerning all of the advantages and disadvantages of the property, and with neither acting under any compulsion to buy or sell.

In arriving at your determination of fair market value, you should take into account all factors which could fairly be suggested by the seller to increase the price paid, and all counter-arguments which the buyer could fairly make to reduce the price. Your determination is to be made in the light of the opinions of the various witnesses and all facts affecting value, as shown by the evidence in the case.

Government plans to take certain property may either increase or decrease the fair market value on the date of the taking without regard to any threat of a taking.

The jury is instructed that no consideration shall be given to nor allowance of compensation made for either:

- (1) Any unwillingness of the property owner to part with his interest, or
- $% \left(2\right) =-200$ (2) Any frustration of the personal plans of the property owner, or
- (3) Any opportunities the property owner may have lost by reason of the taking of their land.

HIGHEST AND BEST USE

An owner is entitled to just compensation for the fair market value of the property for its reasonable highest and best use. In making such a determination the jury shall consider the highest and most profitable use for which the property is adaptable and needed or is likely to be needed in the near future. A potential future use of condemned property should be considered not as the present measure of value but only to the extent that the prospect of demand for such use would have affected the price a willing buyer would have offered for the property just prior to the taking.

Four elements must be proven by the landowner before a potential use can be said to have influenced the fair market value of condemned land:

- (1) the potential use must not require a substantial expenditure of capital,
 - (2) the project must not be highly uncertain,
- (3) the property must be physically adaptable to the potential use, and
- (4) a market for the property must have existed, in fact, at the time of the taking or must have been reasonably likely to exist in the near future.

While the term "highest and best use" by its meaning and definition is self-limiting and a property may

have only one highest and best use; nevertheless, property may have and be adaptable to more than one use. Where property is adaptable to multiple uses, the jury is instructed that the law does not permit multiple uses to be pyramided, combined, tacked on, nor added so as to exceed the fair market value of said property for its reasonable highest and best use.

FAIR MARKET VALUE

In determining fair market value, the best evidence is the sale of the same property in an arm's length transaction reasonably near in time on the open market. If there is no such sale, the next best or preferred evidence is a sale of similar or comparable property or properties, sometimes referred to as market comparison. No two properties are identical in all respects, but the sale should be an arm's length transaction reasonably near in time on the open market and the similarities should substantially outweigh the dissimilarities. The comparable sales admitted into evidence should be considered insofar as such sales, looking at the circumstances of each instance, may evidence or throw light upon the present fair market value of the property to be taken, unaffected by the condemnation of such property for public use.

In the absence of any relevant and probative evidence of comparable sales, the next best or preferred evidence of fair market value is net income capitalization. However, before this method may be considered it must be established by substantial and convincing evidence, such as the conclusion of an industry expert, that the property is or reasonably may be incomeproducing and has an economic life from which a determination may be made for the recapture of the value of the investment, plus a reasonable and proper rate of return on the investment, minus a reasonable discount for the shortened economic life.

An additional method, where the property is unique or there is insufficient evidence of comparable sales or net income capitalization, is the cost or reproduction costs method. In this method depreciable improvements are added to the value of the raw land minus any allowed depreciation. However, the cost or reproduction costs method may not be utilized to exceed the fair market value of the property in its existing condition on the date of taking.

Finally, a jury may receive as evidence of fair market value the opinion of a witness who is qualified by reason of education, training and experience and the weight and credibility of such evidence is within the

discretion of the jury in accord with the Court's instructions.

Although a method or formula may be preferred as the best evidence, the law is not wedded to any particular formula or method. In determining fair market value an interaction of these formulas or methods may be the basis for such determination if there is substantial and convincing evidence as to any such method or formula considered and utilized.

The law requires, and the judgment to be entered by the Court upon your verdict will provide, payment of interest by the Government to compensate the property owner for any delay in payment caused by the Government, after the date of taking. So, you are not to consider any delay in payment in arriving at your verdict, and you are not to include in your verdict any interest or other compensation for the delay.

INTERROGATORY	NO.

1.

(1) The jury finds, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the highest and best use of the property in
controversy on the date of taking to be:
(a) Residential subdivision development;
Yes No
(b) Mineral development;
Yes No
(c) Farm land;
Yes No
(2) The jury finds, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the best method of determining the market
value of the property in controversy on the date of the
taking to be:
(a) Market comparison (comparable sales);
Yes No
(b) Net income capitalization;
Yes No
(c) Cost or reproduction costs;
Yes No

(b)	Testimony of	realty exper	ct(s) alone;
	Yes	No	
	(If the answ	er to (d) is	"Yes", please
	list the nam	e or names of	such
	expert(s)):		
The jury	, finds by	a preponder	ance of the
evidence, that as	of February	26, 1991,	the date of
taking, the fair ma	arket value o	f the 100' x	100' lot of
land with its	improvements	of a ho	ome and an
apartment/office b	uilding owned	by the Def	endants, Kirk
Family Charitable	Trust, John	Wilson Ki	rk, Trustee,
William H. Kirk, Tr	ustee, and Be	rnice R. Kirk	r, Trustee, to
be:			
\$			·
(Not to e	xceed the sum	of \$	
nor less than the	e sum of \$, as
contained in the ev	idence.)		1
DATE:			
		TUDOD	
		JUROR	

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY PIKEVILLE

CIVIL ACTION NO. 91-62

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

PLAINTIFF,

VS:

ORDER

0.27 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS, ET AL.,

DEFENDANT.

* * * * * *

Assistant United States Attorney David Olinger having informed the undersigned's staff that the parties have agreed upon a trial date of January 20, 1993,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

- (1) the jury trial in the above-styled action shall be held on January 20, 1993 at the Pikeville Courthouse;
- (2) the trial having been postponed, the parties are given until December 4, 1992 in which to submit their proposed jury instructions and interrogatories.

This the 24 day of July, 1992.

G. WIX UNTHANK, Senior Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY PIKEVILLE

CIVIL ACTION NO. 91-62

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

PLAINTIFF,

VS:

ORDER

0.27 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS, ET AL.,

DEFENDANT.

The Court having been advised that certain witnesses will be unavailable on the August 13, 1992 jury trial date set at the pre-trial conference,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

- (1) the August 13, 1992 trial date is SET ASIDE;
- (2) the parties shall confer with their witnesses and among themselves as to the possibility of scheduling the trial at the Pikeville courthouse during the week of January 19, 1993; counsel shall inform the Court by telephone (606-878-2731) within five days of the date of entry of this order as to which dates are acceptable within the stated time frame.

 This the 22 day of July, 1992.

G. WIX UNTHANK, Senior Judge

Glerix Tenthank

United States District Court EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

<u>Pikeville</u> CIVII	L MINUTES —	GENERAL	July 17, 1992
Case No. 91-62 At London			
Style U.S.A. vs. 0.27 ACRES OF LA	AND, etc.,	et al.	
DOCKET ENTRY			
			<u> </u>
PRESENT:			
HON. G. Wix Unthank			
Shirley Denny	90 PM		THE PARTY OF THE P
Deputy Clerk			Court Reporter
ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFS:	Â	TTORNEYS PRESENT FO	OR DEFENDANTS:
David Olinger		Michael Lucas for 437-4029	Lawrence Webste
	ORDER		
PROCEEDINGS:	ORDER		
This matter was called parties present. The Court hadvised,	for pretria aving heard	al conference with I counsel and bein	above noted g sufficiently
IT IS ORDERED that thi Pikeville on August 13, 1992 their proposed jury instructi	at 9:00 A.M	1. The parties si	ISTI SUDMILL

This 17 day of July, 1992.

Copies:

Eastern District of Kentucky

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY PIKEVILLE

LESLIE G. WHITMER
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT

CIVIL ACTION NO. 91-62

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

PLAINTIFF,

VS:

ORDER

0.27 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS, ET AL., * * * * * *

DEFENDANT.

The parties having filed their status report of record,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

- (1) all pre-trial motions shall be filed within thirty days of the date of entry of this order;
- (2) the final pre-trial conference is scheduled for Friday July 17, 1992 at the hour of 1.00p.7M in the Magistrate's Courtroom in the basement of the London, Kentucky Federal Building and Courthouse; and
- (3) the parties are referred to the undersigned's previous order entered December 16, 1991 regarding the procedures related to said conference.

This the _____ day of June, 1992.

G. WIX UNTHANK, Senior Judge

How Tenthouks

Certificate of mailing: Lawrence R. Webster V. S. Attorney 6/2/92 mb

Lexington Clerk london Clerk

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C 111A Rev. 1/75)



	A SERVICE OF	CIVIL	DOCKET CONTINUATION SHEET		
PLAINTIF	F PIKE	3 91-62	DEFENDANT	PIKE 91-62	
UNITED S	TATES	OF AMERICA	0.27 ACRES OF LAND MORE OR LESS ETC ET AL	PAGEOFPAGES	
DATE	NR.		PROCEEDINGS		
1991 12/16	17	ORDER:(GWU) sig. 12/13/91 ent. CONTINUED other related matters, the undersign hereby incorps by ref stand ord of 4/29/83 formerly used by undersign when an active jduge in charge of Pikeville docket (5) The dep-incharge of Pikeville Clerk's office shall provide parties w/a copy of the undersign aforesaid std ord of 4/29/83; at same time copies of this ord are furnish; to aid the parties the clerk shall also furnish a copy of undersign updated ord of 11/6/85 regard intro of exhbs. COM. w/attach std orders of Judge Unthank.			
1992		1			
	*18	Rf#19 .			
2/18	19	line be & is extend no oth exts of time 4/3/92 in ord that the sched of pretrictions.	ORDER:(GWU) sig. 2/14/92 ent. ORD On joint mot parties ORD (1) tyhe disc dead- line be & is extend to & inc. 3/23/92; & (2) As the parties have as yet request no oth exts of time they are remind that a Stat Rept is due for fil on or bef 4/3/92 in ord that the undersign may assess whet any furth time is necess bef. the sched of pretrial conf. COM.		
4/23	20	ORDER: (GWU) sig 4/22 ent 4/23; (1) parties shall file status report w/Clerk of Court w/in 30 days of entry of this order to advise Court relating to above-referenced matter. COM			rt
4/29	21	U.S. MARSHAL's 285 forms RETURNED UNEXECUTED on 4/28/92 no acknowlegements received by KIRK FAMILY CHARITABLE TRUST, JOHN WILSON KIRK, TRUSTEE, WILLIAM H. KIRK, TRUSTEE, BERNICE R. KIRK, TRUSTEE, and JOHN WILSON KIRK.			
5/26	22	5/29/92.	U.S. Note Plead not sig. Signed	copy rec'd	mt
		Plea	se attach wt		
		atta	ch carried alone		

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY PIKEVILLE

CIVIL ACTION NO. 91-62 TRACTS NOS: 1045, 1045E-1 1045E-2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

PLAINTIFF,

VS:

ORDER

0.27 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS SITUATE IN PIKE COUNTY, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, AND KIRK FAMILY CHARITABLE TRUST, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS.

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

On the joint motion of the parties, and the Court having reviewed the record,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: (1) the discovery deadline be and is extended to and including March 23, 1992, and (2) as the parties have as yet requested no other extensions of time, they are reminded that a status report is due for filing on or before April 3, 1992 in order that the undersigned may assess whether any further time is necessary before the scheduling of the pretrial conference.

This the 14 day of February, 1992.

SENIOR JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY PIKEVILLE

CIVIL ACTION NO. 91-62

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

PLAINTIFF,

VS:

ORDER

0.27 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS, ET AL., * * * * * *

DEFENDANT.

Examination of the record has revealed that the parties have not filed a status report or reports in order that the undersigned may assess what further deadlines may be set and to determine when the pre-trial conference should be scheduled. Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

(1) the parties shall file a status report with the Clerk of this Court within thirty days of the date of entry of this order to advise the Court relating to the above-referenced matter.

This the _______ day of April, 1992.

G. WIX UNTHANK, Senior Judge

Glif Terthanh

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATESTERN District of Kentucky
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT PIKEVILLE

CIVIL ACTION NO: 77-167
TRACT NO: 307

AT LEXINGTON
LESLIE G. WHITMER
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
PLAINTIFF,

VS:

MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT ENTERED DECEMBER 29, 1983

251.93 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS, SITUATE IN JOHNSON COUNTY, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, AND BAPTIST CHURCH, ET AL,

DEFENDANTS.

Comes the United States, by counsel, and moves the Court to amend the Judgment entered herein on December 29, 1983 to credit the United States in the final Judgment with the sum of \$3,440.00, the salvage value of the improvements and the oil and gas payments received, as stipulated by the parties, and by the sum of \$11,872.27 in advance relocation payments, and to direct the United States to deposit into the Registry of the Court the difference between the final judgment and the deposit, the salvage value of the improvements and the oil and gas payments, and the advance relocation payments, plus six per cent (6%) interest thereon from the date of taking, April 1, 1977 until paid into the Registry of the Court, to satisfy the final judgment.

The Court is advised that the defendants, William and Hazel Turner, purchased the improvements at a salvage value of \$650.00 and received oil and gas payments of \$2,790.00 on property belonging to the United States. The parties agreed to stipulate said amount would be credited against the final judgment.

The Court is further advised that the defendants were paid \$20,773.00 in relocation payments based on the deposit of \$66,200.00. Based upon the judgment of \$179,200.00, said defendants are only entitled to relocation payments of

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\$8,900.73 and should remit the sum of \$11,872.27 to the plaintiff. Therefore, the United States moves the Court to amend the judgment of \$179,200.00 to credit the total sum of \$15,312.27 to the United States and direct the United States to deposit the difference between the final judgment and the deposit plus \$15,312.27, plus six per cent (6%) interest thereon from April 1, 1977 until paid into the Registry of the Court, to satisfy the final judgment. In support of this motion, plaintiff attaches hereto its Memorandum of Law. LOUIS DeFALAISE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY David Y. Olinger, Jr. Assistant U. S. Attorney

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY PIKEVILLE DIVISION Eastern District of Kentucky

JAH 16 1984

OBJOS

AT PIKEVILLE

LESLIE G. WHITMER

CLERK, U. S. DISTRICT COURT

CIVIL ACTION NO. 77-167 TRACT NO. 307

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

PLAINTIFF,

VS.

AMENDED JUDGMENT AND ORDER

251.93 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS, SITUATE IN JOHNSON COUNTY, ET AL.,

DEFENDANTS.

The defendant landowners, William Turner, Jr., and Hazel Turner, by counsel, have moved the Court, pursuant to FRCP 59(e), to amend the Final Judgment entered by this Court on December 29, 1983, to reflect that the landowners are entitled to interest at the rate of six percent (6%)

per annum on the total amount awarded in said judgment as

of the date of taking, pursuant to 40 U.S.C. §258(a).

The plaintiff has also moved the Court to amend its

Final Judgment to reflect the aforementioned interest, as

well as the stipulations to which the parties agreed in open

Court concerning the salvage value of the improvements and

the oil and gas payments received by the defendants. Plaintiff

also submitted that the Final Judgment should be reduced by

\$11,872.27, the amount of the excess Advance Relocation Payment

received by the defendant landowners.

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The Court has considered the motions of the parties, the memoranda filed in support of the parties' respective motions, and being so advised,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, as follows:

- 1. The Court adopts in its entirety the Final Judgment for the defendant landowners, William Turner, Jr., and Hazel Turner, entered by the Court on December 29, 1983, and said judgment is incorporated herein by reference.
- 2. The defendant landowners are entitled to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on the value of the land at the date of taking (\$179,200.00), less the deposit made by the plaintiff into the Court Registry of \$66,200.00.
- 3. The judgment of \$179,200.00 is now reduced by \$11,872.27, the amount of the excess Advance Relocation Payment received by the defendants.
- 4. The judgment is further reduced by the salvage value of the improvements and the oil and gas payments received by said defendants, as stipulated to by the parties in open Court, in the amount of \$3,440.00.
- 5. This Amended Judgment is a final judgment as to the defendants, William Turner, Jr., and Hazel Turner.

This the 1649 day of January, 1984.

Copies: Q-Cettified 3 attest

(18 Att)

Charles 9 Summan

G. WIX UNTHANK, JUDGE

My David Lemaster

Many Hembree

-2-

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKTStern District of Kentucky PIKEVILLE FILED JAN 09 1984 CIVIL ACTION NO. 77-167 AT PIKEVILLE

LESLIE G. WHITMER

CLERK, U. S. DISTRICT COURT PLAINTIFF, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, MEMORANDUM OF LAW FOR LANDOWNERS VS: 251.93 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS, SITUATE IN JOHNSON COUNTY, COMMONWEALTH DEFENDANTS. OF KENTUCKY and BAPTIST CHURCH, et al, * MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: The Judgment entered December 29, 1983 herein reflect ed the Court's findings and conclusions that the fair market value of the subject property as of the date of taking, April 1, 1977, was the sum of \$179,200.00. The purpose of the motion to amend the Judgment filed herein by landowners is to provide greater certainty, and to provide more specifically, the award of interest to landowners as required by 40 USC Sec. 258a and the Constitution of the United States. -1-1117

IN ADDITION TO THE PRINCIPAL SUM
OF \$179,200.00, WHICH THE COURT
DETERMINED WAS THE FAIR MARKET
VALUE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS
OF THE DATE OF TAKING, LANDOWNERS
ARE ENTITLED TO INTEREST ON SAID
PRINCIPAL AMOUNT FROM THE DATE OF
TAKING UNTIL PAYMENT PURSUANT TO
40 USC SEC. 258a.

The right of landowners to interest in addition to the award of the principal amount of the fair market value of their property as of the date of taking, is a matter of constitutional right and is further established by 40 USC Sec. 258a, which provides that upon filing of the declaration of taking the right to just compensation for the property taken vests in the persons who held title to the property, and further that "said compensation shall be ascertained and awarded in said proceeding and established by judgment therein," and further that:

"... the said judgment shall include, as part of the just compensation award, interest at the rate of 6 per centum per annum on the amount finally awarded as the value of the property as of the date of taking, from said date to the date of payment; but interest shall not be allowed on so much thereof as shall have been paid into the court".

40 USC Sec. 258a.

The government deposited into court at the time of the taking for Tract No. 307 the sum of \$62,100.00.

This Court by the Judgment entered December 29, 1983 determined that the fair market value of the property on the date of taking was \$179,200.00.

Accordingly, landowners are entitled to interest at 6% per annum on the difference, from the date of taking, April 1, 1977, until paid.

Although the provision for interest is made by federal statute, the right to interest emanates originally from the requirement of just compensation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constituion, and the corollary that just compensation must be full compensation. Case decisions which have recognized a constitutional right to interest in eminent domain proceedings include <u>US -v- 100 Acres of Land</u>, 468 F. 2d 1261 (9th Cir., 1972).

Scholars who have treated the subject include 3 Nichols, Eminent Domain, Sec. 8.63:

"... when land is taken by eminent domain ... payment ... should be co-incident with the taking or injury, and if for any reason payment is postponed, the right to interest from the time that payment ought to have been made until it is actually made follows as a matter of strict constitutional right."

Perhaps no more percise statement of the rule can be found than that provided in <u>United States -v- 355.70 Acres</u> of Land, 327 F. 2d 630 (3rd Cir., 1964):

"In deciding what is just compensation for a public taking of private property, courts normally determine and award the fair value of the property at the time of taking. But usually the taking occurs at the beginning of the condemnation proceeding, while the award comes at the end. This means that there is likely to be a substantial period during which the owner has neither his land nor equivalent value in money. In such circumstances, just compensation must include, in addition to fair value at the time of taking, an award for the intervening deprival. To supply this essential element of just compensation, Congress has required that the United States pay 6 per cent interest upon the value at taking from that date until the award is made and paid. 40 U.S.C. \$ 258a"

327 F. 2d at 632.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that a motion to amend the judgment under Rule 59(e) is a proper vehicle by which to correct the omission of a provision for interest in the original judgment. Gray -v-Dukedom Bank, 216 F. 2d 108 (6th Cir., 1954).

CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons landowners respectfully request this Court to enter appropriate orders and judgments to properly and clearly and specifically reflect the award to landowners of interest at 6% per annum, on the unpaid portion of the total market value of the property as of the date of taking, from said date of taking until paid. Respectfully submitted, DAVID LEMASTER ATTORNEY FOR LANDOWNERS WILLIAM TURNER., JR., and HAZEL TURNER 95 Main Street Paintsville, Kentucky 41240 (606) 789-6531 CERTIFICATION This is to certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing Memorandum of Law have been mailed to the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Kentucky, the Hon. David O'Linger, Assistant United States Attorney, Post Office Box 1490, Lexington, Kentucky 40509, the Hon. Charles Brennan, Department of Justice, Land & Natural Resources, Safeway Building, 521 12th Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20044, and the Hon. Mary K. Hembree, Attorney, Department of Justice, Land & Natural Resources Division, Ninth & Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20530, on this the 7th day of January, 1984, and that said service has been accomplished by mailing true and correct copies of same to the above said attorneys by United States Mail, postage pre-paid. -5-

ATTORNEY AT LAW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT District of Kentucky
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
PIKEVILLE

JAN 09 1984

CIVIL ACTION NO. 77-167

AT PIKEVILLE
LESLIE G. WHITMER
CLERK, U. S. DISTRICT COURT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PLAINTIFF,

VS: MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 59(e)

251.93 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS, SITUATE IN JOHNSON COUNTY, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY and BAPTIST CHURCH, et al,

DEFENDANTS.

* * * * * * * * *

Come now the landowners of Tract No. 307, William Turner, Jr., and Hazel Turner, by counsel, and respectfully move this Court, pursuant to Rule 59(e), to amend the Judgment herein entered on December 29, 1983 to provide specifically for the payment to said landowners of interest as required by law, in addition to the principal amount of \$179.200.00, fixed by the Court as the fair market value of Tract No. 307 as of the date of taking, April 1, 1977.

As grounds for same, landowners state that both as a matter of constitutional right, and pursuant to the mandate of 40 USC Sec. 258a, landowners are entitled to interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the total amount awarded as the value of the property on the date of taking, less the amount previously paid into Court, said interest to run from the date of taking until the date of final payment of the total amount.

It is obvious that this Court intended that the

Judgment provide for said interest in addition to said

principal. Thus, for greater certainty, said Judgment should

be amended to so provide and reflect the award of said interest

 $\label{eq:continuous} \text{In support of this motion, landowners hereto attach}$ their Memorandum of Law.

DAVID LEMASTER
ATTORNEY FOR LANDOWNERS
WILLIAM TURNER, JR., and
HAZEL TURNER
95 Main Street
Paintsville, Kentucky 41240
(606) 789-6531

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing motion to amend judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) have been mailed to the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Kentucky, the Hon. David O'Linger, Assistant United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Kentucky, Post Office Box 1490, Lexington, Kentucky 40509, the Hon. Charles Brennan, Department of Justice, Land & Natural Resources, Safeway Bldg., 521 12th Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20044, and to the Hon. Mary K. Hembree, Attorney, Department of Justice, Land & Natural Resources Division, Ninth and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20530, on this the 7th day of January, 1984, and that said service has been

accomplished by mailing true and correct copies of same to the above said attorneys by United States Mail, postage prepaid.

ATTORNEY AT LAW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY PIKEVILLE

CIVIL ACTION NO. 77-167

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY PIKEVILLE

CIVIL ACTION NO. 77-167

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Eastern District of Kentucky

FILFD

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CIRCLERK, U. S. DISTRICT COURT.

PLAINTIFF,

VS:

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

251.93 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS, SITUATE IN JOHNSON COUNTY, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY AND BAPTIST CHURCH, et al

DEFENDANTS.

* * * * * * * * *

The pleadings and evidence reflect, and the Court finds, that on or about the 1st day of April, 1977, the United States of America condemned and took 251.93 acres of land situated in Johnson County, Kentucky. The defendants, William Turner, Jr. and Hazel Turner, acquired title to Tract No. 307, consisting of 188.40 acres on Glade Branch, off Stone Coal, in the Volga Community, prior to the date of taking and were the owners and possessor of said property at said time.

The controversy was heard by the Court with an advisory jury. Upon the conclusion of the evidence and the return of special interrogatories by the jury, the Court requested of counsel, memoranda of points and authorities upon the appropriateness of such findings. The primary issue is the fair market value of the defendants' property on the date of taking, which consisted of land and improvements.

After considering the pleadings and evidence, together with memoranda of parties, the Court finds that the highest and best use for which Tract 307 was capable

and adaptable at the time of taking was residential subdivision development. The Court finds that the method of valuation for Tract 307 is the market data approach. The Court finds that 128.40 acres of the tract was timberland, which had a fair market value of Five Hundred (\$500) Dollars per acre; the tract contained 60 acres of cleared land which had a fair market value of One Thousand (\$1,000) Dollars per acre. The total fair market value of the land at the time of the taking was in the sum of One Hundred Twenty-four Thousand and Two Hundred (\$124,200) Dollars. The Court finds that Tract 307, at the time of taking, had the following named improvements thereon, with a fair market value as indicated:

(a)	Main dwelling house	FMV	\$52,000
(b)	Second dwelling house		13,400
(c)	Two-story barn		6,400
(d)	One-story Barn		2,000
(e)	Three Out-buildings (Each \$40	00)	1,200
TOTA	L FAIR MARKET VALUE OF I	MPROVEMENTS	\$75,000

The Court finds that to adapt the property to the highest and best use for which it was capable at the time of taking, it was necessary for the defendants to expend the sum of Twenty Thousand (\$20,000) Dollars. By reason of the taking the defendants were saved said expense and the plaintiff is entitled to deduct said savings from the fair market value of said property for its highest and best use at the time of taking.

The Court finds that the fair market value of the property and improvements at the time of taking, less said deduct, to be in the total sum of One Hundred Seventy-nine Thousand, Two Hundred (\$179,200) Dollars. The Court further finds that this valuation

is within the range of the valuations established by the testimony of the experts of the parties herein.

A judgment will be prepared and entred pusuant to this Memorandum Opinion and Order.

This 29+4 day of Secondary, 19 83.

Duy Cyrthan

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Whotie of Darid Lemaster
Grany Charles J. Burnan
Grany Gentleam & Grander
Mary Hembre

12/29/83

Eastern District of Kentucky
FILED
DEC 2.0 1983

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY PIKEVILLE AT PIKEVILLE

LESLIE G. WHITMER

CLERK, U. S. DISTRICT COURT

CIVIL ACTION NO. 77-167 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PLAINTIFF,

VS:

FINAL JUDGMENT FOR THE DEFENDANTS, WILLIAM TURNER, JR. AND HAZEL TURNER

251.93 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS, SITUATE IN JOHNSON COUNTY, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY AND BAPTIST CHURCH, et al

DEFENDANTS.

Pursuant to Memorandum Opinion and Order entered this date,

* * * * * * * * *

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

That judgment be and is entered for the defendants, Wiliam Turner, Jr. and Hazel Turner, declaring the total just compensation for the interests of said defendants in Tract No. 307, consisting of 188.40 acres on Glade Branch, off Stone Coal, in the Volga Community, said tract being a part of the 251.93 acres of land situated in Johnson County, Kentucky, the subject matter of the above named and numbred eminent domain proceeding, to be in the sum of One Hundred Seventy-nine Thousand, Two Hundred (\$179,200) Dollars.

The Court directs that the appropriate deposits be disbursed from the Registry of this Court, subject to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. 2042.

1115

This is a multple-party and issue action and the judgment herein is a judgment upon fewer than all the claims as to all the parties; however, there is no just reason for delay upon the issues as to these defendants. The judgment herein is a **FINAL JUDGMENT**.

This 29th day of Secondary, 1983.

2) Wey linthank G. WIX UNTHANK, JUDGE

Copies W/ notice) Mary Hembru

of Entry (Marlis J. Buennane)

Charles J. Buennane

David Lemaster

US. Atty - 2 Certified

+ 7 attest

12/29/83

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY PIKEVILLE 10-21-83

CIVIL ACTION NO. 77-167 TRACT NO. 307

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF,

V.

251.93 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS, SITUATE IN JOHNSON COUNTY, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, AND BAPTIST CHURCH, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.

FILED

OCT 21 1983

AT PIKEVILLE LESLIE G. WHITMER CLERK, U. S. DISTRICT COURTS

GOVERNMENT'S MEMORANDUM
WHETHER THE COURT SHOULD ACCEPT
THE FINDINGS OF THE ADVISORY JURY

Comes now the United States of America and for its Memorandum states:

I

The government endorses the advisory jurors advice that the market data approach is the correct method of valuation for Tract No. 307. The government also endorses the advisory jurors advice that the highest and best use of subject tract is not for mineral development. However, the government contends the highest and best use of Tract No. 307 as of April 1, 1977, was as a farm. This contention is founded on the following:

1. Present use of Tract No. 307 as of April 1, 1977.

Tract No. 307 has always been used as a farm. It was so used until

the present acquisition. It was purchased by defendant on the understanding it would be kept in the family. And it was so kept until the present acquisition.

The evidence is that a substantial amount of labor was expended by defendant in repairing the various farm buildings, fencing, and the farmhouse. This is consistent with the view Tract No. 307 is a farm. Mr. Paul Brown testified that when he inspected defendant's farm, defendant made no mention of the suitability of his land for subdivision. The evidence is abundant defendant Turner is sophisticated in regard to real estate matters; real estate appraisal; and condemnation practices - yet he did not mention any subdivision potential to Mr. Brown. The Courts tend to consider the existing use at the time of the taking as the highest and best use; and although there is no judicially declared legal presumption to that effest, the result is similar. United States v. Buhler, 305 E2d 319 (5th Cir 1962).

- 2. Physical characteristics of the subject property.

 Subject is about 67 percent wooded land. This wooded land is mostly hillsides. Only about 60 acres of Tract No. 307 are open and in the hollows and draws. Development of more than the 60 open acres on Tract No. 307 would cause extensive drainage problems that tend to inhibit development and sale of the wooded portion.
- 3. Access to the subject property. It is obvious the main.

 farm access was from Glade Branch Road and thence across Glade Branch
 Creek to the main dwelling on Tract No. 307. This access is a "red

dog" road. The large rocks thereof require careful maneuvering by traffic. The minor access near what defendant has called the "ball park" requires substantial improvement, which would remain a one-lane approach. This is because there is private property on both sides of this access between Tract No. 307 and the public road.

- 4. Location of Tract No. 307. Tract No. 307 is located in rural Johnson County, Kentucky, about 8 miles northwest of Paintsville. The evidence is uncontested that subdivision development in Johnson County is within a 1- to 2-mile radius of Paintsville and although there is some evidence of subdivision of 10- to 12-acre tracts in rural areas of the county, larger subdivided tracts do not exist in the general vicinity of Tract No. 307.
- 5. Farm value of Tract No. 307. The fair market value of Tract No. 307 is based on an agricultural highest and best use. The only land sales in evidence comparable to Tract No. 307 are those offered by the government and received in evidence by the Court. These sales clearly indicate the upper limit of fair market value as of April 1, 1977, was \$400.00 per acre or approximately \$75,000.00.
- 6. <u>Defendant's farm value evidence</u>. The only specific evidence defendant offered in reference to farm value involved the purchase of Tract No. 307 by Mr. Turner from his wife's uncle, Mr. Everett LeMaster, for \$16,000.00 in 1968 and the uncorroborated evidence of Mr. Turner that he spent \$100,000.00 to repair improvements of subject property. The expenditure to repair does not increase contributory value. It merely maintains that value. Further-

more, the cost of such maintenance may or may not be reflected in the fair market value of the property. But even if the alleged \$100,000.00 is added to the only agricultural land value in the case (submitted by Messrs. Brown and Knight) at approximately \$400.00 per acre, the outer limit of agriculture value Tract No. 307 could have as of April 1, 1977, would be \$175,500.00. Beyond doubt this sum exceeds the true fair market value of the subject property by a very significant amount.

Fair market value is the price which a purchaser, willing but not compelled to buy, and a seller, willing but not compelled to sell, would probably agree upon at the time of taking by the government.

<u>United States v. Miller</u>, 317 U.S. 369, 374-375 (1943); Olson v.

<u>United States</u>, 292 U.S. 246, 257 (1934). It does not necessarily reflect the amount of money invested in a tract of land.

The determination of the fair market value of Tract No. 307 should include consideration of the highest and best use for which the property is clearly adapted. By highest and best use is meant either some existing use on the date of taking, April 1, 1977, or one which the evidence shows was so reasonably likely in the near future that the availability of the property for that use would have affected its market price on the date of taking and would have been taken into account by a purchaser under fair market conditions. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1943). In determining the uses of which the property is cabable, it is necessary to have regard to the existing · demands or wants of the community, or such as may be reasonably expected in the immediate future. United States v. Foster, (CCA Iowa) 131 F.2d 3, cert. den., 63 S.Ct. 760; United States v. Buescher, CCA Iowa, 131 F.2d 3; Morton Butler Timer Co. v. United States, CCA Tenn., 91 F.2d 884; United States v. 3969.59 Acres of Land, (D.C. Idaho). Mere speculative, conjectural, imaginary, or remote uses, or value, cannot be considered. United States, ex rel. and for Use of Tennessee Valley Authority v. Powelson, N.C., 63 S.Ct. 1047, 318 U.S. 266, cert. den., 64 S.Ct. 612, 321 U.S. 773. There must be some probability the property will be used within a reasonable time for the particular use to which it is adapted. Wateree Power Co., C.A.S.C., 220 F.2d 226; United States v. Sanitary District of Chicago, C.C.A. Ill., 149 F.2d 951, cert. dismissed, 66 S.Ct. 94, 326 U.S. 687, and there must be a

present demand for the land for such purpose, or a reasonable expectation of such demand in the near future. Olson v. United States, C.C.A. Minn., 67 F.2d 24, affirmed, 54 S.Ct. 704, 292 U.S. 246.

The defendant has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, his claim as to the value of the land being taken from him by the government. United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 273 (1943); Wilson v. United States, 350 F.2d 901, 908 (C.A. 10, 1965); United States v. Sowards, 370 F.2d 87, 92 (C.A. 10, 1966); United States v. Evans, 380 F.2d 761, 762 (C.A.10, 1967); Welch v. T.V.A., 108 F.2d 95, 101 (C.A. 6, 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 688 (1939); United States v. 765.56 Acres of Land, etc., 164 F. Supp. 942, 949 (E.D.N.Y., 1958), aff'd sub nom; United States v. Glanat Realty Corporation, 276 F.2d 264 (C.A. 2, 1960).

In this case defendant contends Tract No. 307 is suitable for subdivision development as of April 1, 1977. The government disagrees. But for purposes of argument, Tract No. 307 will be examined from this point of view, in light of the above law.

- 1. Physical Characteristics. Tract No. 307 is inhibited for use as a subdivision by its physical characteristics. About 67 percent of the property consists either of rising slopes, ridges, creek beds, or mountain forest lands. Only approximately 60 acres is in hollows; that is, in open land, physically adaptable for subdivision in the reasonably foreseeable future.
- 2. Location and Access. Tract No. 307 is encumbered by location and access difficulties. The main access is approximately

8 miles from Paintsville, Kentucky, over a "red dog" type road. The uncontested evidence is that most subdivision development in Johnson County, Kentucky, occurs within a 1- to 2-mile radius of Paintsville; and, that such development enjoys access on high type, "all weather" roads.

- 3. <u>Size</u>. The uncontested evidence is that Tract No. 307 is about three times larger than the largest subdivision in Johnson County, Kentucky. This indicates 67 percent of the land area of Tract No. 307 is superfluous for subdivision development.
- 4. All comparable sales in evidence. The comparable sales offered and received in evidence on both sides of this case do not support the jurors' responses to the Court's interrogatories in regard to fair market value of Tract No. 307. Even if the 60 open acres on Tract No. 307 were valued at the highest rate of defendant's evidence, the value of that 60 acres would not approach these responses. It must be true that the steeper slopes and forest-covered lands of subject become increasingly less valuable as ridge tops are approached. This is due to problems and costs associated with homesite preparation in regard to leveling, clearing and drainage. Assuming a decrease in value for another 60 acres adjoining the open 60 acres, the remaining 68.4 steeply sloping and ridge top acres must surely be the least valuable on the property and worth only "forest" value.
 - 5. <u>Defendant's sales</u>. Defendant's sales should be given little weight in arriving at the fair market value of Tract No. 307. Those sales were significantly smaller in size then the subject

property. They enjoy superior topography. Many abutted or fronted blacktop roads or U.S. highways. Such sales command substantially higher prices than land, such as subject, that have inferior access and location. Moreover, these sales did not have the same highest and best use as Tract No. 307. For that reason alone they should not be considered. A subdivision lot sale such as used by defendant's witness, Mr. Weddington, has absolutely no bearing on fair market value even of land that may have potential for subdivision development. What is required to demonstrate that potential would be a sale or sales of about the same size, location, and access, that later developed as a subdivision. None such were offered. They do not exist in the neighborhood of Tract No. 307.

Witness Weddington's market sales were not comparable to
Tract No. 307 which consisted of 188.4 acres; his largest sale,
"Lemaster to RECA," being less than 2 acres in size. For this reason
alone (size), Mr. Weddington's sales should be given little weight.
Furthermore, the utilization of lot sales with separating the cost of
the development of such sales would result in the defendant's receiving
an award in which "cost to develop" the land would be included. The
Courts have specifically not allowed this. United States v. 47,3096
Acres, etc. in Oxford Township, Eric County, State of Ohio, and
Kenneth DeChant, et al., 583 F.2d 270 (6th Cir., 1978).

6. Mineral development affecting subdivision claim. The defendant's property was subjected to an oil and gas lease on the date of taking. The evidence showed that this lease restricted the

use of the property by its terms and conditions affecting the potential development of any subdivision as of the date of taking.

Any subdivision development would be prohibited for the tenyear terms of the lease and a larger period if the lessee (Columbia Gas) decided to develop the tract in question. The evidence showed that the defendants were accepting payments from Columbia Gas as of the date of taking.

- 7. The fair market value of Tract No.307. The government contends the lowest sum returned by any of the advisory jurors (\$204,000.00), in response to the Court's interrogatories, is more than \$100,000.00 above the true market value of the subject property, Tract No. 307, as of April 1, 1977.
- 8. Stipulation. The government stipulates that the defendants owe to the United States the sum of \$600.00 for salvage value for buildings, and the sum of \$2,790.00 for the payments received from Columbia Gas on the oil and gas lease after the date of taking.

CONCLUSION The government contends Tract 307 has a fair market value considered as an agricultural property of less than \$100,000.00 and that defendant's evidence does not justify a fair market value of the subject property in excess thereof. The government requests this Honorable Court to return an reward of fair market value based only upon the credible evidence in this case. Respectfully submitted, LOUIS DeFALAISE United States Attorney By: DAVID Y. OLINGER, JR. Assistant United States Attorney Post Office Box 1490 Lexington, Kentucky 40591 Attorney, Department of Justice Land and Natural Resources Division Ninth and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20530 rennan CHARLES J. BRENNAN Attorney, Department of Justice Land and Natural Resources Division Ninth and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20530 -10-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that the foregoing Government's Memorandum has been served upon the defendants by mailing a true and correct copy thereof this 21st day of October, 1983, to the following:

> Hon. David LeMaster 95 Main Street P.O. Drawer 272 Paintsville, Kentucky 41240

David Y. Olinger, Jr. Assistant U. S. Attorney

P.O. Box 1490

Lexington, Kentucky 40591

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
PIKEVILLE DIVISION
FILE D

NOV 2 1 1983

NO. 77-167 TRACT NO. 307

AT PIREVILLE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

PLAINTIFF,

VS:

LANDOWNERS' MEMORANDUM

251.93 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS, SITUATE IN JOHNSON COUNTY, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, AND BAPTIST CHURCH, et al,

DEFENDANT.

MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:

It is respectfully submitted that the government has, by means of its memorandum heretofore filed, furnished <u>no</u> valid or satisfactory reason for this court to ignore or reject the advice of the jury impaneled to assist in the determination of the fair market value of Tract No. 307.

The six separate valuations made by the jurors, ranging from \$250,000.00 to \$204,000.00, all were well within the range of expert valuation testimony adduced at the trial.

The <u>unanimous</u> determination of the advisory jurors that residential subdivision development is the highest and best use for Tract No. 307 is amply supported by competent, relevant, material, and highly credible testimony from various witnesses — a number of whom with many years of experience in developing similar residential subdivision property in and around Johnson County, Kentucky, where Tract No. 307 is located.

HIGHEST AND BEST USE

The jury was no doubt greatly influenced and impressed -- as any unbiased person who heard the evidence in this case could not have failed to be -- with the shocking and complete lack of information exhibited by the government's witnesses as to residential subdivision development in rural Johnson County in the vicinity of Tract No. 307.

The opinions on highest and best use of the government's witnesses Brown and Knight (that the property was suitable for agricultural purposes but not for residential subdivision use) were necessarily rendered largely worthless and incredible by the demonstration (and their own admissions) that each witness lacked even the most basic or fundamental information concerning the substantial activity, near the time of taking, in residential subdivision development of similar properties in the same general area of rural Johnson County as Tract No.307.

This observation is, of course, not meant to personally impugn either Mr. Knight or Mr. Brown (with both of which gentlemen the undersigned attorney for landowners is personally acquainted). Each is no doubt qualified to testify about a number of subjects. Yet, their respective surmises concerning the adaptability of, and demand for, Tract No. 307 as a residential subdivision area, were necessarily rendered highly questionable, and quite properly were rejected by the advisory jury, when each witness professed — indeed, demonstrated — a general ignorance of other subdivision developments on similar tracts in the vicinity, near in time to the date of taking Tract No. 307 (e.g., James Blanton subidvision, Ernest Vanhoose subdivision, Gary Endicott subdivision, ect., ect.)

Landowners must disagree vehemently with (indeed, are shocked by) the government's contention as to the law found at page 2 of the government's memorandum, that: "The courts tend to consider the existing use at the time of taking as the highest and best use".

To the contrary, landowners respectfully submit that the prevalent rule of law is as stated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (quoting and paraphrasing the US Supreme Court's Opinion in Olson -v- United States, 292 US 246, 54 S. Ct. 704, 78 L. Ed. 1236 (1934)), in the case of US -v- 1291.83 acres of land, more or less, 411 F. 2d 1081 (1969):

"It is settled law that the landowner is to be compensated for the fair market value of his property upon the basis of the property's highest and best use . . . in determining value the highest and most profitable use for which the property is adaptable and needed, or is likely to be needed in the near future, is to be considered . . .

. . . the sum required to be paid the owner does not depend upon the uses to which he has devoted his land, but is to be arrived at upon just consideration of all the uses for which it is suitable!

411 F. 2d at 1084, 1086.

The evidence as a whole is overwhelming, and clear and convincing (though it need, of course, only preponderate) that the subject property was easily and inexpensively adaptable to, suitable for, and needed for, residential subdivision use.

The evidence is uncontradicted that for some \$5,000.00 to \$10,000.00 only, a second improved access road from the Fish Trap highway to the subject property could have been fashioned, placing the access to this property on an equal or better footing than that of other subdivision developments in the area.

Lots could and would have been subdivided and sold for residential use, with little or no additional development expenditures by landowners.

As the record itself clearly shows, a key to this case (a central fact that the government, its agent, its lawyers, and its witnessess all have been unwilling or unable to acknowledge) is that in rural Johnson County in the vicinity of Tract No. 307 near in time to the date of taking, large or elaborate expenditures of money for paved streets, paved sidewalks, utility poles, street lights, storm sewers, sanitary sewers, and other such amenities simply were not required or customarily provided for successful subdivision developments.

The testimony of the witnesses Robinson, Weddington, Daniels and Endicott, introduced by landowner, furnishes more than ample justification for the conclusion that, at the time of taking, there was a strong demand for similar subdivision property in Johnson County, and that Tract No. 307 was suitable and situate and adaptable for that use.

The evidence shows without contradiction that enormous commercial activity took place in Johnson County in the 1970's, and in that decade the population increased at a rate of some 40% -- from 17,000 in 1970 to 24,000 in 1980. More land for residential use was needed in Johnson County at and about the time of taking. Landowners contemplated and planned such a use for their property, having had their engineer prepare a subdivision plat.

The record also demonstrates, abundantly, that the force of the testimony of the witnesses Robinson, Weddington, and Endicott is especially augmented by virtue of their years of practical experience, and personal financial investments, in residential subdivision development of properties similar to Tract No. 307 in eastern Kentucky, particularly in Johnson County.

The jurors' unanimous finding that residential subdivision development was the highest and best use of the property
was the one clearly compelled by the evidence. It is respectfully submitted that this finding should be adopted by this
Honorable Court.

VALUATION

The jurors' separate valuation verdicts reflected a range of from \$250,000.00 down to \$204,000.00 for the fair market value of Tract No. 307 on the date of taking, April 1, 1977. The average or median is in the vicinity of \$231,000.00.

Even the verdict of \$250,000.00 amounts to substantially less than \$1,500.00 per acre for this 188.40 acre tract. Yet, examination of a number of sales of comparable but less favorably situated tracts, alluded to in their testimony by landowners' witnesses, reveals per acre prices in the \$1,500.00 or higher range. With all adjustments properly considered, the range of evaluation opinion testimony adduced by landowners was \$329,700.00 to \$520,000.00.

Even the so-called comparable sales furnished by the government can be said to point to a fair market valuation above \$300,000.00 for Tract No.307. For example, the Ace's Creek Tract, which sold for \$22,000.00, was mainly of unusable land, "steep as a mule's face," as one witness put it. Only two acres of the Ace's Creek Tract was usable land, whereas, even by the government's grudging admission found at page 6 of its memorandum, at least 60 acres of the subject property is usable or, as the government concedes, "physically adaptable for subdivision in the reasonably foreseeable future." Consequently, Tract No. 307 contains some 30 times as much usable land as the government's Ace's Creek comparable sale. Simple multiplication reveals that 30 times the government's comparable sale price of \$22,000.00 is the sum of \$660,000.00. Viewed in this context, landowners' valuation witnesses range of \$329,700.00 to \$520,000.00 certainly must be seen as fair and reasonable.

Not to be overlooked is the fact that the government's valuation testimony assumed only agricultural use of the land, not residential subdivision development use. Both the government's valuation witnesses agreed and acknowledged that a change of use classification from agricultural to residential subdivision development will <u>increase</u> the value of the appraisal of the land.

The suggestion in the government's memorandum that \$100,000.00 would be a fair sum for this property <u>ignores</u> the uncontradicted evidence in the record that landowners spent more than that amount renovating the numerous buildings and clearing and improving the land prior to the date of taking. The government's suggestion also ignores the substantial evidence produced by landowners' valuation witnesses, supported by market data studies and comparable sales in Johnson County, placing the fair market value of the tract at between \$329,700.00 and \$520,000.00 on the date of taking.

CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that this Honorable Court should either accept and adopt the \$250,000.00 advisory valuation verdict, or, alternatively, enter judgment for landowners for a sum of not less than \$300,000.00.

Respectfully submitted,

DAVID LEMASTER ATTORNEY FOR LA

ATTORNEY FOR LANDOWNERS WILLIAM TURNER, JR., and HAZEL TURNER

95 Main Street Paintsville, KY 41240

(606) 789-6531

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that I have this date mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing LANDOWNERS' MEMORANDUM to the Honorable David Y. O'Linger, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Post Office Box 1490, Lexington, KY 40591; Honorable Mary K. Hembree, Attorney, Department of Justice, Land and Natural Resources Division, Ninth and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20530; and to the Honorable Charles J. Brennan, Attorney, Department of Justice, Land and Natural Resources Division, Ninth and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20530.

DATED: This the 21st day of November, 1983.

ATTORNEY AT IAW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCK

Case No. 77-167 At Pikerille	- TRIAL
Case Ho.	Date September 22, 1983
united States of america V5. 251.93	s aces, more or less, situate for of tentucky and
Style in Johnson County, Cammonwea	Lucker Commence
DOCKET ENTRY ORDER: Trial resumed. Out of was had pursuant to Rule 51. The jury re	of the presence of the jury, a conference
answers to interrogatories, finding for t	the defendants, William Turner, Jr., and
Hazel Turner. The plaintiff shall file m on whether the Court should accept the fi	
days, on or before October 21, 1983. The	defendants shall file responsive
memoranda within thirty (30) days, on or shall file reply memoranda within fifteen	(15) days thereafter, on or before
December 6, 1983, at which time the matter ation by the Court.	er shall stand submitted for consider-
PRESENT: HON. D. Xix Unotherk	HIDGE
	, JUDGE
M. Blwind. Deputy Clerk	S. Lindstrom) Court Reporter
ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFS:	ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTS:
Charles J. Grennan	David Lemaster
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David Olinger, Ja.	Eastern District of Kentucky
Catharine Redd	Eastern District of Tourish
	SEP 2 6 1983
	0.8/0.2
	AT PIKEVILLE LESLIE G. WHITMER CLERKI U. S. DISTRICT COURT
Case called and continued to	for trial.
advisorij	stors on September 19, 1983.
JURY TRÍAL The Jury impaneled and sworn io as fo	Howse 010 Age
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(1st Alternate) Introduction of evidence for plaintiff begun, and concluded to the continued to the continu	ATORIES Judy polled. Polling waived.
Introduction of evidence for plaintiff begun, and conclusion of evidence for defendant begun, and conclusion of evidence; Rebuttal evidence; Continued to	2nd Alternate) ded; greturns at 4.10 P.M. y returns at 4.10 P.M. ATORIES Jury polled. Polling waived. Defendant; for \$
Introduction of evidence for plaintiff begun, and conclusions of evidence for defendant begun, and conclusions of evidence; Introduction of evidence for defendant begun, and conclusions of evidence; Rebuttal evidence; Continued to	and Alternate) ded; suded; y returns at
Introduction of evidence for plaintiff begun, and conclusions of evidence for defendant begun, and conclusions of evidence; Introduction of evidence for defendant begun, and conclusions of evidence; Rebuttal evidence; Continued to	2nd Alternate) ded; greturns at 4.10 P.M. y returns at 4.10 P.M. ATORIES Jury polled. Polling waived. Defendant; for \$
Introduction of evidence for plaintiff begun, and conclusions of evidence for defendant begun, and conclusions of evidence; Rebuttal evidence; Continued to further trial. Jury retires to deliberate at 3.15 P.M.; Jury Percifer to delibera	2nd Alternate) ded; ded; y returns at \(\frac{\mathcal{H}}{100} \) \(\frac{\mathcal{M}}{100} \). \[\frac{\text{ATORIES}}{\text{Jury polled.}} \] \(\frac{\text{Polling waived.}}{\text{Defendant; for \$}} \] by \(\frac{\text{Plaintiff;}}{\text{Defendant.}} \) \[\frac{\text{Defendant.}}{\text{Reply}} \]
Introduction of evidence for plaintiff begun, and conclusions of evidence for defendant begun, and conclusions of evidence; Rebuttal evidence; Continued to further trial. Jury retires to deliberate at 3.15 P.M.; Jury Percifer to delibera	and Alternate) ded; suded; y returns at

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EAS IRN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

Pikeville CIVIL MINUTES -	TRIAL
Case No. 77-167 At Pikeville, TR. NO. 30	Reso, Situate in Johnson
Case No. 77-161 At Peterulle. TR. NO. SC USA V3: 251.93 acres, Man or Style County, Commonwealth of festi and Mazel Jurier	icky and William June, fr
ORDER: Trial resumed. Out of motion of the plaintiff for a directed ve This matter be, and hereby is, CONTINUED at 9:00 A.M.	the hearing of the jury, oral rdict, be, and hereby is, OVERRULED.
This t	he 22 haay of September, 1983.
G. WIX	Dut Uzufhanh UNTHANK, JUDGE
PRESENT: HON. H. Wix Unthank	, JUDGE
M. Bovens	S. Lindstrom
ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFS:	ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTS:
Charles J. Brennan	David Lemaster
Mary K. Nembre David Dlinger, Jr	Eastern District of Kentucky
Catharine Ridd	FII F
	SEP 2.2 1913
	OBIO2
Case called and continued to	for trial.
ad vectory	0 , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
JURY TORIAL The Jury impaneled and sworn is as follo	ws: on September 19, 1983
(1) (3)	(5)
(2) (4)	(6)
(1st Alternate) (2nd	Alternate)
Introduction of evidence for plaintiff begun, not concluded	
Introduction of evidence for defendant bogun, and conclude	d;
Rebuttal evidence;Surrebuttal evidence	0 11
Continued to 9-22-83 further trial, at	9:00 H.M.
Jury retires to deliberate at; Jury re	eturns at
Ordered Jury be taken to	; be lodged for night.
JURY VERDICT. SEE SIGNED VERDICT.	_Jury polledPolling waived.
JUDGMENT BY COURT forPlaintiff;	Defendant; for \$
Findings, Conclusions of Law, Judgment to be prepared by	Plaintiff;Defendant.
Copies: Charles J. Blennan Plaintiff Copies: Mary K. Hendres	Defendant Reply
Cothering Redd 69-2	3-83 Initials of Deputy Clerk AND 136
David Lemaster	101

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EAS_ARN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

CIVIL MINUTES - TRIAL

PIKEVILLE Date September 20, 1983 Case No. __77-167 At __P3
TRACT NO. 307 PIKEVILLE S_{tyle} United States of America VS: 251.93 acres, More or Less, Situate in Johnson County, Commonwealth of Kentucky and William Turner, Jr., ET AL DOCKET ENTRY ORDER: Trial continued and recessed at 9:10 A.M. in order for the Court to take the jury to view the subject property. WHEREAS, upon completion of the jury view, trial proceedings resumed at 2:00 P.M., with presentation of evidence on behalf of the defendant continued but not concluded. This matter be, and hereby is, CONTINUED to Wednesday, September 21, 1983, at 8:45 A.M.

This the 2/4 day of September, 1983. This the 2/s/ day of September, 1983.

S. WIX UNTHANK, JUDGE PRESENT: HON. G. WIX UNTHANK . IUDGE M. Bevins Deputy Clerk S. Lindstrom Court Reporter ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFS: ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTS: Charles J. Brennan Mary K. Hembree David Olinger, Jr. Catharine Redd David Lemaster Eastern District of Kentucky SEP 22 1983 AT PIKEVILLE

LESLIE G. WHITMER

CLERKI U. S. DISIRICE COURT ___Case called and continued to____ _ for trial. __COURT TRIAL ADVISORY (3) (4) (1st Alternate) __ Introduction of evidence for plaintiff begun, and concluded; resumed resumed Not concluded; ____Rebuttal evidence;____ ___Surrebuttal evidence ____X__Continued to __9-21-83 _____further trial, at 8:45 A.M. ___Jury retires to deliberate at ____ _____; Jury returns at ____ ____; ____ be lodged for night. __Ordered Jury be taken to___ ___JURY VERDICT. SEE SIGNED VERDICT. ___ __Jury polled. _____Polling waived. ___JUDGMENT BY COURT for ____Plaintiff; __ ___Defendant; for \$ __ _Findings, Conclusions of Law, Judgment to be prepared by ___ __Plaintiff; ____Defendant. __BRIEFS to be filed _____Plaintiff

Initials of Deputy Clerk __

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EA, ERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCK

Pikeville, CIVIL MINUTES -	TRIAL
Case No. 17-167 At Pekeville	Date September 19, 1983
1 1 10 000	
Or Lero, and Milliam Surn	V3: 25/. 9.3 acres, Mare en, Ju and Hagel: Turner
the jury being selected and sworn. Oral the jury to view the subject property, be jury will view the said property on Tuesd A.M. WHEREAFTER, upon completion of said CONTINUED for further trial proceedings.	for trial by advisory jury with renewed motion of plaintiff for , and hereby is, SUSTAINED. The ay, September 20, 1983, at 9:00 viewing, matter be, and hereby is
This the 20	day of September, 1983.
G. WIX UNVIIA	Unthanh
PRESENT: HON. G. 21 ix Unthank	, JUDGE
M. Bevens	S. Lindsteam Court Reporter
Deputy Clerk ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFS:	ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTS:
Thompson (Brownan)	David Lemaster
Mary Lathryn Henbru David Olinger, Ja	, G 0, G
David Olineer Jr	
Kathryn Redd, Corps.	Eastern District of Kentucky
of Engineer	FILE D SEP 2.1 1983
0	08102
	AT PIKEVILLE LESLIE G. WHITMER
Case called and continued to	for trial. CCERK, U. S. DISTRICT COURT
COURT TRIAL	
JURY TRIAL The Jury impaneled and sworn is as follows	ows:
(1) Melvina C. Hall (3) Loger Danes (2) Layle Dawahare (4) Ranald Lee	U Musick (5) Danny Ousley
(2) Dayler Dawahare (4) Donald Lee	, Kitts (Doris) Hall
	d Alternate)
Introduction of evidence for plaintiff begun, and concluded	d;
Introduction of evidence for defendant begun, not conclude	
Rebuttal evidence;Surrebuttal evidence	
Continued to 9-20-83 further trial.	t 9:00 A.M
	;be lodged for night.
Ordered Jury be taken to	
JURY VERDICT. SEE SIGNED VERDICT.	
JUDGMENT BY COURT forPlaintiff;	Defendant; for \$
Findings, Conclusions of Law, Judgment to be prepared b	yPlaintiff;Defendant.
SubmittedBRIEFS to be filedPlaintiff	Defendant Reply
Copies: U. S. atty Rold	
many Herebee	Initials of Deputy Clerk Ind
Dand Lemaster	(9-23-83) 134
Charles J. Brennan) mo 139

U' TED STATES DISTRICT COUP EA, FERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCK.

CIVIL MINUTES -- GENERAL PIKEVILLE

Case No. 77-167 At PIKEVILLE
TRACT NO. 307

Style UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS: 251.93 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS,
SITUATE IN JOHNSON COUNTY, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY AND BAPTIST CHURCH, ET AL

DOCKET ENTRY

Tastern District of Kentucky FILED

JUN 29 1983 AB 99

PRESENT:

HON. G. WIX UNTHANK

_, JUDGE

S. Lindstrom Court Reporter

Deputy Clerk

ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTS:

ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFS: David Olinger, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney

David Lemaster

Charles J. Brennan William Graham

PROCEEDINGS: PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE

The matter was called for proceedings with counsel present as noted. The Court heard counsel and being sufficiently advised,

ORDERED HEREIN:

- (1) Motion of plaintiff, in limine, to limit the evidence of the defendants as to the highest and best use of Tract No. 307, be, and hereby is, TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT;
- (2) The parties shall file proposed jury interroga-tories for consideration by the court, on or before July 8, 1983;
- (3) By agreement of the parties, the disclaimer of Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation, be, and hereby is, FILED this date;
- (4) On the court's own motion, this matter shall be tried by an Advisory Jury;
- (5) This matter be, and hereby is, CONTINUED to Wednesday, July 20, 1983, at 1:00 P.M., for trial, by Advisory Jury, in the United States Federal Courthouse, Pikeville, Kentucky.

This the $39 \pm day$ of June, 1983.

US atty G. Graham

Eastern Ly. Production Credit Exercise Johnson Country Sherif Johnson Country Country Court Clerk, Johnson Co.

Initials of Deputy Clerk MB

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY PIKEVILLE

Eastern District of Kentucky
FILED
July 27 1983

AT PIKEVILLE
LESLIE G, WHITMER
CLERK, U, S; DISTRICT COURT

CIVIL ACTION NO. 77-167 TRACT NUMBER 307

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PLAINTIFF

VS:

DISCLAIMER

251.93 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS, SITUATED IN JOHNSON COUNTY, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, AND BAPTIST CHURCH, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS

* * * * *

Comes Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation, by its proper attorney and disclaims any interest in any award herein based on its seven-eighths (7/8) working interest in its oil and gas lease on the subject tract being Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation Lease Number 67941 recorded in Lease Book 48 at Page 767 in the Johnson County Clerk's Office.

Attorney for Columbia Gas Transmission Corp.

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